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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, 1 will argue that the Aboriginal peopies whose traditional territories 
straddie the Canada - United States border have the rïght to pass and repass the border 
freely. Wfi this right cornes the ability to live andor work in either country without 
having to appLy for permission each time with Immigration officids. 1 have suggested 
that instead of Litigating these rights, the governments of both Canada and the United 
States shouid commence tri-partite discussions on how best to accommodate these ri-, 
both on an inte* basis and permanently through legislation- One of the measures that 1 
have suggested is a fom of identification that indicates the individuai biders of 
Aboriginai and Treaty rights to pass the border fieely. 
l have argueci that these mobility rights apply to the Aboriginal Nations who 
comprise the Wabanaki Confederacyt which includes the Mi'kmaq and Maliseet Nations 
who occupy present-day New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, 
Nedoundiand and Labrador, and Maine. It is rny position that these groups have both 
Aboriginal rights and Treaty rights to cross the border without interruption. Both 
AborÏginai Title cfaims and self-government daims by the above groups wodd aiso 
address the issw ofmobLIity within that same territory which Uicludes land in both 
Canada and the United States. 1 have also detailed my position with regards to who 
should benefit fiom these rights, and 1 have advocated for an inclusive dennition of 
"Aboriginal peoplen so that non-status Indians* off-reserve hdians and Metis people of 
both Canada and the United States are not Ieft out, 
In addition, certain h t e ~ * o n a i  treaties namely, the Jizy Treuty of 1794 and the 
Treuty of Gent recognized and guaranteed the "Imlian Nations" their right to cross the 
border h l y ,  and that the border was never meant to affect them. I have argued that these 
international treaties should be recognized as treaties to be protected under section 35(1) 
ofthe ColtStjtUtioon Act, 1982, in so fa as the s p d c  Artides address Indian nghts. Even 
if the Crown or the courts feIt that these intemationd treaties were not "deservedn of 
protection in that sense* the fiduciary duty that the Cmwn owes to Aboriginai peoples 
shouid mandate Iegislative recognition of the promises containeci in these treaties with 
regards to the border. 
The honor of the Crown deman& that trea~meat be afEorded to the Aboriginal 
peoples on this Continent calfed Turtle Island by its Fîrst Peoples. The Crown can not 
now in good niith refuse to recognize the very cights it promised to uphold so that tàey 
muid d e  this country for themselves. The Aboripind and Treaty rights with regard to 
border passage aIregdy exist, and it Îs tirne the Crown worked in partnership with 
AborÏgkaI people to fiditate these rights, instead ofrely on ütigation Iflitigation wilI 
continue to be the dennlt position for the Crown, then 1 h o p  this thesis adds to the 
position of our peoples. 
CHAPTER ONE: 
THE BATTLE INSIDE AND OUT: 
THE STRUGGLE FOR MOBILITY AND 
THE POLITICS OF WHO 
GETS TO GO. 
'LAttack them with your best courage and conduct and 
do your utmost to take, kiii and destroy them. .. By al1 
possible merns, fhd out, suppress, and destroy the 
Indian enemy."' 
INTRODUCTION: 
The focus of this thesis will be on N I A N  COUNTRY and our rights as the 
guardians of this temtory to pass freely over the border; the political iine of colonialism.' 
This Iand bas been Man Country &ce time immemorial, and wi11 continue to be 
viewed as such by the Aboriginal Nations of this Iand, despite the incredile hardships 
our peoples have endured and managed to survive, in order that they couid pass 
something better on to their children's children, seven generations into the fitture? The 
Aboriginal Nations of what is now cailed Canada and the United States, live on the land 
that we c d  TURTLE ISLAND. Since the European popuIations settied this land, 
AboriginaI Nations have been cheated out of their traditionai Iands, and some o f  those 
Nations no longer exist due to the bounties awarded by Europeans for their scalps. There 
- -  - 
' Letîers of Colonel Tiornas W h o k  and Othm - New England Ektory, ~01.47. Deremafter Lenm of 
Westbrook] (no page reference availabIe). 
' 1 am e t m g  this papa m my capacity as a studcnt at Diûhowîe University as a part of the recpkments 
to obtani my Maskis Degree in Law- The opinions and ideas expressed hereïn are my own unies 
otherwise stated and h no way repment the views of my emphyer the Department of Justice Canada. Iii 
addition, the views expmsed hereh do not reaect the vkws of my client the A h t i c  Regional Office of 
the Department of Iiidian and Northm AfWs Canada, 
PIeaic note that Som of the sources Iisad were obtained îhm the Conficienu'al Land CIaim and Treaty 
Files at the New B-ck A b o ~ ~  Peoples Cotmd @LEUP-C.) m Fredericton, New Bnmswïck. 
Permisslermisslon wa  btained h m  the -dent ofthe Organhtion ta use these documents m firrtherance of 
various Abonginai issnes- As a &t, the somccs do not dways have firll bÎbiiographîc material ayaf'tslbIe 
for the purpose offbotnotes and bibii~graphies~ 
was one singe European motto that rang out for aü AborÏguial people to heed, lest they 
choose to assi.Iate bto oblivion: 
BY A U  POSSIBLE MEANS, FIND OUT, SUPRESS, 
AND DESTROY THE INDIAN E N E W  
Even for those Aboriginal peoples who did sunrive European colonkation, their 
f i l i e s  and cultures were still attacked by European politics and values. Even today, the 
right to c d  oneselfan "Indian" is determïned by the Canadian governrnent through the 
Indian Act, RKS-C. 1985, c 1-5. Now, instead of being identifïed as a Mi'kmaq, 
Mohawk or Cree, the federd government has reserved unto itseif the right to pronounce 
which Aboriginal people in Canada are deserved of the nght to be called an "Tndian". 
This right confers upon the holder the right to iive on a resenre and receive various 
benefits under the I d a n  Act. Unfortunately, with this "priviIege" aiso carne domination, 
p o v w ,  loss of culture* discrimination, suicide and perhaps worst of ail, division among 
It is nom this social context that Aboriginal groups today are asserting thek rights 
and ütigating them in court. The path which has emerged h m  the courts is a case by 
case, Nation by Nation and right by right approach for determinmg the scope of 
Aboriginal rights. This creates difnculty in the sense that we only get one srnaII piece of 
the picture each t h e  a case is Iitigated, but for now, this bemg the set path, 1 wdl make 
my arguments for one aspect of aborigmaI ri@: mobiIity, for one srnaII part of  Tude 
Island- the Atlantic pVmces, and for one part of the Iarger Aboriginal groups in Canada; 
the members of the Wabanaki Confederacy. It is fkom this political context that 1 plan to 
make rny arguments for an Aboriginai nght to cross the Canada - U.S. border. 
It is my submÏssion that the Aboriginal Nations which have traditionaiIy lived on 
or near the Canada-US. border have a nght to cross the border unmolested, for traditional 
purposes. By traditiod purposes I do not refer to a "fiozen rights" concept whereby they 
codd oniy cross the border to hunt deer with stone tooIs. I believe that every culture has a 
right to evolve aad thus a modem evolution of their rights wouid include bave1 by car to 
visit family or attend a pow wow or many other activities. These purposes incIude 
travel for hrmting, work, cdtrnal gatherings and other ceremonial pqoses. This right 
should also inchde the right of fke passage for the purpose of choosing to live in either 
country to be with family or to start a new famiIy. A related nght wodd be to import 
goods tax and duty-fke for the purposes of persoual consumption or for consumption by 
the traveler's family. 1 have chosen to deal with the mobility issue as a separate issue 
fiom the importation of goods due to thne and space Iimitations. 
It is my assertion that the member Nations of the Wabananki Confederacy have a 
right to cross the border unmolested for the p q o s e s  listed above. When I Say 
'immolested" I am using the concept as it was used in the earIy treaties of the 17007s 
which were signed with the memba nations of the Wabanaki Confederacy. The treaties 
and promises made by the Crown mcIuded rights for Mans to go about their activities as 
they have always done with the promise that they would be left done or "unmolested" by 
either the settiers or representatives ofthe C m  Today, this t a m  wodd be baianced 
wi& the C m ' s  right to pmtect its bord- and codd mean that some fom of 
identification codd be ased to detemine the beneficiaries of such a bord~crossing right, 
as opposed to behg detained at the border, forced to attend unmigration hearings or 
nIling out numerous fom. 
The identification to be used at the border to signify Aboriginal border crossing 
rights, codd be an agreed list of cards that w o d d  be acceptable to both the AboriginaI 
peoples and the Ihmigration officials, such as status car& or membership cards for 
Abonginal o r g h t i o n s  such as the New B M c k  Aboriginal Peoples CouuciI who 
represents status and non-status Indians Iiving off reserves. A sirnilar process exists for 
other federd organizations such as the Department of Fishen-es and Oceans to iden- 
Aboriginal fishers. Another form of identification might dso be worked out whereby 
membership iists are supplied to h tgrat ion  for them to issue speciai border cards. It is 
not acceptable to many in the Aboriginal community to go through the current process as 
it exists under the Immigration d e s  and policy. Some of our traditional members would 
take offense to signing declarations a s h g  the goverment to accept a traditionid 
marnage as the basis of the nght to cross the border. They do not wkh to have to ask for 
permission to cross the border on a reguiar basis. They wish to assert the right îhey 
akady have, as one based on Aboriginal rights, as recognized by the J i  TreaM and not 
one which stems h m  modem day mimi-gration Iaws. In the end, it is not the form of the 
identification that is sigrdicant, but the recognition of the right itself. 
Due tu tirne limitations, this paper will not ded with such issues as the right to 
miport h a r m s  or tax-fiee goods for the purpose of commercial sale. 1 wiU base my 
arguments on various aspects of AborigÏnaI rights hclruimg "ternational treaties", 
Indian treaties, Abonginai rights and negotiated rights incidental to Aboriginal titie and 
self-gove~11nent~ I have written this thesis with the hope that it may prove to be of benefit 
to those Aboriginal Nations who have difncdties traversing the Canada4J.S. border in 
the+ attempts to work, visit theu familes, participate in cultural activities or other 
traditional activities. Whiie some of my arguments codd be applied to other 'border" 
ûiies who rnay aiso be able to establish Aboriginal rights with regards to crossiag, I have 
Iimited my arguments to the specinc state of the Wabanaki Confederacy and their 
pdctiiar treaties and cultuml traits7 etc. 
This issue of border crosshg is especially relevant to the members of the 
Wabanaki Confederacy whose member Nations occupy the present-day Atlantic 
provinces and Maine. 1 wilI assert that these groups have an Aboriginal right to pass 
fieely over the Canada - United States border. One of the most contmversiaI sources of 
this nght cornes nom the J i  Treap of 1794 and the promises that were made to the 
Aboriginal Nations about £iee passage over the then newIy formed border. While the 
courts have not recognked the J i  Treaty as an international treaty that has been 
incorporated into o u .  law today, the= remains the unresolved issue of the Crown's 
promises made to the Indian Nations so long ago. It is my assertion that not only do the 
Iater Indian treaties serve to reinforce those earlier promises, but the provisions of the J i  
Treaty dealing with the rÏghts of Aboriginal peoples shodd itseifbe reçognized as an 
Indian treaty. At a minnnum, the Jay Treafy provides evidence of an Aboriginal right to 
cross the border, 
TIiere are modem ways ui which to correct the problem ifthe court was so 
mched to protect the interests of Aborigmal peopIes. It wodd be unconscionabIe to 
d o w  the Crown to benefit h m  the promises made by the Indians to rehïn fkom 
hostiiities, while at the same time failing to Iive up to their own promises to the uidians of 
fiee border passage. The Indian Nations relied on these promises to theu detriment, in the 
sense that they refhbed fiom attacking, oniy to have the Iaw recognizing these Bghts, 
revoked years Iater. In addition, Aboriginal title claims in the same area add strength to 
the quest for fk passage based on AbonginaI title rights over the land and the 
conesponding right to govern within those Abonginal temtones. 
The case Iaw tends to deai almost excIusively with the "legal" aspects of 
Aboriginal rights and the Iegai reasons why justices decide in favor or against the indian 
Nations seeking affirmation of a paaicular right. Recent decisions have corne a Iong way 
towards understanding and developing unique methods by which to asses these claims 
and give vaiidity to the modem-day exercise of them. The= is an inherent Limitation on 
these cases, as the judges mua base their decisions on Iegislation, common law, property 
Iaw and contract principles, in order to resolve Aboriginal issues, as the Canadian justice 
srstem expects of them. It is this very system of Justice, which uses foreign languages, 
vaiues, d e s  and laws to adjudicate Aboriginal issues that underlies the erratic way in 
which courts have dedt with Aboriginal people and our issues. They have recognized that 
the issues are sui  genenk, yet still rely heaviiy on the very common Iaw concepts they 
wam about. In the end, the suigenerik principle is just another Iegai principle and needs 
ütigation to be put to any use. WhiIe the prtcpose of this paper is to present possiaIe Iegd 
argummts why Wittlanaki members shouid have the rÏght to cross the border, it is 
miportant to understand that there exkts many other views in the Abonginai comme@ 
as to the spintPaI and cuIanaI sources of such a right, which is not the focus of this thesis- 
ABORIGZNAL MOBIZITY 
K€UT IS MOBIUTYFOR US? 
This thesis wilI begin with an introduction to the concept of Aboriginai mobility 
withul the Wabanaki Confedemcy. This introduction is followed by an explanation of the 
politics of Aborigind issues and who gets to benefit fkom positive court decisions. Too 
o h  Aboriginal issues are cast in light of the theoreticai legal arguments and neglect the 
very people they most affect. Once a decision has been handed down h m  the Supreme 
Court of Canada, the idea is that now the Crown and Aborigind people wiU sit down and 
work out a process by which to implement the particulars of the right The question of 
who gets Ieft out of the bargaining process is either ignored or lefi out, with claims that 
this issue is too cornplex. There are groups which are habitudly left out, including 
Aborigind people who Iive off reserve or do not qualify for status unda the Indian Act as 
an "InciÏan". While 1 can not spend much time solely on this issue, it wil1 be included in 
the anaiysis of court decisions and possible solutions for the hture. I will attempt to 
present this thesis in my own voice and do aot profess to be the voice for ail Abotiginal 
people. Just as other peopIes around the world have dinéring views within their own 
culture, so too do AboriginaI peopk differ on many poIitica17 social and legd issues. This 
is a positive aspect ofour peopies and 1 o d y  desHe to add to the discussion- In the end, I 
hope that we can work through a solution to the problem of fiee passage over the border 
for the benefit of those AboriginaI Nations who iive near, work or travel over the border 
that is inclusive of the Abon@ people affected. 
There are certain characteristics of Aboriginal Nations which appear to be 
common lmowledge among anthr~pologists~ ociologists, archaeologists, historians and 
anyone who has researched h to  the ways of life of different Aboriginal people. Some of 
the more common traits ÏncIude EMng in Iarge extended families, living off the lands and 
the seas as hunters and gatherers, and following either nomadic or semi-nomadic lives. 
For the most part, each Nation or alliance of Nations had their own particuiar temtories in 
which to hunt and fish. Sometimes wars wouid change the temtories and sometimes the 
Nations moved according ta the ability of the land to sustain them. Some Nations lived in 
one place in the summer months and other places in the winter months, whereas others 
just moved accordhg to food supplies or alliances. There are various sources for this type 
of anthwpo iogical and historical information and o h  experts prepare reports for court 
about the particuiar Nation in iïtigation. Aboriginal people lmow their histories through 
the oral stories told by their elders which are passed down fkom generation to generation. 
The non-AboriguiaI researchers know this Somation thmugh their various studies 
which ùiclude absenring gmups and documenting cuituraI traits and Ianguages and other 
characteristics. MobiIity, was no doubt the key to suMvai for many Aboriginal Nations 
as a part of adaptability and the slow evoIution or progession of t h e  witbin a cdture. 
The purpose of  my paper is to present the IegaI arguments for fiee passage over the 
border. Due to time and space limitations, 1 can not present an archeaoIogid or 
anthropoIogicd overvÏew of the varbus Nations of the Wabanaki Confederacy other than 
to reférbrieffy to examples of the type of hÎstorÏcaI evidence that wouId be r e f d  to in 
litigation. That kind of in-depth historicai research wodd be necessary for fidirre 
Iitigation in order to support the Iegai assertious with regards to estabIishing Aboriginal 
nght~. 
What mobility means to us spans over thousands of years of traditional usage of 
our lands which we know has been done since tune ïmmemoriai. WIde each of out 
separate Nations may have had Merent terrïtories, we were neighboa and as such 
traveled this common territory for trade, intemarriage and warfare. The traditio~d 
temtories of the Mi'kmaq, Maliseet, Passamaquoddy and Penobscot comprise the areas 
of what are today refened to as Maine, New Bnmswick, Nova Scotia, PEL, 
Newfoundland and Quebec. Our elders tell us of ancient travels over temtories that 
wouid now span territory in both presentday Canada and the United States. 
Unfommateiy, I wÏlI not have the time to include an anttvopoIogicai or ethnohistoricd 
background on alI the member Nations of the Confederacy. Obviously, in any hture 
Iitigation the specinc group asserthg mobility rights wouid have to cornpiete mch a t e  
but for my purposes, I wÏlI use the ='kmaq as an example and present a brief ovenriew 
of evidence relating to tenitory, trade and traveI. 
The Mi'kmaq peopies were considered by anthropologists and other sociaI 
scientists, to be part of the Maritime Archaic tradition which dates back fiom 7500 to 
3000 years aga These peoples of which the M Ï k a q  were a part, relied prbady on 
marithne resources for SlIlYivai. Many arc6aeoIogists consider that th& territories dong 
with the other mies of the Confederacy spmed an area îÏom northern Labrador to 
Maine. Later archaeoIogicaI nnds contabed evidence of trade as between Nations ni this 
ares Trade items mcluded both procîucts made Gont ivory tusks of sea mamais  and 
tooIs flaked h m  distinctive stone? One pdcdar site in northeastern New Brmswick 
refet~ed to as the "Augustine Mound" contained evidence that these peopIe ". . . were in 
contact with reiiipw idem and cmemonialpractr'ces f omjàr to the south. " These 
items were unmistakably not local: 
Stone artifacis interred with the dead nichde largefinel'y 
flokedpoints and hives, gorgets (potirhed stonependan~. 
perforateedfor wemng on the chest). and pipes. Man. 
wealth goocls were made of raw matmals not available 
locally, the most spectaculm of which wme rhousanh of 
rolled copper beau3 and inipCements of nntive copper. a 
raw material obtuinedfiom the western Great Lakes 
region. ' 
The artifcts and bu~t~aipractices indiccite affilation with 
the Adena culture far to the s d ,  with its centre in the 
Ohio VuIley. [O 
It is this kind of evidence that would be used to assert that the Aboriginal peoples 
of the maritime area, later rnembers of the Wabmaki Confedemcy, had trade contacts and 
religious affiliations with peoples far to the south into present day United States. Groups 
iike the Mi'krnaq and MaIiseet continued their relations with Nations h m  the United 
States through the Confederacy and were most strongIy ailied with the Penobscot of 
Maine. Interestingiy enough, today, whiie the fkderai govemment has placed most 
Mi'kmaq on reserves in New Bnmswick and Nova Scotia, a Iarge concentration of 
Mi'kmaq remab in Boston. Even m modern times, many Mi'kmaq people have remained 
transient or mobile and continue to traveI, work and live on both sides of the border, so 
' k D. McMÎih, N i e  PeopIés and Cu~tures of Canada (Vancouver: McMùlan, 1988) at 31-53. 
[h- Mc;Mi/hJ 
' BUi, at 38. 
16rif, 
much so that the concentration of Mi'kmaq in Boston is considered to be Iarger than the 
concentration fond  on most of the Mi'Iunaq reserves in the Maritmies." There wiII be 
littie trouble substantiating the daim that the member Nations of the Wabanaki 
Confederacy traveled the border area for political, social and ceremonial, as weil as trade 
reasons. Their history spans thousands of years on this continent, since time 
immemorial. " 
A lecent court case deaihg with the Abonginai nghts of Mohawks with regards to 
the borda addressed the issue of trade and how this impacts the analysis of the possible 
Aboriginal rights. One significant finding by the trial judge in Mitchell v. Canada 
(Minister of National Revenue - M.NX)*', was the fact that trade was Found to be 
integral to the Mohawk culture. The evidence h m  ancient village sites indicated that 
trade started at about 3,000 B.C. and dennitely by 300 B.C. The interestïng factor m the 
trade evidence was who and where they traded, which Ïncluded a mde route eastward to 
the Atlantic Coast for marine-shell beads. The focus of this thesis is on the Nations that 
inhabit the Atlantic Coast area and Maine, which include the member Nations of the 
Wabanalà Confederacy. WhiIe the judge fomd that the trade may not have been on as  
Iqe  a scaie as it was for the Hurons, it was enough to be considered of 'Wai 
importance" to their culture." For the ptirpose of this thesis, 1 wilI use this kind of 
evidence in my anaiysis of the AborÏpinai rÎghts of t ~ s  group as  a whoIe. 
- 
[O 16ii 
" Ibid- at 52-53, 
lZ R v. Y i  der Peet, Cf 99q 2 SC& 507. bereniafter Yi derPee& 
" Mitchell v. Cmada (Minater of N m a l  Revenue) 099n 4 C N L X  103. (Fed. TD-)@eremafter 
Mitciiefl, mu& 
" Ioid- at pam tO8- 
The question which is yet to be answered is how this type of information wouid 
be treated ifit were submitted as evidence to establish a claim of border crossing rights 
by an Aboriginal group. What ifthe Mmt Nations of  the Wabanaki Confedemcy 
asserted as an Aboriginal right, the right to be nomadic or semi-nomadic? It does not 
sound iike a nght which has farreaching implications such as an Aboriginal nght to 6sh 
or hunt or clah a certain ami of land. On its face, it would appem that if a Mi'kmaq 
person or an Abenaki person wanted to iive in one place in the winter and another in the 
SuLIlIller, they would simply go ahead and do it as an exercise of their ancient traditions. 
By cornparison, many Canadians have winter homes and summer homes or fiy to hotter 
places in the winter and stay at home for the sumer. Very few peopIe wodd deny a 
New BnuwKick'er the right to move to Nova Scotia h the summer and Horida in the 
winter. The onIy limitation for these Canadiau citizens, is that they must go through 
Immigration as dl international traveIers must. By cornparison, Canadians have a right to 
have1 within their own geographical temtory, free h m  restrictions based on provincial 
borders. An individual couid have a crimind record and that wouid not supercede his or 
lier right to traveI k I y  within his or her Canadian territory. Aboriginal peoples are 
asking for no less than the right to traveI kely within their traditiona1 territory, which 
mcludes [and In both the United States and Canada 
Canadian citizens derive theit right to Ieave and return to Canada h m  the 
speciflc provisions of the Irnmi,gration Act which details who has thÏs rïght of mobility. 
AboriginaI peoples have an additionai protection of theu rights: constitutiomd protection 
of theg aasfiog AborÎgUiai and tre,aty nghts, Providing that they could show that they 
have an existing Aboriginal or Treaty right of m s s  border movement, these rights codd 
not be so easily restricted under the Immigration Act without justification and 
consultation. Non-aboriginal Canadiam do not have this added protection and therefore, 
it folIows that the d e s  would be different as between Abonpinal peoples and Canadian 
citizens. 1 wiii argue in my the's that Aboriginal peopks do have this right and its 
constitutional protection mandates a dinerent set of rules for Aboriginal peoples. 
The individual Nations of the Wabanaki Confederacy wish to exercise their 
traditional modes of mobilïty, yet are experiencing Immigration problems gohg back and 
forth over the Canada - United States border. 1 am not suggesting that Canada open up its 
borders to aU peoples without restriction. The Crown has a valid right to protect its 
citizens by rnaintaining controI o v a  the border, but this right must be baianced by the 
Aboriginal rights at issue. The Supreme Court of Canada in V i  <ler Peet, supra, hhas 
aiready held that Crown sovereignty must be reconciled with the Aboriginal and Treaty 
rights. It follows then that those Crown interests must also b e  baianced with Aboriginal 
rights which relate to free passage over the border. The Crown's legislation must not 
hfihge the nghts of Abonginai peoples protected under the Comtitution Act without 
justification, possible compensation, consuItation and minimai impairme~d~ 
While the Federal Govenunent has Iegislated certain ''ririgh' for status Indians 
under the Imigraton Act, the scope of these rights are yet to be de tadned  There also 
remai& the intere~f~ of non-status Indians and Metis with regards to cross border 
movement that are not specifTcaIIy dwlt with under the l i i g ~ o n  ~ ~ c t , ' ~  It is notabie 
'* R v. Spmow, El9901 1 S.CK 1075. -Spmm+jE 
" 1 hpve chosen not to mchde the Iiiint, as they are nonhem peopIes who have not occupied territorles îhat 
pppii the southem Cana&Ui&d States borda areas- As the basis ofmy thesis t e k  on bra&onaL usage 
of the area, this wodd ody indude what have beenreferred to as border t n i  such as the Mohawk and 
that these rÎghts were IegisIated without regard to the différent rights which may exist as 
between border and aon-border trrcbes, 
By individuai accomt, the problem until recently, has not been with the United 
States border as they used to let Canadian Indians back and forth to Live work or visit 
without having to have au &en card or green card, without having to register at the post 
onice as an aiiea, and without having to obtain work authorization. However, in recent 
times the US. border has been more struigent about the exportation of tobacco and other 
sellable items and also travel generally. Nonetheless, there has been Linle problem with 
Canadian Indians going back and for& to Live, work or visit in the United States. The 
problem appears to be at the Canadian border, with Canadian officiais refiising io let 
American-bom Indians back and forth over the border without a great deal of paperwork, 
if at aIL" The Canadian government appears to be taking action based on the citizenship 
of the p a o n s  as Canadian or Arnerican and ignoring their membmhip in their own 
particular Aboriginal Nations and that of the Wabanaki Confederacy. Subject of coune to 
issues of national concem, associations with terrorist organizations and 0th- such safety 
issues, I will argue that the members of the individuai Nations which make up the 
Wabanaki Confederacy have the right to pass fkely over the Canada-U.S. border to Iive, 
work and travel regardes of theîr citizenship as Canachns or Americans. 
tEie me& Nations of the W a b e  Confederacy. At the same the- 1 do aot wish ta be seen to exclude 
t6em fiom any fbture c h h s  in tEmt regad L have also not d d t  with the Abonpinal peopk who iive m 
Maska and my possiife arguments they rnay have to cross the borders due to time limitations m my 
the&* 
" Facts   bout rheJay Treotyfor Cmadiim-Born Narrive A ~ m r k m ,  O-e: Wabanalri Legal News 
Homepage h t t p J / w w w . p t f ; t . o r p / w a ~ v ~  (visite& 13 Noveniber 1998)- Pi& Tree Native 
AmmeLIcan Unit M97, See aIso I m p ~ r t a n t ~ n f ~ ~ m O t t f o ~  Cànadi'm-Born N i e  Amen'cans: Cmss Border 
Righ& ontlne: Wdanaiii Legd News Homepage hm.J/u~wnr.~tiaofe/wabanakr/info 98.htm - *  9 (vislted 13 
The question of '*ho we are" is more a question of politics, than it is what we 
mean to each other as the Fust Peoples of this continent. This is a sad situation to find 
ourselves in, but I ais0 r e a e  that we have evoIved to this position as a resdt of 
tremendous hardships, racist govemment policies and decades of suffering and isolation 
nom ourselves and our traditional ways of Iife. At the same tirne, we have to take 
responsibility for our children and our cdtures and sincerely try to focus on whit is 
important about our StnrggIe and set aside the discrimination which exists among some of 
us due to ignorance, greed and petty politics. When 1 Say petty politics, 1 do not mea. our 
organization into groups to advance our causes particular to our temtories or Nations. I 
fully support this type of advocacy to advance our causes on the potiticd @ont. What 1 do 
not support is the divisions within our own Nations that would see us see women's issues 
as separate fkom children's issues and family issues and men's issues or community 
issues as a whoIe. There are aiso divisions that reIate to who7s farnily is in power at the 
band IeveI. The worst division is among not only the Federai Govemment, but ais0 our 
own AborÏginal politickm who profess to decide who c m  be considered an AborigÏnal 
person based solely on their own seKinterest without considering the issue in its entirety 
and deciding what will be best for the future generatiom. Until recently, this has included 
fimiting the voting pool. The Supreme Court of Canada in Corbiere Canada (Mhirter 
of Indimz Affaits and Nortlim ~evelopment)). heId that section 77 of Indiun Act whic6 
deaIs with the prevention ofoEreserve manbas h m  votmg on Band ma- offended 
' Corhkre v.. Canada (Minkter of lirdimr andNorthen Affairs) [i9991 S.UC No24 (S.C.C.), online: QL 
(S.C.J.), mefemaftef Corbiere], 
section 15 of  the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. With regard to off-reserve 
band mernbers, the court explaineci: 
In the context of this vulnerable group. and these important 
interests, tlik distinction reinforces the stereolype that band 
membms who do not lnte on resenres are "less Abonngrnal', 
and less valuable members of their ban& than dose who 
do. A remonable person in the position of the claimants, 
firi& opprised of the contert, wouid see the dzferentiaal 
treuiment contained in S. 77(1) us suggesting that off- 
reserve band members are Iess worrhy or valuabLe as band 
m b e r s  and members of Canadian society, and giving 
them less concem. respect and conrideration than band 
members living on resetve. I9 
There seems to be a prevailing fear amongst sorne of us that if we open our 
cornmunities to those who have been forced to separate h m   the^ reserves or for those 
who never had the benefit of  close relations with families members due to adoption, 
Ministeriai apprehension of children or by birth, or the hdim Act, that somehow 
everyone h Canada wouid be able to claim they were an "Indian" and ai1 would be Iost. 
In reaiity, 1 do not think the statistics bear that doomsday prediction out Currentiy, 
Abonpinal people are projected to comprise 2.7% 'O of  the population, according to 
Statistics Canada To pose that everyone one of that two percent has had relations with 
the other 98% is more than incredtûous. I can't Unagine why they wouid want to make 
arguments to support the Federai government's defcinition of who we are as First PeopIes 
and members of  Aboriginal Nations. Certaidy being defhed as "...a person who 
* Ibid- at 120, 
Cana& Report of the Royal CommisPson on Abortjjai Peuples.- Lookmg Fornord, Looki~g Back; VOL 1 
(Ottawa= Supply and Senrices Canada, 1996) at f 5, perehdkr R U ,  VOL 4, 
Indionf* wouid not ody take the culture out of who we are, but belittles us to mere 
administrative numbers that do little more than teii the govanment who they have to pay 
for with regards to services. Given the fact that there are a sufficient number of children 
and women who hold status as "Indians" under the Indian Act, but have no Aborigind 
blood &g in their veins, or my cultural history with the Nation, stands for the fact 
that one does not even have to share the same culture as our ancestors to qu- as a 
"govemment Indian". 
What is woae is that even "govenunent Indians" are not treted equaily, nor do 
they have the same "priviIegesYT as  others Eom within this group. Aside fiom the voting 
issue as explahed above, here is how Indian -tus entitlement is established under the 
Act: 
6. (1) Prrsons enailed tu lie regisered - Subject to section 
7. a person tr entitled tu be re@tered if 
(a) that person was regrgrstered or entitled to be registered 
immediatelj p ~ o r  to Aprii f 7, 2985; 
(6) thut person ù a m e d e r  of a body of pmsons that iiar 
been dechmi by the Govenor in C m d  on or ofter Apd 
17, 1985 to be a band for the purposes of this Act; 
(c) the n m e  of that person was omitted or dektedfrom the 
Indian Regzkter, orfiom a Band Lirt prior to Sqtem6er 4. 
1951, under ~~bpm~graphl2(l)(a) (N), parugraph l,2((1)(6) 
or subsectibn 12(2) or under subparagraph I2(l)(m) 
pursuant to an order made under srrbsecrin 109(2). as 
each provision read hmedr'ate&prior to April17,1985. or 
undm any former provision of this Act reIating tu the smne 
subject-matter as mty of thme provisions; 
(4 the name of that person was omitted or deletedm the 
Indàn Reg'ster, orfiom a Band LrStprior to Sèptember 4, 
1951, under srtbparagruph I2(1)(a) (ni) pursuant to an 
order made under subsecrion 1 09(1), as each prowon 
read immedintely @or to A p d  1 7,1985. or under any 
former prowsion of this Act relating to the sume subject- 
matter as any of ihose provisions: 
(e) the name of tliatperson was omined or deietedfiom the 
Indian Reeter, orfiom a Band Listprior to Septmnber 4, 
1951, 
(i) under section 13. as it read imrnediately prior to 
Sepember 4, 1951, or under uny former provirion of this 
Act relating to the same scrbject-matter as that section; or 
(6) under section 112, as it read irnmediately prior to July 
1, 1920, or under any former provision of th& Act reluting 
io the same subject mutter as that section; or 
0 that person is a person both of whoseparents are or, if 
no longer living, were ut the time of death entitled to be 
registered under this section. 
(2) Idem - Subject to section 7, a person is entitied to be registered 
ifihat pmsott is a person one of whose purents i s  or. ifno longer 
IMng, wwar at the time of death entitled to be regktered undm 
dsection (2). 
(3') Deentihgprovision -For the purposes ofparugrapph (I)Ct) and 
subsection (2). 
(a) a persun who was no longer [Mng irnmediately prior to 
Apd 17,1985 but who was at the time of death entitled to 
be registered s h d  be demed tu be enritled to be regrstered 
under paragraph (l')(a),- and 
(B) a persun deswibed in pmagraph (1) (c). (4. ce), or It) 
or nr6sectim (2) wfio was no longer liMng on April17, 
1985 s h d  be deemed to be entitled to be regrsiered under 
n that provr'sr'on. 
The Act does not Say much about ancestry, cdhtre or commmiity. A simpler way 
to tmdeatand entitlement is as folIows: a section 6(2) hdim can not pass on uieir stanis 
to their chrldren unles they marry another 6(2) Indian or a 6(1) Indian* In contrast, a 6(1) 
Indian can pass on their status regardless of the status of their spouse, although, without 
their spouse having status, their children wouid bbonly 'be 6(2) Mans.  This explanation 
solmds just as ndicuious as the sections h m  the Act look The govemment has 
concocted this racial fonnula to decide who w2.I and wili not be considered as Indians in 
this country without regard to tradition, culture or the community. The arbitrary nature of 
these formulas and cut-off dates for who can be an Indian determines the rights of oniy 
part of the Aboriginal popdation and stands without justification. There were groups of 
Aboriginal peoples recognized as such for hundreds of years before the Indian Act, as the 
concept of ngistration o d y  came about in lg%The Act was originally designed as an 
assimilistic tool to ensure that within a few generations the Indian population wouid be 
weii subsumed hto the broader more bbcivilued" population? Larry Gilbert argues that 
these provisions of the Indian Act are ". . .bold attenzpts at reducing the Aboriginal 
population.. ." of Canadax With regards to thÏs mandate of reducing the Aboriginal 
popdation, Gilbert explains: 
...that the m e n t  indian Act continues with that tradition, 
Subsection 6(2) of the present I n d h  Act is a case in point 
which many obsmers cumü.er tu be a draconim attempt 
by Par~iamenr to limir the llumber of Indians in Canadaa It 
is ofirt r4erred to as the second generation nrt-ofde- 
Subsection 6(2) iS simpïj~ a new techniipe fur an old habit 
of Ottawa 'sr it w u  oftén calledpurgng or correchitg baird 
Irsts..," 
- - - 
" Indfm Act, RSC. 1985. c32 (P Supp.), SA; c.43 (4?" Sopp.), 0.1. 
" L. Gubat, Enritlement to rd- Stam und Membmsh@ Coder ik Canada, (Toronto: Thomson Canada, 
1996)- Dereniaftex MemhershIp Codea. 
=Riid, at 1 2  
=16rif, 
Today, this kind of policy justification wodd not stand up to any of the test the 
courts have created for Aboriginal 15ghi.s. The issue of who we are, involves more than 
just Indian Act dennitions. We are divided among many social and politicai Lines. The 
Aboriginal peoples of Turtle Island have their own Wations* such as the Mi'kmaq, Cree 
and Mohawk Nations as weil as those traditional unions such as the Iroquois Confederacy 
or the Wabanaki Confederacy. These Iarger unions were organizations of smaller Nations 
for the protectioa of temtones and cultures. Today, these once strong united Nations are 
now divided for the most part into bands under the Indian Act. Each band under the Act is 
headed by a chief and councilors usuaiIy elected by the residents of the reserve. The 
struggie to have some power over the Iife of your family and yourseif after years of 
poverty and depression, while understandable, detracts fkom the Iarger politicai issues. 
Where is the debate over fishing rights or the plan for how we wi11 unite to organize 
negotiations for self-government or land daims? The larger picture is Iost in the battfe to 
provide for one's family. Therein lies the agony of decision, since many of us put our 
f d e s  before aii else, but how can we effectively balance this need to swive  with the 
needs of our chiIdren7s f d e s  into the fbttrre? 
This is not to Say that this band system has not ever worked. What 1 am saying is 
that this systan is a foreign one to our Nations, one imposed on us by the Indian Act and 
has fded mi~erably for many Nations. The system is made wone by decades of poverty 
and dislocation h m  otr histories and our traditional beliefs- An aspiration to get back to 
orn traditional beliefs does not mean that 1 am advocating the views of those few who are 
atternpthg to go back to the ways thmgs were 800 years ago. But certainIyl we cm Ieam 
h m  our ancestors about what we can do to improve the path to our future. At the 
present, many of us are left wondering who are we and who represents us? 
Given those unanswered questions, we stiU have the many political iines as they 
are currentIy drawa. We may be members of our Naîions, in the traditional sense of the 
larger Mi'kmaq Nation or other Nations. We may be status Indians, registered under the 
Indian Act. We rnay also be members of a particuiar band or reserve. 'Iltese bands are 
represented generally by the chief and council who for us in the Maritimes, usually means 
an filiation with the provincid Union of Chiefs. For example, many of the bands in 
New Brunswick are represented by the Union of New Bninswick Indians (LINBI.), 
which is a Iarger scaie politka1 union of the chiefs in the province, Some dissatisfaction 
with this group has lead some of the bands to pull away fiom the Union and join forces 
under the auspices of the MAWlW Council which has been loosely described as  an 
association of the non-UNBJ. bands. In Nova Scotia, their sister organization is cailed 
the Union of Nova Scotia Indians (ü.N.S J.), Nationally, the Assemb ly of First Nations 
(A.F.N.) claims to represent the interests of the chiefs aud First Nations, as bands are 
offen c d e d  Within the provinces, there are aIso triid associations nich as the Saint John 
Tnbai Council in New Brunswick. ALI of these organizations demand recognÏtion and 
involvement m the politicd arena Ofien their claims as to who they represent overlap 
with other groups, and sometimes Abonginal peopk f d  through the cracks. 
Even the Iarger National o r g ~ t i o n s  are chalIenged by other political 
organixations such as the NationaI NatÏve Indian Women's association which promotes 
women's issues. These women's issues mcIude tfie issues of aII Aboriginal women in 
Canada, and do not necessariiy depend on an affiliation with the AFN. The Inuit Taprisat 
of Canada (I.T.C.) represents the concerns of the northern Aboriginal peoples on a 
national basis. The Metis National CounciI (M.N.C.) cIaims to represent the Metis 
"Nation" of Canada which by their own voice, are those Metis who are descendants of the 
Red River Valley Metis. They refer to the Metis as a separate and distinct culture as 
opposed to a group comprised of memben with mixed ancestries. There is aiso the 
Congress of Aboriginal Peoples (C.A.P.) formerly lmown as the Native Council of 
Canada (N.C.C.), which represents Abonginai peoples on a national basis. CAP claims to 
represent the interests of those Abonginai people who Live off reserves in Canada This 
includes people who identifjr as status Indians, non-status Indians, and Metis. They have 
afnliates in the provinces that represent at a local level, off-reserve Aboriginal people in 
the various provinces. 
For New Brunswick, the New Brunswick Aboriginal Peoples Council cIaims to 
represent the off-resexve AboriginaI comrnunity and for Nova Scotia it is the Native 
Council of Nova Scotia These organizations often have a hard t h e  being heard by 
govemrnental departments or securing fiuiding for thek projects due to the uncertainty 
which befalls being an Abonginai person without also being registered as  an Indian under 
the Indian Act. This, of course, ignores the fact that many of their members aIso have 
their status under the Act. Within the provinces there are ais0 other organkations which 
put yet amther Iayer of politics into this already cornplex mix. In New Brunswick for 
mstance, there are also other ad hoc p u p s  which form as a d t  of current poMcaI 
issues in the news, such as the Native Loggers Association which fomed der the ment 
%fAWLW ka Matiseet word that IoaacIy transIatesmto "the peopfe'. 
timber rights cases, to negotiate the nghts of native loggers. There is dso the recently 
formed accountability group who are demanhg more accotmtability fiom their 
poiiticians at the band Ievel. 
ThÏs year was my first year in Nova Scotia and 1 have met many people through 
the Iaw school. One of the first things 1 noticed was how the Abonginal people 1 met 
introduced themselves. Every single one associated hùnseif or herself with a band or 
political organization or local lobby group. Not one penon said, 1 am a Mi'krnaq from the 
Mi'kmaq Nation of Nova Scotia or theu own padcular group. I know for me, I have been 
easily caught up in the politics and have felt the same disassociation from my culture as 
others. I see no reason why there can not be both the active politicai lobbying and the 
cultural identity with one's Nation. Even this simple, idedistic comment, invites the 
highly political questions of who then can c lah  to be a member of the Nation. Many 
chiefs and persons womed about having to share resources and social programs wodd 
E t  membership to those who meet the requirements of the Indian Act for both status 
and band membership. This method of identification as stated earlier is a arbitrary, racist 
fomuIa that I believe wili not stand up to the many chaIlenges to the Bill C-3 1 legislation 
to shortly corne before the courts. This legislation, while reinstating some women with 
their stanis, at the same tene imposeci the second-generation cutoff nile and exclnded 
many people fiom "quaIifymg" as status Indians under the Indian ~ c t ?  The Act is simpIy 
not compabiIe with onr method of determÏning who cm daim rights such as treaty rights 
and AborÎgbaI rights, and who we are as members of our Nations. 
"An Act tu Amend the hdr'im Act, RS-C- 1985 c- 27- 
When we speak of treaties, other layers of subtle politics creep into play. Those 
who cIaim to be the beneficiaries of local treaties are quick to point out the difference 
between temtorid Indians and non-temtond Indians. This is rightfidiy so, given the 
forethought and sadices our ancestors made so that OLK children and their children 
codd preserve as much of what was ours as possible. Other Nations did this for their 
own peoples and we must respect the path our ancestors set for us. For Nova Scotia, a 
simpIe way of explainine a non-territorial Indian wodd be someone who beIongs to an 
Abonginai Nation who's traditional temtory did not inchde present day Nova Scotia, 
such as the Mohawks, the Tiingits, or the h t t  of Northeni Canada The essence of a 
treaty right as set by the courts to date is that you must prove a nibstantiai connection to 
the original group of signatories to the ûeaty. " These Treaty rights are also tied to the 
Iand base or traditional tem-tories of the Bgnatories. So, if the Mi'krnaq were signatones 
to a treaty then presumably, modem day Mi'kmaq codd claim the benefit of any of those 
treaty provisions. The questions r e m e  though, who are the Mi'kmaq aside from the 
broad theoreticaI concept of Nation. Wouid these peopIe be oniy status Indians registered 
mder the Indian Act and who are members of the local Mi'kmaq bands in Nova Scotia? 1 
donTt hink so. We have a few cases which support the concept that aü that is required is a 
substantiai comection. So, in the Fowler case for instance, it was good enough that the 
accused hunter show his direct heage to his mother who was a status Indian and a 
member of the band that c d d  be traced to the onginaI signatories. WhiIe this court 
appeared to have attempted to corne to a fair and reasonabIe determhation ofthe 
beneficiary issue, they were dohg so based on the Iaw. The question is really whether the 
courts are an appropnate forum for deciding such rnatters that are inherentiy tied into the 
culture and poiitics of Aboriginal Nations seeking self-govemïng powers. 
In a recent case fÏom the Ontario Provincial court, R v. P0wIey7q a man and his 
son defended charges for dawfkliy hunting game by claiming they were Metis and as 
such had vaild Metis rights to hunt Neither of  the men wére status Indians and the 
provincial d d l i f e  legislation only excluded status Indians fiom the act. The court held 
that the PowIeys were of mked ancestry and therefore Metis, and that the Metis had a 
right to hunt for food. As a dt, there was no justification for excluding Metis rights in 
the provinciai hunting Iegislation. Vaillancourt Rov. J. held: 
ifthe Metis erercise th& AborigrgrnaI rights without the 
beneft of a liceme, they are not on& putting themselves at 
risk of legisative sanctions but they have are forced to 
SM tfirough the forests like miminais as opposed to 
h t e r s  exerdisng their consti~utiional r?ght~.'~ 
This case relied on Fowler.supra, in not limi*ting the rights of Aboriginal peoples 
to only status Indians. Often Aboriginal people are made to feel inferior or less worthy 
than those registered under the Indian Act as uidians. This right to be recognized as an 
AborÏginaI person in the eyes of the law, wiU have to be incorporateci into the Iunited 
right of Aborîpinai Nations to control their membership. The RoyaI Commission 
recognizes the Iegitimacy and Hideed the right of Aboriginal Nations to determine their 
own citlzens or members, but that it shouid not be an dettered right The ComrnÎssion 
recognizes that due to the history of Aboriginal peopIes in Canada, the Iack of sufficient 
R v. Powféy [199911 CNL& 153. (Ont). 
f i f i l  at para 16. 
land bases and resonrces, that this would factor mto the membership issue and some 
Nations might be inclined to restnct membership Imfkirly. 
1 believe that in the end we will have to corne up with a reasonable concept of 
membership that will include a comection, but it is neither too stringent, nor arbitrary 
like the Indian Act. The connection can not be too remote so as to have no limit, but not 
so shzngent as to deny Aboriginal peoples their valid claims to ancestry. CIearly the 
jtrrisdictïon to control the membership Iists and the process by which to make 
determinations must be retained by the Aboriginal Nations thernselves as part of their 
cu1tura.i rights and inherent right to self-government At the same tirne, there wilI have to 
be a set of checks and balances in pIace to ensure fainiess is part of the process. The 
politics are such that 1 suspect that in the beglluiing there will be many challenges to the 
denid of ùidividual memberships. There are many Aboriginal people with valid ancestral 
links that shouid not be excluded arbiharily. 1 wodd support a method by which we 
adhere to the "substantial connection" test. It appears to provide the necessary flexibility 
and reasonableness necessary when deaIing with human beings and their cuitural, social 
and political associations. The Royd Commission on Aboriginal Peoples concluded that 
we can not rely on r a d  characteristics to determine who Aboriginal peopIe are: 
3. Abon'ginalpeoples are not racial groups; rather they are 
organic poIiticaI und cuitural entities- ACthougfi 
contmporary Aborr'gniaf groups stem h&oricu~yfifiom the 
o ~ ~ p e o p l è s  of North Am&, trhey o j b  huve maed 
genetretrc herrerrtuges and hclude individuak of vmied 
ancestiy- As orgmic polirical enritfis, they huve the 
'' Canada, Report of the Royal Conrntiksr'on on dborigihal Peoplm: Restructuriïtg the Relar'omM, VOL 2 
( û î t a . .  SuppLy and Services Canada, 1996)- RCQP voL23. 
capacity to evohre over time and dange in thefr intemal 
composition." 
With regards to the issue of First Nations and the large number of non-statu 
Indians who are not permitted to reside within their Nation's territories by v h e  of 
disquaMication under the Indian Act, the RCAP states that the federd govemment m u t  
fully disclose their policy with regards to this issue. The commksioners recognized that 
given the power of self-government, the Aboriginal Nations may UnfairIy exclude this 
gmup of Aboripind peoples: 
Since an Aboriginal Nation must be constituted Ni an 
indurNe manner to quaw for the ngfit of self- 
detmination, a large-scale membership dispute ofrhis 
kind could be very signifcant." 
So, we are left with the question of not who we are, but who will we be? It is 
obvious that at Ieast for the time being, we are a varied bunch, but who wil1 we be in the 
new miIIemium? It is interesting to note that the Conrtihction Act refers to Aboriginal 
peoples as Indian, Inuit and Metis, without providing corresponding defhitions for each 
of those terms. It is equalIy interesthg to note that when doing the federd census, 
Statistics Canada divides Aboriginal peoples into four groups, those being: (1) North 
American Indians registered under the hdian Act; (2) North American indians not 
registered tmder the Indian Act; (non-status popdation); (3) Metis people; and (4) huit. It 
is niteresting for two major reasons, one that thae is some recognition that the non-status 
population aiso comprises part of the Aboriginat population and more specinc to my 
papa, that these numbers inchde more thanjnst Canadian Indians, and indudes Man of 
" fiid- at lm- 
= fiid at 183, 
North America, namely Mans who originated in the United States. The approxmiate 
numbers of recorded 'Indians" are as follows: 438,000 status Indians and 112,600 non- 
status Indians. RCAP wanns that the effects of BILL C-3 1 must be addressed or there 
wiIl be rapid decline in statu Indians and the non-status population will sweli. 
Although the Metis peopIes are protected in our Comtitution Act, according to 
RCAP, the federal government did not keep records on them. Only 139,000 peopIe 
idmtified as Metis in the 1991 census, whereas the Inuit population is about 38,000. 
Despite ancient predictions that Aboriginal peoples wouid soon be extinct and despite the 
assimilistic laws within the lndian Act which atternpted to Mll this prophecy, RCAP 
has recently reinforceci the fact that: 
It is cieur that, despite declining fertiiity rates, AAborigrnal 
people wiil be a continuing presence in Canadian society: 
Nideed. th& population shme is projend to inerettse. 
Demographic projections thur reinforce the assertion of 
Aboriginalpeopie t h  they will continrîe as dim-nct 
peuples wfiose prerence repires a renewed reiutiomhip 
wilh the rest of Canadian society. " 
It is realïty then, that demands that the issue of Aboriginal peoples' rights and 
concems, be dedt with and a new relatiooship fomed It aIso demands that issues of 
identity and membersfiip be dealt with m a principled, fair and open mamer so as to be 
indusive of dl Abonginai peoples and not just those registered under the Indim Act as 
Indians. This issue, whüe avoided at aii costs by most politicians, must be de& with if 
any of these Aboîiginaf Iegal issues brought before the courts can be resoIved effectively. 
It Ïs too easy to say that MÏ?miaq people have a treaty nght to htmt in Nova Scotia, but it 
is much more di.€EcaIt to deveiop a method that wilI detemine who is a Mi'kmaq, This is 
the reason why I thought it mciaI that 1 present thÏs issue before I proceed with the legal 
argument for why AboriginaI people have a Bght to cross the Canada-US. border. I thmk 
the background is relevant and so too is the m o d e d a y  politics. While we have no 
definitive rnethod of resolhg the issue yet, I want to reiterate that when 1 speak of 
Aboriginal peoples in my thesis, 1 wilI b e  using that term in an inclusive marner to 
include those that live off the reserve and those who do not have status, but nevertheles 
form part of out many Nations. I WU be focusing this paper on the Nations which 
comprise the Wabanaki Confederacy to give the issue a concrete context h m  which to 
deveiop my legai arguments. 
WMANAIP;C CONFEDERACY: 
The Wabaaaki Confederacy was essentiaily an aibance of the different Aigonkian 
groups whose temtories were comprised of the present day Atlantic Provinces and our 
neighbor state of Maine? Historicai sources use Man names interchangeabIy and it can 
be dificuit to sort out the difference between the Abenaki and Wabanaki Conlederacies, 
the Eastern Indians and the Abenaki Nation themselves. Anthropologists, historiaas and 
missionarîes aU used a different means to distinguish beiween the Nations, using simiiar 
names for different combmations of gronps, leadmg to even more confusion for present 
day researchers. A passage h m  a doctoral thesis on the Abenaki i1iustrates this historicd 
codkion: 
16M- at 23, 
"MW of the Northemm A lgonkr'mt hmr  LT. Aliams, Atlas ofAnrm'cm Hisory (New York Charies 
Sai ier  & S o q  1943) at 39. Map ofAlgonEàn~- 
fiom the Pennacook in the west to the Micmac in the east. 
In additon. the special case use ofAbenaki for the enrire 
group, und Abnaki for the local population of the Kennebec 
niter meutes disrinctiom that seventeenth- and eighteenth- 
century tenns do not support. There arefkther 
complicatiom Aivin Morrison notes that the Etchemin 
'éither developed bto. or were repiaced by. today 's 
Malecite and Passmaquoddy peoples. " Pierre Baird. the 
first Jesuit missionary in the area. used Etchemin to 
designare both K m e k  and Penobscot Abnaki. The eariy 
French in Acadiu alm refmed to the lndims of southern 
Maine as the Almouchiquoik, while the Englkh spoke of al1 
the Indium e u t  of the P Lscataqua River as the '*Eastern 
Indians': Hisroncal usage md unthropological raxonomy 
rmains in confict. For hhtorical purposes it s e a r  
cleurer to refer - as in standrird French pracrice - to the 
Abnaki as a generic tenn for the entire Indian population of 
what is now the State of Maine und to distinguisli groups by 
their riverine or coastal location: Sacos, Andruscoggrhs, 
Kennebecs (synonymot(slj? the NomXgewocRs Ger the 
village site), Penobscots and Passamaquoddies- 36 
The Confederacy was primarily fomed to combat the increasing pressure from 
Iroquois warfare. It was probably established somehe around the mid-eighteenth 
centtxy and at times the Confederacy was also ailied with the Ottawa Indiaas and the 
catholocked Mohawks at Canawagua3? The Groups of Nations had a history of  alliances 
as they Lived m dose prorUmity throughout the territory presentiy know as New 
BnmswfnmSwf& Nova Scotia, Newfoimdland , Prince Edward Island , Maine and the 
surmunding areas. '"eu strong ties were evident during the treaty conferences and 
negotiations in the late t6OOYs and eariy 17007s. The various Nations o h  let the Iarger 
pups send representatives to meet with Engiish oEciaIs about treaty signulg and 
-- - 
" It Modon, The People of the Dmu>c The Abnaki and In& Relmionr with Nov Englmd and New 
France, Id00 - 1727. (Mahie: University ofMaine, 1975) at 1 1.12 [hereMer People of the D-1- 
MeMüm, supra note f at SI. 
ratifications. Many of the srnalIer Abenaki triis named as parties to the peace-making 
process have disappeared or been absorbed into the bands in western New England and 
Quebec. These incIuded the Arresaquntacook, Ahwenok, Passanawack, Pamadniak, 
Weesungawok and some otherdg 
While 1 do not have the time to get into a thorough review of the history of the 
Wabanki, for the purposes of my thesis, I will assume that based on the above 
information, the Confederacy included at les t  the Mi'kmaq, Maliseet, Passamaquoddy, 
Penobscot, Nomdgewocks and the Abnaki. The main groups are the Mi'kmaq and 
Matiseet as they have temtories in the Atlantic provinces and Maine. I have chosen the 
member Nations of the Wabanaki Confederacy as they were al1 participants in the 
conferences Ieading up to the Treaties of 1725 and 1726 which I will discuss later, in 
Chapter Two of this thesis. They dso occupy the generd temtory of the Atlantic 
provinces and Maine, thereby "qualifying'' as border-hibes, based on their history of 
trading patterns, close pohticd ties and intennarriage which spanned a m s s  the border. I 
wiII therefore present arguments that they have Aborigulai rights to cross the border, and 
rights fiowhg h m  Abonginai title to the area as well. They wouid have also been 
Iocated close to the action when the J i  Treuty was being signed promising Lndians rights 
of Eee passage over the border. I am not making generai arguments that wodd apply to 
other Aboriginal groups as some would not have lived near the border and othas wodd 
18th Cenhay and Nav England : Seiected Feotures Map ~ I . I K  Native Commm*cations 
Society ofNova Scotia The Mi'kmaq Treaty Hmdûook (Nova Scotk: Native Co~ll~~~~lll*cationç Society, 
1987)- 11h e r e h f k  Le" Century MopT- 
') D e p a r û m ~  of hdim Affairs and Nonhem DeveIopment, We Shouïd Wak nt rhe Trua Mr. h m e r  
Made (New BrtmwÏcIr= DIAND, 1992) at74 - 76, mniafter Dumnter 's Tractf. 
have signed different treaties. 1 intend to present ail of these arguments in my thesis 
sofely with regard to the member Nations of the Wabanaki Confederacy. 
CHAPTER TWO: 
FAITH IN OUR ANCESTORS: 
MOBILITY THROUGH ABORIGINAL 
AND TREATY RICHTS 
<niis land where you want to become absolute master, 
this Iand is mine. 1 have corne out of it Uke the grass, it 
is where 1 was b o m  and reside, it is my Iand that is 
mine Indian..?" 
INDIAN TREATIES: MPLIED MOBILITY?: 
M a n  Treaties in Eastern Canada are agreements th& were negotiated by specific 
Aboriginai Nations and the British Crown in the 1600 and 1700's. The treaties signed in 
the Atlantic provinces included the members of the Wabanaki Coafederacy and have 
been cded Peace and Friendship Treaties as they were signed generaily to secure peace 
h m  the various Iocd Indian Nations. At one time, the hdian Nations fa outnumbered 
the British population and were very skilled in war. The British relied on the kindness of 
the Indians to survive on this Continent. The Indian Nations signed these treaties often to 
ensure that while they were permining senlers to occupy minmiai terrîtory, they also 
wanted to ensure that this would not affect their rights to their lands, and their rights to 
hunt, fish, a .  so forth. Today, the sacredness of these documents are seen differentiy by 
the Aboriginai Nations than they are by the governments in Canada The Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples explained the ciifference in viewpoint between the 
two cultures: 
Tu tlie AborigtnaI nations, treatratres me w'taip (Nfng 
insrnments of relatinsh@. Ineyforged dynmc and 
powerfl reI&tarronsItips that remmk in Hect to this dw. 
Indeed the spin't of the treatr-a kas remaiired more or [ess 
coltststent across this continentr evmr as tlie tennr of the 
beuliani?s have changed owr the. 
C0i i~o11  ofunpublished documents on Canach nnd AmerÏca: PubWed by Frmdi Canada, L 17-19. 
Canadiam and th& govmnmentr, howevm: are more Iikeiy 
io look on the treuties as ancient hirtory. The treaties. to 
Canada, are often regarded as inconvenient and obsolete 
relies of the emiy days of this counby. With respect to the 
early treaties in part~èu~m~ which were made with the 
British or French Crown. Canadian governments disniiss 
them as hmng no relëvance in thepost-Confederation 
period. The fact remanis. howewr. that Canada hm 
inhented the treaties that were made and is the benefciary 
of the Zan& and resources semed by those treaties and 
stiil enjoyed today by Canada 's citkem. '' 
There are other treaties which affect Aboriginal peoples which have not been 
considered in the same iight as Indian Treaties. The Joy Treaty and the Treaty of Ghent 
are considered international treaties and to date have not been usehl in securing nghts for 
Aboriginal peoples with regards to the border, despite the fact that they specincaily 
provide for Abon'ginai mobiüty rights. Despite the fact that Aboriginal rights were 
recognized and protected in these internationd treaties, they have not been held to be 
enforceable by Aboriginal people IargeIy because the Indian Nations were not signatories 
to the treaties. 1 wiU deai with these intemationai treaties ai the next Chapter. 
There have been numerous uidian Treaties negotiated and signed since contact, 
but one of the most important series of treaties for this geographicd area are those that 
were agned by the Indian Nations and the British Crown. For the purposes of my thesis, 
I wilI ody be dealing with two of the numerom treaties and promkes that were issued 
between 1675 and 1794.1 have chosen the Treaty of 1725 /26 " for its inclusion of aII the 
Nations of the Confederacy, and the Treaîy of U S Z .  as this treaty has been interpreted by 
the Supreme Comt and pmvides a usefid precedent by which to d y z e  the possiiIe 
'' RCRP v d l ,  supra note 20 at 128-130, 
" Tne Subinr'ssroa mdAgreencent of the Eaptent fndim, December 15, t725, Boston, New EngIand, 
mobiIity rÏghts? Thae are simply too many treaties and histoncd information for me to 
cover aü of them in this thesis. It is my belief that the mobility right could be established 
relying ody the two treaties I have chosen. 
These treaties have gained renewed importance in the lives of AborighaI people 
in the years fo1Iowùig the protection of Treaty rights in section 35 of the Constitution Act. 
Treaties have been used to validate AboriginaI hmting rights, fishuig nghts, and even 
rights to limited commercid activities of the pa.*cular Aboriginal Nation signatones. 
The vaiidity of some of these treaties has aIready been recognized and pivm effect in 
many Iower court decisions in the Maritimes. The ody one that has been andyzed by the 
Supreme Court of Canada to date is the Treaty o f  1752, cailed the Treaty or Adcles of 
P eace und Friendship Renewed, 1752. The courts find thernselves having to interpret 
various provisions in the treaties with very Iittle Wntten context or explanation. Given the 
importance of the Crown's roIe in s e c u ~ g  these treaties, the courts must guide their 
interpretations with this history in mind. The Supreme Court of Canada recently held in 
nie key hterpretiveprinciples which app& tu neahès are 
fist .  that -y ambiguity in the will be resdved in 
favour of the Indians und, second, that trean'es shouki be 
intetpreted rit a manner t h t  main tah  the integrity of the 
Crown, parffarffcuIlanly the Crown 'sfiducimy obligation 
towarrls abotiginal peopier.? 
The court deait with the histoncd background to the treaty era of Canadian and 
Indian history and summarized the d e s  h m  previous case law that [ends saisitivhy to 
the unique nature of these agreements. Cory J. in Budger, outlined the basics of treaty 
interpretation: 
Fht, it must be remembered that a treaty represents an 
exchange of solemn promises between the Crown and the 
vm'ous Indian nations. It k an agreement whose nature is 
sacred ... Second the honour of the Crown t3 always at 
stake in its dealing with Indian people. Interpretatioons of 
treaties and stattdtory provisions which have an impact 
upon treaty oraborigmal rights nw t  be approached in a 
manner which maintains the integnty of the Crown. It ii 
always assumed that the Crown intendr tofurfii its 
promises. No uppearance of 'sharp deuiing " wiii be 
sanctioned ... Diird, uny ambiguities or doubrfui 
qress iom in the wording of the treuy or document mt 
be resolved in favour of the Indians. A curoI1ary to th& 
principle is that any limitations wliich restrict the rights of 
Indianr under treaties be narrow[y 
comtmed ... Fmrth, the onur ofpraving that a treaty or 
aboriginal kght iiaP bem atznguisshed lies upon the 
C m .  Tiiere m t  be 'Sm*ct proof of the fact of 
extf*nguishrnent" and mevrdence of clem and plain intention 
on the pmt of the govmnmmt tu extr'rtgubh neas, rigfits ..." 
I wili focus on the Treaty of 1752 as its interpretation by the Supreme Court of 
Canada has set the precedent for treaty interpretation in Canada and wiII apply to my 
anaiysis of the other, earlier Treaty of 1725/26 that has not been mterpreted by the 
Suprerne Court of Canada to date. This analysiysis fi provide the background to my 
review of the international treaties and why 1 think they too, provide enforceable rights 
for the member Nations o f  the ConfederacyY 
In Simon v. Ine Queen * the Supreme Court specifically dedt with the Treaty of 
1752 as it pertained to the huntuig rights of the Mi'kmaq in Nova Scotia. This case 
involved a band member of the Shubenacadie Indian Brook Band who was registered as 
an Indian under the Indimi Act. James Matthew Simon was charged under the Nova 
Scotia Lan& and Forests Act " for possessing shot larger than the prescnted lunit and 
possessing a rifle during closed hunting season. Simon admitted the ai1 the elements of 
the charge but asserted that his right to hunt in the Treaty of 1752 was protected h m  
provincial legislation by m e  of section 88 of the Indian Act, which provides as foilows: 
88. Subject to the tenns of any treaty and any other Act of 
the Parliament of Canada. aal laws of general application 
from rime tu tirne in force in any province me applicab fe tu 
art in respect of Indiam in the province. except to the extent 
that such Iaws are incoIISi;Ptent with thk Act or nay order. 
rule, regulation or by-law made therettnder, and acept to 
the extent thm such Iaws ntake provision for any mutter for 
which provision b made by or under this Act. 
The Treaty was upheld by the court as a valid and binding, as were the hlmting 
rights contained therein. The Supreme Court of Canada in so holding, set out a method 
for treaty anaiysis which is relevant to my anaiysis as to whether the Treaty of 1752 
contains any rights upon which the Aboriginal beneficiaries mÎght c lah a right to pass 
keIy over the Canada - US. border. The relevant questions as set by the Supreme Court 
were: 
(1) Was the Treaty of 1752 validly created by competent parîies? 
R Y. Simon, CI989 2 SICA. 387. [heremaiterSh0n3~ 
"Lands and Forestr A m ,  RSN.8 1967, c-163, S. 150(1). 
a hdim Act, mpra note21, S. 88. 
(2) Does the Treaty contain a right to hunt and what is the nature and scope of that 
right? 
(3) Kas the Treaty been terminatecl or Iimited? 
(4) 1s the appellant covered by the Treaty? 
Ch the fÏrst question of the capacity of both parties to enter into the treaty, 
Dickson, CJ. cited the case of Nowegiiick v. The Queen " as standing for the principle 
that treaties should be constnred liberally and any ambiguities resolved in favor of the 
Indians. The court in Nowegijick held: 
It seem tu me, however. that treaties and statutes relating 
to Indians should be liberufly constmed and dmbtful 
expressions resolved in favour of the Indians.-*. 
In Jones v. Meehan, 175 US, 1 (2899). it was held that 
I n d h  treaties "rnust ... be construed, nnot according to the 
technical meaning of [their] w o r h  ... but in the sense in 
wliich they wmld naturally be understood &y the helndian~"*~ 
adopt a broad and generous interpretation of what constitutes a treaty as well as the 
preliminary question of capacity to sim. Justice Lamer explained that capacity must be 
seen h m  the point of view of the 'uidians" in determining whether it was reasonable for 
them to assume that the other party they were deaIing with had the authority to enter into 
a bindmg treaty. He went on to state that the person making the agreement on behalfof 
the Crown need not have special powers, as the '%dians'' were not on parwith a 
sovereign state, and thus fewer fomalities were required The simple reguirement is that 
the person must have represented the Crown in an hportanf authoritative hction? 
In Simon the court pointed out that many courts have aIready assumed that the 
Treaty of 1752 was validly created. Chief Jusfiusfice Dickson heId that not only did the 
Mi'lanaq delegates have the authonty to bind the Mi'kmaq Nation, but so did Govemor 
Hopson, as he was a representative of His Majesty and thus had suEficient authority to 
bind the Crown? The court oniy dealt with the Mi'kmaq Nation and thus the treaty 
would have to be re-examined if another Nation were to assea that they fell under the 
same Treaty. The relevant part of the Treaty which States who the parties are, provides 
that it is between His Majesty in the old territones of Nova Scotia, aiso called Acadie 
and: 
Ma~or Jean Baptisre Cope chiflachem of the T d e  of 
Ma& Indian4 inhabiting the emtern Coast of the 
said Province. and A n d m  Ha& iMhrt.  Gabriel Martin 
and Francis Jeremiah members & Reî&gates ofthe Suid 
Tribe, for thliemselves and their said T d e  and their k irs  
anci the heirs of their kirs forever. " 
(emphasis added) 
It seerns clear that the oniy signatories or intended beneficÏaries to this Treaty are 
the members and heiis forever of the Mi'kmaq Nation. Not ody does the Treaty 
specincaüy date Mick Mack, but they aIso mention theu generaf temtory, Le. the eastern 
coast of the said province, which at that time was oId Nova Scotia Looking at the map of 
oId Nova Scotia " and the tnid texritories 56, it Ïs easy to see that the Mick Mack were 
the only tnbes within that territory in the eastern part of the Province at dl, and the rest 
were in the south and west. A different interpretation might have been possible had the 
Treaty stated "Eastern uidians" as opposed to soIeIy the Mick Mack. since the English 
ofien referred to al1 the tni%es who occupied the territory h old Nova Scotia as Eastern 
Indians, or Abenaki. The -ers were not oniy specific in the triie name, but also their 
temitory and suice past treaties included ai l  the names of hibes, or used a generic name to 
indude them dl, it is assumed the &amers did this purposely to treat only with the Mick 
Mack. With such specificity, it is doubdul that broad, Iiberal phciples in treaty 
interpretations couid be used to enlarge the category of these particular beneficiaries. 
It has also been argued that not only is the Treaty of 1752 Imiited to the Mi'kmaq, 
but it was onIy referring to a small Band of Mi'kmaq living in Eastern Nova Scotia at the 
tirne of the Treaty. 1 believe that this is the narrowest of interpretations and is not 
befitting the unique nature of relations among the entire Mi'kmaq Nation. The Treaty 
refened to the Mi'kmaq, their hein and their heirs forever. Followîng the Iiberai 
interpretive principIes as  discussed above, and given that there is ambiguity in the 
wording of the document, hîs cIause shouId be nad m favour of the entire Mi'kmaq 
Nation. Therefore, wwhile the actuai signatories may have ody resided in one area of the 
Mi'kmaq Nation, that does not mean that there was no mtention to cover the Mi'kmaq as 
a whole, in a representative capaci@. 
Regardless of whether or not those partidar Mi'kmaq did sign the Treaty in a 
representative capacity or not, the broad, liberaI hterpretative p ~ C i p I e s  wouid appIy to 
what is meant by the % e k  and h e k  forever? Who the Mi'kmaq consider as ''heirs" may 
- - - - -- - - - - 
" TdaC T d o n ' s :  Approxiinate Bounddès M i  h m r  Dtnmner'E Tract, szïpra note 39. 
not be the same as what the British htended it to mean. Mi'krnaq today stül have large 
extended f d e s  and often even nonrelatives are refmed to as "Auntie" or "Unde" and 
are treated in every other way as f d y 7  because to that particuiar Mi'kmaq famiIy, they 
are family. It wouid be an onerous buden to expect a Mi'kmaq person to trace thek 
ancestry back to the particdm group of Mi'kmaq that sïgned the treaty. The court in 
The Micmacs did not keep written records. Micmac 
iradirions me large& oral in nature. To impose am 
NnpossibZe burden o f p o f  wouid, in efect, render 
nugatory any nght to hunt that a present-day Shtibenacadie 
Micmac Indiart would othew&e be entitled to invuke bared 
on this treaty? 
I wodd argue that while the Treaty 41752 is not so broad so as to apply to aii of 
the rnember Nations of the Wabanaki Confederacy, it is e q d y  not so narrow so as to 
appIy ody to a handfiri of Mi'kmaq and not the whole Nation. With respect to the rest of 
my andysis of the Treaty of 1752, I wilI proceed on the basis that the rights contained 
therein, applies only to the Mi'krnaq, but to al1 of the Mi'kmaq. The court in S i o n  was 
deaihg not only with the hunting rights that were contained in the Treaty, but also rights 
which may be incidental to the fk exercise of those hunting nghts. The relevant portion 
of the Treaty states: 
It is agreed that that the said trilie of lndim shall not be 
hindwedfrom, but have fiee liberty ofirmtmg andfishing 
as m a i  ... 58 
The court went on to explain that the phrase "as d" dÏd not limit the types of 
weapons that codd be used tu hmt to those nsed ni 1752, but was to be mterpreted ai a 
sr Simonf supm note 46 at 408. 
ff exibie way that is sensitive to the evohtion of hunting practices over the.  It was held 
that the right to carry a weapon was a nght which was incidental to the fkee exercise of 
himting contained in the treaty. Wtiile subsequent cases deahg with Aboriginal rights 
holds that a right cm ody be protected ifit is not incidental to a larger right, the same is 
not tnie of treaty nghts." It is my view that a right to cross the Canada-US. border is 
necessady incidentai to the '%ee Iiberty of hunting and fishing as usual" since it was 
prornised that they should never be hindered Eom the exercise of this nght. 
The prohibition by Immigration officiais against the £tee passage of Indians wodd 
not ody hinder hunters who wanted to hunt in their traditional territory, but totally 
prohibit it. Since these rights are protected in the Constitution A a  under section 35(1), 1 
wodd argue that these immigration laws should be of no force and efféct to the extent 
that they are inconsistent with Aboriginal treaty rights as per section 52 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. The relevant portions of the Imnri@mion Act do not amount to a 
cIear and plain htent to extinguish these rights, nor does it specincaily address the issue 
of treaty rights with regards to mobiIity across the border. Yet, the other articIes of the 
Treaty are relevant to the issue of the neces* of fkee movement over the border m 
order to exmke theu treaty rights. Articfe Three of the Treaty deais with the promise by 
the Mi'haq to: 
... use th& utntost Endemors to b r i e  in the other Indians 
to Renew and Ra@ thh Peuce, ..? 
PresumabIy, the Mi'kmaq wouid have to have the ability to travel throughout the 
territory in order to bring in the 0 t h  Nations who signed the Treaty of l725/26 to renew 
~e peace by signing the T m t y  of 1752. This wouid involve traveling across the lands of 
what is now Canada and the United States in order to accomplish this task. Not ody are 
there rights which involve present-day cross-border rnobility, but there was an obligation 
which necessariiy inferred the right to cross what is now the Canada - U.S. border. Given 
that these ~ a t i e s  were signed in good faith by both parties, the Mi'kmaq would have 
every right to believe that they would forever have the right to travel over these 
temtories. Any other interpretation would Iead to an absurd result, in that promises and 
obligations were made that couId not be carried out. Certainiy, this cm not be the result 
that either party intended. In addition, the Treaty of 1752 confirms the rights promised in 
the earlier Treaty of 1725/26. As I will argue in the aext section, I believe that the earlier 
treaties recognized the right to cross the border, if not explicitly, then implicitly. I wouid 
submit that the Treuty of 1752 recognizes previous rights and obIigatioos that necessarily 
infi a right to keIy travel the lands that are now divided by the Canada - US. border. 
In regards to the third branch of the treaty analytis, the court heId that the 
evidentiary requirements for proving the termination of the Treaty had not been met. Fnst 
of aiI, an Indian Treaty is sui generis and not created nor terminated according to the d e s  
of international law. As well, once it has been estabtished that the Treaty is valid, the 
party armg its texmination bears the bmden of proof of temination. StrÎct proof is aiso 
reqimed Îfextm~shment isto be proven, which ui this case, it was not The court 
contempIaied the possibility of whether a Treaty couId be exthguished, but gave no 
answer?' That question has been answered in more ment  cases on s.35(1) of the 
Constitution Act, which have heid that treaty nghts protected under s.35 cm not now be 
extinguished, akhough they might have been abIe to be extingukhed prior to 1982." 
Thus, the court in Sinon held that the Treaty of l7.U is of as much force and effect today, 
as it was in 1752.~ At least in terms of the Mi'kmaq members of the Wabanaki 
Confederacy, they shouId have the nght of Eee passage over the border at least to 
facilitate traditionai and modem day hunting, fishing and trading practices, and to 
maintain social and political relations as guaranteed in the Treaty with the other member 
NatÏons. Unfominately, the Treaty of 1752 may provide M e  assistance for other Nations 
of the Wabanaki Confederacy. 
THE TREATY OF I7.5/26: 
The Treuty of iï2X26 is another treaty between His Majesty and the various 
Nations wCthin the area of New England and Nova Scotia This Treaty was ratified by the 
Nations m severai documents, incIuding Mascarene's ratification, his promkes to the 
Indians, and the 1726 Nova Scotia ratification and Govemor Doucette's like promises to 
the same bbIndians''. The relevant portion of the Treuty of 1725 reads: 
P unto the Penobscot. N'dpwalk and other Tribe~ . 
*in HLS Majesty S ProMnce afresaid md th& naturai 
descendants respective& gü th& lands. libertiés and 
merti'ees not by them conveyed or sdd to orpossessed by 
any of the EngZisIt Subjects as aforesaraid. As ah0 the 
" Riid* 
" Y i  der Peet. supra note 12. 
" Sniop supra note 46. 
Timy of I î ' S ,  supra note 42. 
At the coderence of the C'Indian" delegates with Govemor Dummer in Boston 
several promises were made by Dummer to ensure the " Mans' " concerns with regards 
to the effect of the Treaty were addressed One particular promise read: 
That the said Ind- shall peaceably Enjoy al2 their lands 
andproperttes which have not been by them comeyed and 
sold unto orpossessed by the Engfish. and be no wuys 
molesied or disturbed in their planting or improvment: 
andfirrther that there be aibwed t h  the-fiee 1- m d  
priMIege of  Huntine Fîdiine; and Fowling, as fo*iner[~~~~ 
(emphasis added) 
As weU, Mascarene made promises to the Indians, after their ratification, which 
That the Indians diail not be rnolested rSi th& nerson~, 
fkntiw Fishing and p l d n g  groundr nor in anw otlrer 
lawfii occusion~ by His Mujesty 5 subjectr or their 
dependents ror in the exercîe of the1 . C 't relr~ton 66 ..* 
(emp hasis added) 
Similady, Lt Governor Doucette's promises at the 1726 Nova Scotia ratification 
And 1 do F~rfherpromise in the absence of iris honour 
the LI. GovX of thepnwhce in beharfof this said 
Govemment, mut the said Jitdinrrs shall rrot be tnoîesîed 
Person's. Huntrihg Fishing and Siooting & 
plmting on theirplanting Ground ~ o r  in an-v othet their 
Jiwhi Occmion~ By iris Majesty 's subJects or their 
Dependents nor in the aercike pf thml reiioipa ... " 
Goyenor WiIIim Dummer 's hmrSes to de Delegaies of the Eostem Indians. ffom Dummer f T ,  
suprac note 39, 
M<~tl~cmene's AmIciès of Su6mLsston and Agreement, t 725 and Mascarene 5 Promirer to rhe Delegaies of 
rhe Emrm lirdm, fiid 
" R~@catibn of the Attr'cfep Entered liito at Boston by Chids of the Emrern Indiun T i  and PromrSs 
Made by the LL Governor Doucette to the Chi* of the E m m  Indi0ltsOltS Bid- 
The Crown promised repeatedly that the Mans would have the liberty to hunt 
and fish, practice their religion and carry out any other Iawfbi activity without 
moIestation, as had been done fomerly. The miautes of various confierences about the 
Treaties between the govemment officiais and the delestees evidence the necessity that 
their rights be protected in order that they wouid even consider signing these Treaties. 
Even in the 1700's. the "Indians" knew they had rights and reminded the English officids 
ofthis fact Most recent court cases on hunting or fishing nghts of the Mi'kmaq or 
Maiecite in the area have assurned the vaiidity of the Treaty of 1725 and upheId it. As a 
resdt, I wodd argue that were the Treaty of 1725 put to the test in the Supreme Coint 
treaty anaiysis as set out in Simon, it would be found to be in hill force and effect today. 
Thus, to apply the treaty andysis to the Treaty of 1725, these four questions 
would have to a~swered according to the evidence: 
(1) Was the Treaty of 1725 validIy created by competent parties? 
(2) Does the Treaty of 1725 contain either direct mobility rights or rights 
incidentai to the prbary rights which wodd give a mobility right, and 
what is the nature and scope of such rights? 
(3) Has the Treaty of 1725 been terminated or limiteci? 
(4) Are the vanous mies of the Wabanaki Confederacy covered by this Treaty? 
The nrst question is one of the Mian delegates' and Crown deIegates7 capacity to 
enter into a valid and binding treaty. The court in Simon accepted the case Iaw which 
permh extrnisic evidence in the detemination of micertainties or ambiguities m treaties. 
The Treaiy c f I 7 ' 5  mentions the names of two Penobscots who cIaimed they were 
empowered to enter mto the Treaty for dI the maes- HistorÏcaI documents such as 
conference minutes indicate that the four chiefs who ended up signing the Treaty did so 
with the authority of the other tnibes. One British observer wrote: 
... tribes sent belts to those f i e s  for confirmation of their 
agreeing to what shall be conchded-." 
As weU, the Iater ratifications of the Treaty by ail the tnbes is fùrther evidence 
tbat the deIegates had the authority tu speak for the other tnibes. Major Mascarene had 
spent the whole Swnmer of 1726 ratifying the peace with those tnaes. JoumaIs were kept 
of the day to day business regardmg the Indians and presents were recorded for each tnie 
who ratified or signed duplicates of the Treaty. There is corroborahg evidence that the 
original signers to the Treaty of 1725 had ample authority to sign on behalf of dl. There 
is also anthropologicd evidence, already mentioued, which desm%es the political ties 
between the goup of Abonginal Nations ofien referred to as the "Eastern Indians", 
"Abenaki" or Wabanaki Codederacy. The Penobscot were considered the superior or 
stroager of the groups and it wouId therefore be na-, taking into account theù 
refationship, that they would assume a Iead role orbe spoke persons in Treaty 
negotiations." The Penobscot were so outspoken about their land rights in negotidons 
becanse they were responsible for the welfare of the other triies and they took that 
responsîîility seriously. " 
The second part of the nrst issue on capacity is the capacity of Governor D m e r  
to negotiate the Treaty of 1725 on behaffof the King of Great Bntain- The questions to 
m e r  wouid be: (1) Was Governor Dummer a representative of the King who hefd an 
" Docmnentaqr Wory of ttie State of Mame, Conference Kth The Megotes VOL EL (no page refefe~lcc). 
@ New Brunswick Magazine, ~~ of the MuIi;Feets VOL 1, no, 1,1898, @u page referace), 
PenhaflowP fndrmt W i  (no hMio&rap6icaI intiormati'ou a d b I e ) .  
important and authoritative position? and (2) Wodd it be reasonable for the Aboriginal 
Nations to conclude that Governor Dummer had the requisite power to bind the British 
Crown with this Treaty? 
On the f h t  question, Dummer had been given specifïc instructions as a Govemor 
on how he was to deal with the tribes. These instructions included a mandate to maintain 
or establish peace and fnendship with the Indians and to deal justly with them in their 
lands and possessiofl~.~' Governor Dummer was the Govemor of the whole 
Massachusetts Bay Colony, which included oId Nova ScotiaR, where the Treaty was 
negotiated and was the highest up in the chah of political power in the colony. He was a 
direct "arm" of the KUig of Great Bntain who gave him his commi*ssion and thus, his 
position was one of great a~thonty? 
Due to his high ranking position, it wouId be reasonable for the Nations to have 
believed that he could bind the British Crown. In the Conferences between the Engiish 
and the Aboriginal Nations, usudiy the chiefs were sent as deIegates and Governor 
Dummer as the representative of the Crown. Even when Major Mascarene was sent to 
have the Treaty ratined by the Nations in 1726, he was assisting Govemor Dummer, and 
the Nations were well aware of that fact Any questions or disputes regardhg the Treaty 
were mostly addressed to Governor Dummer- " Thus, considering theu varÎous deaIings 
with Govemor Dunmier on Treaty issues and alliance issues and hÏs high ranking 
-- - 
Our Land, supra note 43 at 140- 156. 
" 18d Cenr~ry Map, supra note 3% 
Ibid 
"People of the Downr, supm note 36. 
" Treafy of 1725, supra note 42- 
position, I wodd argue that it would have been reasonabIe for the tribes to believe he had 
the capacity to bind the British Crown. 
The next issue set out in Simon is whether or not the Treaty contains direct 
mobiiity rights or rights incidental to the exercise of the primary rights which wodd 
UicIude a mobility right, and an indication of the scope of those rights. Agaiu, the court 
accepted that the case Iaw had demonstrated that a fair, Iarge and liberal interpretation of 
ambiguous treaty provisions is necessary. Again, it is to be noted that the Treaty is to be 
read as it was understood by the Indians and not that of the Cmwn's lawyers. The court in 
R. v. Home " dso agteed that wording alone does not sunice to detennine the legal 
nature of a treaty and therefore extrinsic evidence may be used. Finally, in R. v. TcIylor 
and Williams " the court had to interpret a Treaty with regard to hunting rights. The court 
allowed the use of the minutes of the negotiations leading up to the treaty which detailed 
the concem by the chiefs for protection of those nghts. In this case, the minutes of the 
counciI were as  much a part of the Treaty as were the written articles. The court heId that 
extraneious matenai is properfy before the court when there is ambiguity in the treaty.* 
It is documented the concems the AborighaI Nations had in regards to the borders 
between the different powers and constantiy queried of their mobility rights. The 
accumdation of these concenis were Iater addressed again in the J i  Treaty, which 
specifrcaIiy recognized that Indians M g  on both sides of Uie border bad the ri& of fke 
passage. Thus, I wodd argue that these promises of fiee passage be mchded m any 
d e m o n  of '%ee Iiberty of the pason" and "non-molestation of the person" 9r the 
present treaty's text. It was noted time and t h e  again in the minutes of the conference 
Ieadùig to the Treaty of 1725, that the Indian Nations were not giving up their lands and 
that whiIe some s m d  settfement was permitted, the Mans retained aiI the rights 
associated with their traditional territories which would include mobility. 
From the case law, it is appropriate to look at the context of a word or phrase 
when trying to establish its scope within a treaty. Knowing ail the concems indians had 
over their ability to tnwel theu territones, undisturbed for huating and fishhg and other 
travel it is not surprishg that they had their concem addressed in the Iater Jay Treaty. 
The Jay Treaîy h p l y  addressed concems that were already present and put to paper, the 
ability to cross the border. The promises under the Jay Trenty were meant to address 
mobility concerns that had evolved after the Treaty of 1725 was signed and the Indian 
Nations saw the power struggIe between the two Eurupean powers over Indian land. 
Given the large, liberal interpretation that treaties are entitled to, I wouid argue that the 
"fm Iibeay" and "non-molestation" promises m regards to hmting and 0th- activities, 
referred to in the Treaty of I725 wouId include the nght to cross the traditional te~~itones, 
now divided by the border, to hunt, fish, trade or any other traditionaI activity, without 
behg subject to the Immigration Act. CertainIy, these rights wouid preclude Confederacy 
members £tom behg harassed or detained or m any way imposed upoa by either 
government at the border. I beiieve these rÎghts wodd be in keeping with the principies as 
enunciated ni Simon. 
The court in Tifor ,  supra heId with regard to Cmwn actÏons: 
In approuching the t m s  of a treaty-.. the honor of the 
Crown ik ulways w d v e d  and no appearance of "sharp 
dealing"shouId be sanctiuned. " 
The occurrence of "sharp deaiings" on the part of the Crown g e n d y  in treaty 
negotiations is well documented An English official wrote to the Council of Trade and 
Plantations about the then recent wars with the Indians, where he stated in part: 
neir quarreis and wurs were not for ambition, empire 
or bloudthirstmess but to defend their property and 
bmn& ... Their injures have been very great, as dntesting 
them of their land by force orfiaudJirst making them 
d m k  and then to sign what they knew not what. .. 
Ad to this our inhumuniîy tu them ... We vi@ t h m  with al1 
rnanner of nanies. and opprI0z~s Ianguage, cheat abuse and 
beat them. somerimes tu the loss of limbs. pelt them with 
stones and set dogs upon them ... tu0 ofien 
an Article of Peace h a  nrn in one sense in English and 
quite contrav in Indian. by the Govmor S express 
order. .. 
As can be seen fiom this passage, the Eugiish admittedly dedt unjustly with 
Aboriginal Nations, through the use of force, intimidation, aIcohoI, h u d  and faIse 
promises. It wodd be hard to thmk of a situation more unjust and thus I wouid argue that 
these actions by the Government firrther justines giving the rights contained in the 
Treaty, and any incidentd rights, as broad and large an interpretation as possibIe. 
The scope or extent of the rights shouid be considered h m  the perspective of the 
"natural understanding of the Indians". In this case, the Nations throughout history 
stresseci repeatediy the importance of their ability to pass fieely within thek territory 
which was not fashioned around the political bordas of the Engiish, Not ody were the 
. - 
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groups promised fke hcberty of their traditionai huntkg and fishing practices as usuai, 
they were promised truck houses, kedom of religion and that no one would molest them 
in the? bbvels" as evidenced in the Treaty, its ratifications and promises, as welI as 
conference minutes. Similarly in the IaterJay Treaty, the Indians were given an 
exemption b r n  border duties to cornphnent their right of fkee passage. One of the moa 
important histoncd documents supporthg a specific right of Eee passage over En@*& 
territories and borders, were the instructioas to Crown officiais directing them to promise 
the indians: 
... t h e  wilC nevet be moleste4 in their hunting. travels or 
fuhing, ut any time wronged or iinposed U D O ~  in their 
pade or truck of thekfurs, etc." (emp hm*s added) 
1 would argue that the signatories have a Treaty right to not be molested, wronged 
or imposed in theu travels, which inchdes travek for the purpose of transporthg or 
tnicking their fius for trade or their travefs in the pkt ofhunting or fishing. They aIso 
have an Aboriginal treaty nght to not be molested in the practice of their religion which 
would indude the performance of ceremouies in traditional temtories obiivious to any 
"borders" as set by the European powers. This would include ail  their traditionai activities 
whether it be sustename activities or sociai and poiiticaI interaction. AU of these treaty 
rights are dram fkom the articles of the Treaty of 1725126 and the correspondhg 
promises as provided above which are aIso part of the Treaty. 
The third issue m the mterpretation of this Treaty is whether or not the Treaty has 
been te-ated or rmiitecL8' In Shm,  q r a ,  the court deak with termination by 
" LG Dunbar to ML Popple. C o I o d  Papas Cadendiar vol 37. (no page derence). [[ieLelnafter DunbmI. 
" Shan, supz note 46. 
hostiIities and termination by extinguishment and heId that once it has been established 
that a valid treaty has been eatered into, the party armg for its termuiation bears the 
burden of proving the circumstances and events justmg the termination. Thus, in 
regards to a daim for the rïght to £kee passage, uninterrupted travel or non-molestation of 
hmting or religion, it wouid be up to the Ctown to idenw any specific hostilities and 
prove that these hostilities ifany, had the effect of terminating the Treaty. The budm is 
the same shouid the government d e g e  extinguishment. As explained earlier, the Crown 
requires "strict proof of the fact of extinguishrnent" as welI as evidence of c1ea.r and plain 
intention to extbguish treaty rights. I believe that the Crown would have no more 
evidence in a c l a h  today, to establish termination or extinguishment, than they did in 
Simon, and thus the Treaty 41725 wodd be of as much force and effect today, as it was 
at the t h e  it was concluded. 
The fourth issue is whether those who subrnit ii daim are covered by the Treaty of 
1725. The case law and the histoncal documents aIready presented, are evidence that the 
Cape Sables (Mi'Ianaq), St. John's (Maliseet), Penobscot, Naridgwalk and the other 
smaller m%es previoudy mentioned, were mciuded in the Treaty. Aiso, the joumds of 
English officiais and minutes at Conferences refer to the Eastern Indians, Abenaki and 
various tnbes mterchangeably. Zfthere had been any doubt as tu whether the Mi'kmaq 
and Maliseets and Penobscots were mcluded, CoIoneI Westbrook in his letter noted that: 
... St John mrd Cape Sable indians have agreed to abide 
by what the Penobscot indiam have agreed to m d  obide 
by whar tliqr s h d  agtee to - tltey m e  w~-ning tu be at 
peace.-- 82 
Lmm of Westbmok, supm note 1 - 
Theù hclusion in the Treaty is mainly evidenced by their ratification of the 
Treaty during the summer of 1726. nie Chiefof the Cape Sables Indians ratifîed the 
Treaty on May 3 1,1726 with Major Mascarme. 1 believe we can conclude that the entire 
group of Abenaki or Eastern Indians as descn'bed in the territorid maps provided, are 
covered by this Treaty. Further 1 would argue that the Treaty of 1725 gives the uidian 
Nations theu mobility rights either directly as a protection fiom imposition of their 
travels or incidental to their nghts of fiee exercise of their hunting, trading and religious 
rights, and is stilI in force today. As a resuit, that Treaty would be protected under section 
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 as an "existing" treaty right. 
As well, section 88 of the Indian Act, provides that the terms of a treaty wilI be 
paramount to any provincial legislation which may be in conflict. Therefore, it would 
foIIow that provincial Iaws shouid fdI in the face of a treaty right. Unfortrmately, the case 
law has held those treaty rights to the same justification test as seen in R v. Sparrow." a 
case on Aboriginal rights that wi11 be deait with later in this chapter. In the case of border 
rights, we are deaihg with federd legislation, under the Immigmton Act. With regards to 
federaI legidation generaily, there is a divergence of opinion as to whether the same 
priucipfes that apply to Abonginal rights, shouid dso apply to Treaty rights. 
1 thuik there is an inherent d i f f i c e  between Aboriginal and Treaty rights in the 
sense that while the former is significant for its basis in the history and d t u r e  of a 
Nation, the latter has those characteristics and an additionai soîemnity in the good faith 
exchange of rÎghts and respollslcbiIities that the Aborigmal Natiom have relied on to the 
most part to thek detriment. Pa- MackIan in his artick "Fkst Nations Self- 
Government md the Borders of the Canadian Legatlmaghation"'" argues that treaties 
are solema agreements that shodd remain paramount over both provincial and federd 
J d c e  Larner's statement in Sioui that "{the) v-y 
defiition of a treaty ... makes it impossible to avoid the 
conclusion thut a Peary c m o t  be exthguikhed without the 
consent of the Indians iirvolved" ought [O be taken 
s&usly as precederttiol support for the proposition that 
feded and provincial IegtsIation is not paramount over 
conjricn'ng treuty gumanteesr promises made to natives by 
the Crown acght to be imagined as setting the boundaries 
ofpemtirsible [egidative actii@ in thef ir tw~~ Imagining 
treaties in thù way forces recoizrt'deration oftraditionai 
undwstundings of the nature of legiautive mthority: its 
end result would be to view treuties entered into &y the 
Crown with native peoples rn constitutiontd documents 
dmmca~ingpermr.Ssible and impennbsiib[e spheres of 
legisutive authority as it intersects with native interests." 
1 agree with the above interpretation of the paramountcy of AborigEiai treaties. 
There can be no greater "Iaw" or obiigation, than a treaty between two Nations who have 
put their min& to the future and their solemn agreement as to how that future will 
evoIve. S a a c e s  are made and compromises are negotiated m good faith with the 
presumption that both sides will honor their promises. There is no conceivable way Ui 
which the Govemment codd jus* an infiingement of a treaty right. The Treaty is a 
solemn past between two Nations that is meant to be honored mtiI snch t h e  as both 
parties consent to achange. The court m S M  while holding that there was a treaty m 
that case, interpreted the Treaty in such a way so as to mcorporate the '%aIidity" of 
European settIement- So too couid the court address issues such as National Secrrrity 
issues as an implied condition of the Aboriginal treaties inctuding the Jay Treuty. Justice 
McLaughh in her dissent in Van der Peel stated that the way to reconde Aborïginai 
rights and Crown interests is by negotiation that ends in an agreement; a treaty protected 
under section 35(1). With regard to reconciliation, McLachlin J. held: 
Tradtionaolly this h m  been done through the b-eaty process. 
bused on the concept of the abonginal people and the 
Crown negotiating and concluding ajuît solution to their 
divergent interests, @en the historicalfict that they are 
irretrrtrrevably compelled to [ive togethm. At th& stage. the 
stage of reconciliction, the courts play a iess important 
mie. It is for the aborigrnul peoples and the other peoples 
of Canada to work out ajust accommodarion of the 
recogniied aborignal rights? 
ifthere are problems with those commitments later, it is for the Abonginai group 
and the Crown to try to renegotiate, otherwise, the treaty as uitended, stands "as is'. The 
situation of treaty nghts is very different fiom Aboriginal nghts. Mthough both are 
protected mder section 35(1) of the Constitution Act. 1982. treaty nghts are by theK very 
nature Aboriginal nghts that have already gone through the process of reconciliation, 
Treaties are the resuIt of the Crown and the Aborighai Nation reconciluig the Crown's 
sovereignty with the haditional AbonginaI rights of the Nation. The deaI has aiready been 
made and reconded with Crown interests. The Crown at that time not oniy had input into 
the reconciliation, but dso had the drafters &te up the Treaties IargeIy in their favor. 
The Crown c m  not in good faith, Iater suggest that because they have new interests to 
protect that the Treaty itseifmust be re-reconciled with these new interetm. That process 
- 
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is cded re-uegotiation and it takes both parties to participate and consent to the changes 
that will be made to the treaty* if any. 
Unfortunately, the current situation is Canada is that any federal legislation would 
have to pass the justincation test as set out in R. v. Spamowt7 In this test, once the 
Aboriginal claimant has shown that they were acting pursuant to an Aboriginal right, the 
Cmwn must show that the right has been extinguished or the burden shifts to the Crown 
to prove that there is a valid legislative objective for interfiring with the Aboriginal nght. 
Here, the Crown would have to reconcile its fiduciary duty for Aboriginal peopIe by 
showing that the right was infringed as little as possible, that where appropriate, 
compensation was paid, and that the Abonginal group was c o n s ~ l t e d ~ ~  As stated above, 
this process o f  double reconciliation is fundamentally flawed, as with regards to treaties, 
reconciliation has aiready taken pIace. 
With regards to the f e d d  lmmi&ation Act, I believe, that based on the above 
discussion, the Mi'lanaq could show that the nght to cross the Canada - U.S. exists in the 
Treaty of Z725/26, and that thjs Act interferes with that right. In addition, the Crown bears 
a heavy butden m proving extinguishrnent Given that the court in Simon found that the 
huntmg rights under the same Treafy of 1752 had not been exthguished, and that the 
evidentiary base wodd be similar for this treaty, as it was in Simon, 1 have no doubt that 
the Crown would lack SUffXcient evidence to establish extinguishment FinaIIy, with 
regards to thejustincation part ofthe test, 1 wodd argue that the justification test does not 
appLy to Treaties- NonetheIess, wo&g withli the present case law, I wodd argue that 
" Badg-, supra note 44. 
"filil, 
while protecting the Nation's borders wouid be a valid legislative objective, 1 beIieve that 
the Crown wouid be unable to demonstrate that they impaired the Treaty right as Little as 
possible or that they have compensated or consulted with the Aboriginal Nations affected 
by the legislation. 1 have already alluded to less intrusive ways of dealing with the border 
issue in my previous chapter, such as identification cards. 1 think the Crown wodd be 
bard pressed to Say that there exists no other way, but the current way, when no nation 
wide consultation has taken place with the Aboriginai groups to fhd out. No one has 
offered the Nations any compensation yet, so I doubt the Crown has reaily put much 
thought into their fiduciary duty to take these preIhhary steps. As a result, the Crown 
would fail to both justiQ their legislation and to reconcile their fiduciary duty towards the 
member Nations of the Confederacy. 
The last aspect of the treaty test as set out Shon is who cm claim to be a 
beneficiary of the right to cross the border. The AboriguiaI Nations of the Confederacy, 
be they now Canadian or American, should have a complete right to h e  passage based 
on their T r e u ~  of U2.X The specific Aboriginai people who would be entitled to mobility 
rights, incIude the "S tatus Indians" as defhed in the Indm Act, as welI as the n a W  
bom descendants of the orÏginaI Nations who signed the Treaty. The Treaty of 1725.26 
specincaliy Ïncludes the descendants of the Nation signatories, stating: 
... S m g  unto the Penobscut, Nm'dgwaik and other m-bes 
within his Majesty 's province aforesaid md thek naturaï 
descendants. ? (emphasis added) 
The Tteaty of 17'2 was even more specinc as it mcIuded: 
M W  Jeun Baptiste Cope chièfsachem of the Tibe 
of Mick Mack Indians. IInabitiig the eastm corn of the 
saidprovhce, and Andrew Hadey Martin, Gabriel MMamn 
und Francis Jeremiah members and delegates of the said 
M e .  for themeives and the& suid triXe th& Leirs and the 
heirs oflheir heirs-formerr g0 (emphasis added) 
The case law has only required that the claimant show a substantiai comection to 
the onginai signers as held in R v. Fow[er 9'. In the case of status ''Indians" in Canada, 
the substantial connection is a legai one as provided by the Indian Act. in regards to the 
non-statu or Metis claimants, the same general test is appiied, Le. whether they have a 
substantial comection to the original agnatory Nations. In the Fowler case, the court 
held: 
A claimant who could ... prove a substantiai connection 
with a signatory of the treaty, could mail himerof the 
rights enshrined in the treaty without regard to his staîus 
under the Indian Act, 92 
The accused ui that case had shown he was an AboriginaI descendant of the 
orighaI simatory Nation, by vunie of the üneage traceci through hÏs mother who was a 
status "Indian", even though he was not a "status" Indian, It is subrnitted that the same 
connection test wouId appIy with equaI force to Arnerican Man descendants of the 
treaty signers based on their ancestry. The court in Simon heId that there shouid not be an 
"impossible" burden of p r ~ o E ~ ~  1 would argue that based on the case Iaw and the hiberal 
interpretive prhcipIes regarchg treaties, that all the Wabanaki members wouid be 
beneficiaries of the treaty rights under the Treaty of l725/26 be they C d a n  or 
Arnerican, based on their substantid comection to the treaties as descendants of the 
signatones. The citizenship Lnposed on Abonginai peoples, based on a political border 
that was estabfished welI after the nghts were agreed to in the Treaties, should have no 
affect on those rights. The Cmvn, whether it is the provincial Crown, the Federal Crowu 
or the American Federal Crown, was stiU the Crown as seen by the Indians back when the 
Treaty was signeci. The Crown, is the Crown, is the Crown, and can not now Say they 
never intended to hifi1 its promises, and must, in good faith iive up to its obligations. 
93 Shm, supra note 46. 
T e  villify them with aii manner of names and 
opprions Irnguage, cheat abuse and beat them, 
somehes  to the las of ümbs, pelt them with 
stones an set dogs upon them ..."" 
ABORIGINAL RïGHTS AND CROSS BORDER MOBILITY: 
SECIION ilS(I) OF THE CONSlTTUTTON ACT, 1982: 
In 1982, section 35(1) was included in the Constitution Act 1982. It is under Part 
II, entitIed: Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples ofCanada and reads: 
35. (1) The exzsting Abonginal and trenty e h t s  of the 
Abonngrnal peoples of Canada are hereby 
recogniked and aflmed- 
(2) In this Act, "'Abo@inuipeoples of Canada " 
includes the Indian. IImr and Metis peopks of 
Canada, 
(3) For greuter certainty, in subsection (1) "'treaty 
righrs'include~ rights that now &t by way of land 
cluim agreements or mqy be su acquired. 
(4) Notwithstanding as ,  otiierprovision of this 
Act. the AbonC@naL and treaty r-ights referred to in 
sthsection (I) me gtraranteed equally to male and 
fmtae personr. '' 
The probIem for the courts, after the new additions to the Constitution Act, was 
how to interpret section 35 as it appiied to Aboriginal peopIe and their "Aboriginal 
@hW- The Sparrow case was the first Supreme Court of Canada case to deal with this 
issue and became "thet"defïnition of AborigmaI rights, dthough the case specincaüy 
dedt with fishing rights. This case set out the test of whether legisfation was ûdiinging 
Aboriginal rights. The case Iaw which foiIowed fbm the Supreme Court of Canada, 
94 B-r, supra note 79, 
nameIy R. v. V m  der P e e  R v. ~ladstone, '' and R v. N. T. C. Smokehwe," sets out a 
more detailed test, referred to as the "integrai to the culture" test For deteminhg whether 
an Abonginal right exists. Two other cases which came out in the same year, nanely, R. 
v. ~ d d '  andR v. Cote,"' expanded on some of the evidentiary considerations in 
litigating Aboriginal rights cases. AU of these cases will be discussed in this section, as 
they relate to Aboriginai rights held by the member Nations of the Wabanaki 
Confederacy. Abonginai rights are both part of the common Iaw o f  Canada and recentiy, 
part of Canadian constitutional Iaw, yet they are different ffom rights as held by non- 
Aboriginal Canadian citizens. John Burrows in his text on Aboriginal Legal Iss~es~,'~~ 
explained the ciifference: 
Abon*grhal rights dc~erfioom other common lm nghts Nt 
another sign~ficant respect. Genetaily, rights in a 
dmocracy m e  dependent tpon their recognition or 
f imation &y governmental authority or Imv. Aboriginal 
nghts a'st because they are dmivedfiom aboriginal 
pracrices. customr. und traditions. Bey exist in Cmadh 
lm rrot becme of governmental recognition, but because 
they were not atzhguiSled upon Bntish or French 
assertrions of sovera'gnty or their estabiishrnent of 
goveninientd atithority rir what ù now called Canada- By a 
process known as the Doctrine of Conmiuity, the rights of 
the aboriginal peoples remained until such t h e  as the 
European powers erplicily altered or abrogated tfiem." 
'' Consîitun'on Act, 1985 s.35(1). Sections (3) & (4) wae added in 1983. 
% V m  der Peet. supm note 12- 
* Glaktonn, Npra note 59. 
a SrnoRehouse, supra note 59. 
* R Y. ~ d - ,  119961 3 S.CE 1 O 1. @aemaftnAdatlfs1. 
" R v. Cote, LI9963 3 S.CK 139- [heremaAer CoteI. 
'O' 1. BUPOW* Abort'gtiral Legalbsuer: Cm- Matmàk & Commentary, ~~ Butierworths, 1998) 
In the foIIowing section, 1 wil1 review the case Iaw on Aboriginai rights and how 
it relates to cross border mobility for the mernber Nations of the Wabanaki Confederacy. 
I will aiso address the probIem of bcAmm~can" Indians asserting Abonginai rights in 
Canada, and what it meaos for the Confederacy. 
One of the most important aspects of Aboriginal rights is that they are not derived 
h m  Legislation, nor are they dependent on expiicit recognition by the European powers 
that settied this land and brought their law with them as stated above. Recentiy, the 
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Adams explained that: 
[Vhe fact that a particuiar practice, mtorn or tradition 
continzted following the amval of the Europeuns. but in the 
absence of the fuma1 gloss of le& recognition fiom the 
European colonriers, shoufd not undennine the protection 
accorded to aboriginaIpeoples. Section 35(1) would fail to 
achiwe its noHe purpose ofpreserving the intetegr and 
defining features of distinctive Iraorignal societies i f t  on& 
protected those defining features which were fortunute 
enough to have received the Iegd approval of British and 
French coion~zers! O3 
This case was a d m h a t i o n  of the previous case Iaw on Aboriginal rights, which 
are mostly based on the Spanow case mentioned earlier. Before I address border crossing 
nghts for the Wabanaki Confederacy, it is important to review this key case in Aboriginal 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Sparrow, supra med the previous case law on 
AborÏgmaI peopIes in the determination of their rÏghts to corne up wÎth a test for 
'03 Adams, Supm note 99 at 12ï-122- 
interpreting the rights as protected under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. The 
Court started with Nowegriick . supra which held: 
... Reaties and statutes relating to Indm shouîd be 
Iiberaily constmed and doubtjiii expressions resolved 
in favor of the in di an^^'^ 
Then, they cited an Ontario appeai court case, R. v. Agwa los which held that this 
p ~ c i p l e  in Nowegijick shodd apply to the interpretation o f  section 35(1). FinaLy, 
Guerin v. The Queen '" was referred to, for its principle of interpretation that the Crown 
owes a fiduciary duty to AboBpinal people and that section 35(1) ought to be defhed m 
iight of this histork relatiouship. 
The test as enunciated in Sparrow was compnsed of Four basic questions, which 
were: (1) Has the applicant demonstrated that he or she was acting pursuant to an 
Aboriginal right? (2) I f  so, has that right been exthguished ? (3) I f  not, the colut must 
then decide whether the Iegislation has the e f f i  of interfering with an existhg 
Aboriginal right, the burden of which lies on the group claiming the right, (4) If yes, then 
the burden switches to the governrnent to justi& the Iegislation, by answering: (a) Was 
there a vaIid legislative objective, Iike preventing h m  to the populace, consenration, or 
oths objectives which are compellnig and substantid ? Here the court m Sparrow 
considered and accepted the prÏority as set out in Jack v. Tite Queen, which was: 
(i) c o ~ ~ ~ m u t i o n ;  (ii) Indion f ishq;  (iii) non-Indian 
connnerciaIfishing; or (N) non-Indian sports fihing; the 
h d e n  of conrenration measUres shouId not fallprimanani'y 
upon the I n d i a ~ f i s h ~ . ' ~ ~  
" NowegiJick, supra note 49 at 36. 
R. v. Ag- (1988), 28 OAC. 20 1. [herehfh AgmaI. 
'06 GU& v- R, [19w 2 S.C.R. 335- @ m 5 d k  Guerin]. 
'"Jack IL R, CI9801 1 S.CK294at313- @ereïi&erJack]. 
The next question wodd be (b) Did the Crown reconcile its fiduciary duty to 
Aboriginal people with the legislation by: (0 ensuring the legislative plans treat 
Aboriginal people in a such a way as to ensure that their rights were taken seriously? 
Some of these considerations wouid include: whether there has been as Iittle infigement 
as possible in order to effect the desired result, whether in a situation of expropriation 
compensation is available, and whether the Aboriginal group in question had been 
consulted, 'Og 
Yet, despite this case being heraided by Aboriginal rights advocates as "THE" 
case which established a favorable tool for determining section 3S(I) rights, there were 
some inherent problems with the Sparrow test. First of ail, the lower court decisiow 
which fo1Iowed adopted various hterpretations of what the test entailed. Some decisions 
vigorously upheId anythÏng which looked Iike an AbonginaI rÏght to fish and some courts 
vigorously upheId the Legislation which was infi.inging upon these rights, under the guise 
of conservation. Despite the hoped for predictability in interpretation Sparrow was 
expected to give, the decisions of the lower courts which ensued were just the opposite. 
The decisions conflicted with one another over whether the test was intended to uphold 
Aboriginal rights or to uphold conservati~n.'~~ It aIso begged the question whether section 
35(I) was more important for the recognition of Aboripinai rights, or the recognîtÏon of 
the "asserted" sovereignty over AboriginaI people. Michael Asch and Patrick Mackiem in 
" Spmw* supra note 15. 
'" S e  R Y. MysIlraII (I993), 146 N B R  ( 2 0  345. R v. McCiy (I992), 127 NBK (26) 328, R v. Denny 
(1990), 94 N S K  (26) 253, (1991), IO4 NScR (2d) 257, R v- Tnomar Peter Pau1 (t996), 182 N B X  (2d) 
270, (1998),196 N B K  (2d) 292,[19981 S.C.C.A. No. 298, R V, Pe&Jeziw (l996), 175 N B K  (26) 70, 
FwIer, ,supra note 28. 
Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An Essuy on R v. ~~arrow,"O explain this 
inherent problem with section 35(1) and how the court in Spmow uiterpreted its 
meaningr 
In sum, although the Court in Sparrowpays attention to an 
inherent theory of aborigiul right. its reasonr uitimately 
betray a reiiunce on a contingent rîghts perspective, which 
serves to rein in the scope of s3S(I) riglits. The arsertton 
of Canudian sovereignty h qfiicient to nulZlifL und render 
non--tent any pre-exrkting d a i m  of ubonngrnai 
sovereign& which would otherwise constitute an "eristing 
aboriginal right " within the meaning of s -3w) .  ... 
The Constitution Act, I867specij7es that Indians und landr 
reserved fur Indians fail under the exciusive Iegidative 
authority of Pariiument [in section 91(24)]. ... 
Yet nowhere in the Constitution Act. 1867 does it actuaIi"y 
state that the Canadian State en~oys overeignty over its 
indigenous population. ... 
Tlius, despite initiai appearances to the cuntraryC the 
~ t ~ ~ c u t i o n  for the assertion of Canadian Sovereignty. un 
assertion which undipins the ccherence of the contingent 
theory of abori@ai rights, cmnot be focated in the text of 
the Constitution Act, 1867."' 
There was dso a problem with the test itselfas laid out in Spamow. Despite the 
cornt's anphasis on the Crown's heavy burden of justification stemmiag from their 
fiduciary duty to Abonginai people, the test had the effect of revershg that onus back 
onto the Aboriginal people in pmving their Aboriginal rights. The nnt step of the test 
req@red the Abonginal people to show that there was an ÏnEngement of their rights. 
That would be an easy enough task had the court not gone on to defÏne what additional 
items to consider in order to establish a prima facie hfihgement. It read: 
To detennine whether the fishing n ' t s  have been 
interfered such os to constitute a prima facie infEngement 
of s.35, certain u u e s t i  rnust 6e asked. First , is the 
limitation unreasonuble? Second, does the regdation 
impose undue harhhip? Third. does the reguIatiort dmy to 
the holders of the right theirprefmed rneans of aercising 
that right? The onus of proving a prima facie infngement 
lies on the individual or grorp challenging the 
Iegidation!" (emphasis added) 
The first consideration is whether the inningement was unreasonable. Since the 
govemment m u t  later prove that their Mrbgement on the Aboriginal nght was 
masonable in t m s  of its objective and in light of its fiduciary duty, it seems odd that the 
Aboriginal people must tirst prove it to be unreasonable. The test was only supposed to 
be whether there was a prima facie idkingeusent, not the additional burden of 
reasonabIeness. The inequitable burden on the Aboriginal peopIe did not stop there. The 
next question which "rnust" be answered in order to prove a prima facie infringement of 
an Aboriginal nght is whether the legislation hposed "trndue" hardship. Once again, the 
test Ïs lackmg in cIarity, since no "hardship" is "due" and it is doubtful that a m m  
inconvenience would be considered a hardship at all. Thus, the word "imdue" is not 
necessary, d e s s  the court only intendeci to mclude the severest of hardships. 1 wouid 
consider that having to wait untiI a band office opens to cegister for a license is a 
hardship, and delaying a traditional or ceremonid tri@ for hours or even days is a hardship 
for some eiders. The court did not espouse a test or serÏes of questions by which ta 
Io Sparrow. supra note 15 at 1 1 1 2  
determine if the hardship was "due" or 'imdue': Yet, in Spmrow, the court held that it 
couid not be a 'tnere inconvenience". 
Six years iater, in R v. Nikal '13, another Abonginal f i shg  rights case, the 
Supreme Court confhned its position on having to prove 'bdue" hardship in 
establishg a prima facie interference with an AborÏginal right. In N W ,  the appellant 
was an Abonginal person charged with fishing without a Iicense con- to the British 
Columbia fishing regulatioos. Under these reguiations, Aboriginal persons were entitled 
to fish for salmon in the manner that they preferred, but they had to have a Iicense under 
the fisheries regulations. Although the appellent argued that the license requirernent was 
an f ingrnent  of his Aboriginal right to fish, the Supreme Court held it was a necessary 
part of the identification process which cecognizes that right- 
It must aiso be remedwed that abo@frtal rights. 6y 
definition. c m  on& be exercked by aboriginal people. 
Moreover. the nature and scope of abon'ginaI rights wi&l 
flequentiy 6e dependent on upon rnembmship in particuiar 
bands who have established purtin<lm rights in specific 
localities. In this context, a licerrse may be the lem 
intrusive way of estubilising the existence of the aborîgrnal 
nght for the a6ongrnaIperson as well as prevenring those 
who are not a6origrnulsfi.onr erercl'sr'ng aboriginal 
right~."~ 
While I agree that there must be some sort of identification used to establish 
AborÏgind people h m  non-aborighai people, certaidy a license is NOT the least 
intrusive way of accornpfishing this task A simple form of identitication that cumntly 
are hdian status car& which indicates ail  the necessary mfomation: a v d a b l e  
registration number, a picime and which band the fisher belongs to with regards to 
territorhi fishing. A license signifies "permission" by the Govemment to fish, as opposed 
to an acknowIedgement of the AboriginaI right to fisk I thÏnk the issue of the c u I M  and 
ceremonid aspect of fishùig is Iost when the issue is made bbhardship" as opposed to 
necessity. At a minimum, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans could have consulted 
with the band, and perhaps agreed upon the band cards or perhaps a unique card which is 
used soIeIy to identify Aboriginal rights holders and is culturaily sensitive of the nature of 
the nght. Abonginal people beîieve that this nght came form the Creator, not a 
goverment agency. With respect, the court couid have been more sensitive to the 
Aboriginal aspect of our rights. Rather than expand my critique of either Sparrow or 
Nikal m e r ,  1 I I I  now discuss the Supreme Court of Canada's clarification of the test 
in the Van der Peet tnlogy."' 
The Spamow case, respectfûiIy, did not him out to be as promishg a tool for 
Aboriginal people as fkst hoped, aithough, it was more progressive than past decisions 
such as CaLder. supra for instance. Then came the Smokehouse, supra, Van der Peet, 
sripra and GIaaStone, supra tdogy which reconsidered the whole issue of Aboriginal 
rights m light of their commercial aspects. Since the issue in Spmrow was fishing for 
food or ceremonid purposes, the Supreme Court had to revisit Spmow and the test it had 
set out. The 7-2 rnajority in Von der Peet enunciated a more detaiied test for definmg 
Aborigina.1 rights and expandeci on the major considerations that the Iower courts must be 
aware of m determining sui generis nghts, such as Aboriginal f i s e  rights. In the end, 
the accnsed m V i  der Peet f a  to meet the AboripinaI rights test to uphoId a right to 
'''Ibid- a t  para 95. 
"* Y i  der P e e ~  Npm note 12, Gfadstone, . ~ p m  note 59, Smokehme, supray note 59. 
sell the fish she caught under her Indian Food Fish License. While 1 respectfùIIy beiieve 
that this case was wrongly decided, the decision did mark a clearer "Iegai" method for 
determinhg the scope and extent of Abonpinal rights. It is obvious that a more equitabIe 
altemative to rights adjudication is needed as the courts decide these issues based on 
fiawed assumptions such as Cmwn sovereignty over Aboriginal peoples as a given, or the 
need for Aboriginal people to prove to the Crown their rights as opposed to the Crown 
having to dispense with the burden of disproving the rights. In actuaiity, the Crown 
should be talking with Aboriginal groups and workuig out viable soIutions for Aboriginal 
peoples as opposed to the constant Iitigation. In this thesis, I will use the Iegd tools as 
given in these cases and try to take advantage of the positive aspects and show how they 
c m  be used to expand Aboriginal rÏghts in terms of mobility. This, of course, does not 
mean that I endorse the rigid Iegd system as the best route to senling Aboriginal claims. 
The Supreme Court explaineci that in Spamow it was not seriously disputed that 
the Musqueam Nation had an Aboriginal right to fish for food and thus it was 
unnecessary for the court to answer how the question of rights under section 35(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 are to be defined. Whereas in Van der Peet's case, it was 
necessary to recognize both the "rights" aspect and "Aboriginal" aspect of AboriginaI 
rights? which the court thought codd best be achieved through a ptrrposive approach to 
hterpreting section 35(1) of the Consttution Act, 1982. Ln that regard, Chief Justice 
Lamer heId: 
In my viav, the doctrine of Abor i ,a l  rights d s ,  and ù 
reco@ed md q@med by S. 32(1). becmrre of one simple 
fact- wrien Europe- arrbed in North A r n e ,  
Abo~gàdpeopfes  were already dere, living h 
communitties on the Cm4 iïn6parfiarfi~atiirg h distrncfive 
cuitures, rn they had done for centuntunesS It is this fact, and 
this fact above allotiter minority groups in Canadian 
society and which mandates their special legal. and nav 
constitutional stahr~."~ 
The Chief Justice went on to explain that Caldm recognized Abonginai rights as 
part of the cornmon law and that the above basis for Abonginai cights is consistent with 
the approach taken in Calder which held: 
Aithough I think that it ï3 c h r  that Indiun title in British 
Columbia cannot owe itr ongin to the Proclumatiorz of 
1763, the fact is that when the settiers came. the Indians 
were the% organized in societies and occupying the Iand 
as their forefathers had done for centuries. mis is what 
Indian titie means and it does not help one in the solution 
of thik problem to call it a 'personal or tmjiuctoos, right ': 
What they are asserting in this action is that thqy Lad a 
nght to contmue to [ive on their [an& as their forefathers 
had 1Ned and that this nght h a  never been lb@iIiy 
ating~ished"~ 
Section 35(1) oow ensures that the Aboriginal rights recognized and anirmed 
theremder can not be e~tinguished."~ Afier a iengthy consideration of Canadian, 
American and Australi*an cases, the Court in Van der Peet held that the jespnidence 
supports the proposition that Ab0ngina.i rights protected under section 35(1) are best 
understood as the means by which recognition is given to the fact that distinctive 
Aboriginal societies occupied North Amerka before the Ettropeans came, and the means 
by which to reconcile this prior occupation with Crown sovereignty. Then the court set 
out the test to identify whether an appellant has established an Aboriginal nght protected 
under that section: 
"' Y i  clerPeet, supranote 12 at538. 
'" Calder v. Attorney Grnerot of Brffiih CoIumbia, cl9731 S.CR 313. at 328.Befemafter CaIderI. 
V m  <ler Pe- supra. note 12 
... in order to be m Alo@$naZ right an activity mtat be 
an element of a pructice. o.utont or tradition integral to the 
dktr'nctnre mltlcre of the dbonginalgroup daiming the 
right* 
The court then set out ten factors to be considered in the application of the 
''Integral to a Distinctive Culture" test. The first factor is that the courts must take into 
account the perspective of the Aboriginal peoples thanselves. Yet, at the sarne time they 
must be careful to do so in terms which are cognizable to the non-Aboriginal legal 
system, Secoady, the courts must identiQ precisely the nature of the c l a h  being made in 
deteminhg whether an Aboriginal claimant has demonstrated the existence of an 
Abonginai right. This identification process wouid include: (a) the nature of the action 
done by the Abonginai person pursuant to an Aboriginal right, (b) the nature of the 
governent regdation, statute or action being irnpugned, and (c) the tradition, custom or 
practice being reiied upon to establish the nght. In regards to this anaiysis, the court 
specifically noted: 
Moreover, the court must beur in mittd that the activities 
may be the exercike in a m o d m  fonn of a practice, 
tradition or m t o m  that exised pnor to contact, and 
sharid v q  ifs characterization of the daim acc~rdin~l'y-~ 
The third factor to consider m the integral test is that in order to be integrai, a 
practice, custom or tradition must be of centrai significance to the Aboriginal society in 
question. This means that the Aborigmal person must show that this practlce was one of 
the thmgs which made the culture of the society distixictive. The cIaimant does not have 
to prove that the practice was distinct, as in mique, but the practice cm not be tme of 
every society; like eatmg to survive, for example. The practice aiso can not be occasional 
or incidental to another custom. Another way of Iooking at the assessrnent wodd be to 
ask, whether without this practice, would the culture be fundamentally altered. IZ' 
Contmuity of time is the focus of the fourth factor. It states that the practice, 
custom or tradition which constitute Aboriginal rights are those which have continuity 
with the traditions, customs and practices that existed prior to contact. In regards to such 
an apparentiy onerous evidentiary burden the court clarified that: 
That this ik the relevant time shoufd not suggest. however, 
that the Abonginal group ciaimikg the nght rnust 
accompikh the nert ta im~ossib?e task ofproducing 
çoncIusme ew Xence Fom pre-contact limes about the 
practices, custom and traditions of the& comrmrnity. It 
would be entirely contrav to the spirit and intent of s.35(l) 
to d i  Aborignal rights in mch fushion so as to 
precfude in pructice <rny successjù~ clami for the existence 
of n<ch a nght. The evidence relied upon &y the applicant 
and the coum may relate to Aboriginal practice, mtom 
or traditions post-contact; it si* neek to be directed at 
demonstrating which aspects of the Aboriginal community 
and society have their origins pre-contact. " (emphasis 
added) 
It is this concept of continuity that avoids the "fiozen rights" approach to section 
35(1). Thus, the evolution of these practices bto modem fonns wili  not prevent their 
protection as Aboriginai rights under section 35(1) as long as they have this contmuity 
with pre-contact times. The court dso stated that the Aboriginal group need not prove an 
unbroken chah of practice. The a c t ~ t y  codd have ceased for a tune iu the past and have 
since resurued again. Judges were aIso directed to adopt the same flexibk approach with 
continuity as they are to adopt in regards to evidence of the right. Continuity in ternis of 
the Metis was an issue to await detemination in a fiiture Metis cIaim.'" 
The fifth factor requires COLU& to approach the d e s  of evidence in light of the 
evidenhary difficdties inherent in adjudicating Abonginai claims. In terms of 
interpreting the evidence and enforcing the rules of evidence, fuhne courts are directed to 
be conscious of the speciai nature of Aboriginal claims and of the evidentiary dificulties 
in prowig rights which originate in times when there were no written records of the 
practices engaged in. This factor ties in with the sixth factor which requires that the 
claims of Abonginai rights must be adjudicated on a specific rather than generai basis. 
The court held that Aboriginal nghts are not "general and univend", that their scope and 
content must be determined on a case by case basis. Similarly, the seventh factor states 
that for a practice to coastitute an AboriginaI right it must be of independent sigdicance 
to the Aboriginal cultun in which it exists. This means that the right can not just be 
incidentai to another practice in that society. In other words: 
Incidental practices. ~ o m s  and traditions cannot qrraiify 
as Aborigrkal rights through a process of piggybackt'ng on 
integml practices, ~~stoms and traditi~m.''~ 
Another factor to consider is that the integrd to a distinctive culture test requires 
that a practice, custorn or tradition be distinctive; it does not require that that practice, 
custorn or tradition be distinct This means a practice must make the cuIture ' that  it is", 
as opposed to the practice being different fkom the practices of other culturestures The&th 
factor states that the idluence ofEuropean cuitare wilI ody  be relevant to the Inquisr ifit 
is demonstrated that the practice, custom or tradition is odv integral because of that 
influence- More specincaIIy, the court heId: 
Ifthe pructice. w t o m  or tradition was an integral part 
of the Abon'fiai community 's cuitare prior to contact with 
the Ewopeonr. the fact that the traditfon continued Mer 
the arrivai of the Europeans, and adapted in response to 
their mvai, is not relevant to detennination of the ciuim; 
Euzopem &al and influence cannot be used to depme 
an Abon'gritai group of an othenwse valid daim to an 
Abonginal right." 
The Iast factor to consider states that the courts must take into account both the 
relationship o f  Aboriginal peoples to the Iand and the distinctive societies and cultures of 
Aboriginal peoples. This consideration is a recognÏtion that Aboriginal rights aise not 
oniy h m  pnor occupation of the land, but also fÎom prior social organization and their 
distinctive cultures. The dissents in this case were more generous to the interpretation of 
the scope of Aboriginal rights. In this regard, Justice McLachh stated: 
Ifihe Abo~ginalpeople show that tfiey traditionally 
mtained themseIvesj?om the mteT or sea, they have a 
prima facie nght to continue to do su. absent a ireaty 
exchmging that ngfitfôr other considerution. In most 
cases, one worrld expect the AboriginaC tight to trade to be 
confned tu what ïk necessmy to provide basic hmaing 
transportation. ciothing and amenities - the modern 
equivaht of what the Aborïgina[peopk in question 
forme* tookfrom the land or thefihery, over and above 
what was repz"edforfood and ceremonialp~poses!'~ 
The dissents in Von der Peet wouid have been more generoos to the Abonginai 
claimants, and reflect the tme nature of the rights to which Aboriginai peoples are due. 
AborigfnaI peoples have Iived off the Iand on Turtie Island since time immemonla1. They 
have supported themselves m the manner in which they chose as most bomtifiû. This 
method of living off the land and chooshg how to go about doing so wouid appear to be 
most integral to a culture that indeed it codd not sunrive without doing so. The court has 
already paid iip service to what is integsal to a culture, and 1 can think of Iittie which is 
more inte@. It is uonic that it is a foreign court, with foreign laws and a foreign judge 
with the assistance of foreign anthropologists evidence, who in the end detemiine what is 
integral to that particular Nation- Mary-Ellen Turpel in her article Home/Land speaks to 
this foreign Iegai system: 
Tlie complerty stem from what can be called the 'aboriginal 
dimension ' of the legal dispute. This refus tu the fact that the 
dispues that have arrSen in these cuses stem directlyfom the 
[egacy of a colonial regime that continues to be imposed on 
aborigrird people by decontexr~aIking these conflicts and 
ignoring the impact of the iaw on aboriginalpeoples' lives- T' do 
oflienvise would denrand macal reflction on the adequacy and 
oppressive nature of the colonial regime establisited by the 
Constitution Act, 1867 and the Indian ~ c t .  *" 
The courts appear to be carrying on the same paternalistic legacy of deciduig what 
is m our best interests, that the Department of the Interior and the Indian Act started years 
ago. WhiIe the court, at the same time as it dismisses the h z e n  rights theory, (whereby 
the Abonginai Nation presumably does not have to exercise their rights in the same 
rnanner as they were exercised at contact) the court aiso adopts the theory in reaiity, by 
only recognizing practices that were integraï to their cdture pnor to contact. The corn 
have Ieft IittIe room for the evolution of the AborigmaI cuitmes to change and adapt to 
theIr ckciimstances. Yet, no one ho[& the same anCient standard to the European 
commmuties- One of the most precious characteristics of Aborigmal people is not that 
they provide a sentimental giimmer in the eye of Canadian society of the noble savage, 
but their abiIity to withstand the atrocities committed upon them by the Emopeans. It is 
their abiiity to stand in the face of death and SHI have the courage and forethought to do 
what they could to provide for their firture generations, hie our treaties for example that 
rnake them the peoples that they are today. 
The Europeans couId not trade fast enough with the Aboriginal Nations and take 
advantage of them, for the sake of profit back in Engiand. On the same no te, there exists 
no reason why Abonginal peopIe can not sustain themselves today by the very same 
practices if they so choose. I wish to reiterate that while I will continue with the legd 
maiysis of Abonginal rights, 1 do not accept some of the underlyuig assumptions and 
principles upon which the courts make their decisiou. I am simply trying to take the best 
parts of the decision and make them work for a right for Abonginai peoples to exercise 
theu rights, iike the right to fieely cross the Canada4J.S. border. It is with this 
understanding that I will proceed with the rest of the Van der Peet tnlogy. 
The Gladstone case did pick up on one of the problems with the Spmrow case, 
that being the test for prima facie kfrhgement of an Aboriginal rÏght. The Supreme 
Court explained: 
nie S p m w  test for infingrnent might semn, atfirst 
giance,to be intentai& cuntradictory. On the one han4 the 
test staies that the appeUmt needsimply show that thme 
hm been ap*a fucie htetjiérence with their rights in 
order to demonstrate t h  those nghts have been infnged, 
sugge~fcing thereby t h  any meankgfùf diinnrutiort of the 
appellant k rights wtïl constirte m higrnent for the 
ptnpose of t h  analys&. On the othw han4 the questrionr 
the test dkects camts to unswer nt detemtnting 
wliether un fnfnngement had takm place incorporate ideas 
such as unremnublèness and "undue" hardrliip. ideas 
which suggest thai something more than meaningfid 
diminution is required to demonstrate infnnement This 
intemal contradictron is, however,niore apparent than real. 
Tire questions asked &y the Court in Sparrow do not define 
the concept ofpnma fucie infngment; they on& point to 
factors whkh WiII indicate thut S U C ~  m injkhgtment hm 
taken place."g 
In order for the signatories of the Treaty of 172.5 to establish an Aboriginal right 
to fke passage over the border in a future court chalienge, they would have to begin with 
the four-step Spmrow test, which consisis of (1) is there an Abonginai mobility right, (2) 
Ifyes, was the right extinguished before 1982, (3) If no, is there a prima facie 
infiingement of the right, (4) Ifso, was it justified? In order to deai with the fïrst step of 
the test on establishing the Aboriginal right, Van der Peet provides the factors to consider 
m the integral to the distinctive culture test The nrst factor is that the court must take into 
accotmt the perspective of the Aboriginal peoples themselves. The alIied nations of Old 
Nova Scotia, being the Wabanaki Confederacy, have, fiom the  irnmernorial, relied on 
their fkedom to hunt and fish, traveI, trade, practice their ceremonies and intermarry 
wherever they chose, within Abenaki territory which incIudes land m Canada and the 
United States. They have a very unique aiTiance which Uiciudes many diffcrrnt Nations 
under the Wabanaki Confederacy. Much anthropoIogical and historical evidence wodd 
have to be produced in a court case, but the presentation of this kind and amount of 
historical and anthropologicai evÏdence is beyond the scope of this papa. Some of the 
sources already cited clearly evÎdence a reliance on fkedom of mobility for every aspect 
ns Gïadnone, mpra, note 59 at 757. 
of their traditionai Kves and this practice continueci &er contact and was v d e d  by the 
various promises made to them in conference minutes, Indiau treaties and international 
treaties. Many of the eariy Europeans recorded their experiences with these groups and 
thus, their information provides somewhat of a written record for tunes when Abonginal 
practices were not recorded by the Indians thernselves due to their oral traditions. The 
standard of evidence in regards to pmving an Aboriginal mobility right is flexiibIe, as is 
the interpretation of it, as held by the court in Von der Peet. 
These Nations c m  even assert evidence of post-contact practices as long as it is 
directed at showing its ongins in pre-contact &es. There are numerous anthropoIogicai 
studies which indicate how most tribes al1 over North Amenca were either nomadic or 
semi-nomadic and theu very swivai depended on this abzty to travel as they needed. 
But this case is distinct in the sense that dl these different Nations had allied together for 
various reasons even before the Wabanaki Confederacy was formaiiy named. In contrast, 
a p u p  iike the h u  had no specid connection to lands near the Canada-U.S. border and 
nothhg in their Iives depended on free access to this area. 
Thus, the ability to have fiee passage over this area is very specific to these 
Nations under the alliance and afYected every part of thek traditionai practices h m  
hunting to tradmg to reIigious practices. More ment anthropologicai work anaIyPng 
ancient Mi'kmaq and Malecite buriai cites in New Bnmswick and Nova Scotia show that 
trade was very important, and probabIy created tribal ailies as a resuit The AboriginaI 
trading system in the area ofpresent day Atlantic provinces connected them to most of 
the mbe~ near their traditional territories from present day Nova Scotia tu present day 
Maine and beyond Anthropological widence h m  mch sites mdicates cuIhnaI and 
tmding ties of the aiî the Nahons in present day Atlantic Canada and  aine?' A distinct 
system had been set up here and was integral to the cultures of ail these eastem M a n s .  
The importance oftrade increased with contact and was continueci, but this expansion o f  
a pre-existing practice cm not by Van der Peet f anaiysis detract hom their valid trading, 
thus mobility right. 
In the second factor, the court wodd have to determine the precise nature of the 
claim. It is submined that these Nations have mobility rights which are impe~ous to the 
borders that were later hposed. The conferences and intemationai treaties such as the 
Jay Treaty provide very convuicing evidence that these Nations were never meant to be 
included in those persons who had to account for theu cross-border travels. The Jiy 
Treaty specificaily granted them fiee passage. As we11, this evidence would likely support 
the notion that this right was of centrai significance to these Aboriginal societies as to 
make it distinctive of the cuItine as required by factor three. The question to be asked is 
whether without this practice of fke mobiiity over the border area, wouid the culture have 
been hdamentaiIy aitered, and 1 argue that it would have been. Had thete been no free 
passage, there wouid not have been the triid alliances either before contact or after 
contact. Htmting tenitories wodd have been différent and familial ties wodd be 
drasticaiIy akered h m  the lack of contact, languages, and culturai practices would no 
doubt have been significantly aItered 
AboriginaI mobiiity across this ara  is fidamental to these groups' very 
existence. A specinc intemational treaty, The Juy Treaty, which I wiil deaI wiih in the 
next Ch-, was considered necessary p d y  because of AborigÏnaI concems over the 
border issue. The Mans  were wen apprised of the impendïng division of land betweai 
what wouId Iater become Canada and the United States. As weli, conference minutes and 
Indian treaties more th adequateIy document not only the Indian concern over the 
border, but aiso codkn  their rights to fiee passage in d.erent  clauses of the Jay Treaty. 
These kinds of documents provide evidence of recognition of an Aboriginal right aiready 
recognked by aU the parties. Again, in the fourth factor, the same evidence would 
establish the traveling patterns and the practices' continuity Eom pre-contact times to 
present day. Even the modern forms ~Fexercising these rights would be protected if the 
Aboriginal right was established, as judges have been directed to be flex.i"b1e not only in 
the d e s  of evidence, but aiso the interpretation of the evidence. 
Factor five means that the courts would have to realize that the kind of evidence 
that a Aboriginal elder would contxiiute otally, cannot be under-valued simply because 
this kind of evidence does not conform preciseIy w*th the d e s  or standards o f  evidence. 
in this case, there are elders h m  various Nations who attest to the historic fiee passage 
in their territories and the subsequent fixe passage after the bord- were created. Aiso. 
two more recent Supreme Court cases, Ad- and Cote7 Iessened siightly the evidentiary 
requirements to establish pre-contact practices. The court in Adams held that no 
Aboriginal group wilI ever be abIe to provide concIusive evidence ofwbat took place 
prÏor to contact, and thus: 
... where there i s  evidmce that at thepomt of contact a 
practice was a sign@cantpart of a gr- 's cuitwe. . then 
the Abon@taZ group will have dèntomtruted that the 
pmctrke war a szSZgn@cant paivt of the Abori@nuLgroup 's 
c u b e p r i w  to C O ? ~ ~ ( I C ~ - ' ~ ~  
' % f d i .  supra note 99 at 128- 
SimilarIy, Cote held that evidence that a practice was signincant at contact wiII be 
evidence of si@cance m pre-  on tact.'^' Von der Peet aiso stands for the proposition in 
factor sut that whatever rights these Nations codd estabiish would apply solely to these 
particdar Nations and not other Aboriginal groups generaily. 1 would argue that the 
evidence wouid aiso show that inter-territorial travel was not occasional or incidental to 
other practices of the different groups claiming the mobility right. Mobility is a right in 
and of itself. The nlationship AboriginaI peoples have with their traditional territones is 
a unique aspect of their culture, and the use of these solely for travel is a connection that 
can not be discounted. The anthropoIogicaI and archaeologicai evidence illustrates that 
mobility was essentiai to d v d ,  hunting practices, and religious practices such as 
f i g  and other aspects of Aboriginal life. Their special connection or alliance would 
aIso be different fiom other groups in Canada, and their connection and reliance on free 
passage over the border temtory remahs today. 
[ would argue that m ternis of factor eight, an Abonginal right of mobiIity or fiee 
passage over the border wouId be supported by the evidence. Since factor nine is about 
European innuence ody being relevant ifthe Aboriginal practice of travel or rnobility 
onIy became integral because of this influence, it wouid not apply in this case. The 
anthropologicd, historical and oral evidence wouId support the claim of mobility nrithin 
this territory as integral to these groups particuiar culture and this did not corne about 
soie1y because of contact. FMy, the tenth factor regardmg Indian relationships with 
their territorÎaI and other lands is alsu supported by the evidence. Wabanaki territory has 
"' Cote. supra note 100. 
not changed in any significant amount since before the Europeans arrive4 and they have 
hunteâ, fished, Iived and traveIed in the same areas for centuries. On that basis, 1 wodd 
argue that the right of fiee passage over the border is one of the rnost important rights 
these Nations could assert as it Bects aU the most important cuitural aspects of their iives 
including familial ties. How thai codd the right be recognized for only Canadian 
Indians? The centrd sïgnificance of Aboriginal nghts wodd be completely irrelevant if 
the court were to then read a narrow interpretation of the definition of Abonginal peoples 
under section 35. There is a historicai context that must be recognized when dealing with 
references to Aboriginal peoples. Since contact, they were often refmed to as Nations, 
and the cases cited earlier demonstrate that they were dso treated as Nations through the 
Treaty process. They are refemd to in section 35 as peoples as they are part of their 
collective Nation, and not presented in the same context as individual Canadian citizens. 
These Nations inchde ai l  those Abonginai p u p s  whose traditionai territories included 
land m what is now Canada, or those whose traditional practices were exercised on the 
same Iands. Also included Ui the dennition of Abonginai peoples are those AboriguJaI 
Nations to which Canada made solemn commitments and promises under both 
internationai treaties and Indian treaties. In regards to mobility rights, this inchdes aiî the 
member Nations of the Wabanaki Confederacy that may presently be considered 
AmerÏcan citizens, 
Once an Aborigmd right has been estabfished, the next question is whether or not 
that right has been extingm'shd The Sparmw case stated that the word "existing" m the 
CollStirUtion Act, meant that section 35(I) applies onIy to those rights that were in 
d e n c e  m 1982, and did not revive nghts that had been extinguÏshed This does not 
mean that the right is exercisable as per a certain time m history. An existing Aboriginal 
right cannot be read so as to incorporate the specific manner in which it was reguiated 
before 1982. Most ùnportantly, the court held that these rights must be interpreted 
flexibly so as to "permit their evo1ution over tirne''. Although the tespondent Crown  IL 
that case tried to use the long history of fisheries regdation to prove that their rights had 
been extinguished the court was quick in pointing out that the argument confiised 
regulation with extinguishment. The court in Sparrow held that: 
The test of exttnguishntent tu be adopted. in our opinion. is 
that the Sovereign 's intention must be clear and plain if it 
is to extinguish an aboriginal right.IJ2 
The court went on to explab that the extensive history of fishery regdations and 
the specific mention of Indian fishers was not enough to extinguish their rights. AU the 
Iegislation did was control the fishery, not dehe the mderlying rights. The court 
recognized that despite any uncertainties of the RoyaL ProcIamution, and its different 
judicial interpretations, it stands as a basic declaration of the Indians' substantial interest 
in the lands, Thus. I wodd argue that although the Customs and Immigrations Acts were 
created to control border issues Iike the m o n i t o ~ g  of who goes back and forth over the 
border. nowhere does it specificaiIy eXtmguÏsh the right of Aboriginal people to fieely 
pass without being "moIested'' or "disturbed". 
The Inimigation Act m particular ody IegisIates in regards to one small group of 
Abonginai people, and in no way arnotmts to an extensive treatment of aii  Aboriginal 
peopIe in terms of extingrtisbhg their rights- It merely amoimts to reguIatmg an actMty 
for ody a srnaII percentage of Aboriginal people. Even if the Act were constnied as 
granting certain rights, certainly the act of granting rights, can not be said to amount to 
strict proof of extinguishing other rights not even mentioned in the legÏsIâtionn The 
relevant part of the IegisIation states: 
4. Where riglit to corne into Canada - ( I )  A Canadiun 
citrz:en and *a permanent resident have a right to corne into 
Canada.. . f a  
(3) Rights of lndians - A person who is regrstered as an 
Indian pursuant to the Indimr Act haî, whether or not that 
person is a Canadian cituen, the surne nghts and 
obligations under this Act as a Cartadian citiren. 
5. Where privilege tu come into or remuin in Canada - (1) 
No person, other tltan a pmson d e s d e d  in section(rl). h a  
a nght to come into or remain in C~nada!~' 
I wotdd conclude that the Immigrarioon Act does not have the effect of 
extiaWshing an AborÏgind mobility right for the treaty signer groups, but mereIy seeks 
to regulate the border activities of Canadian citizens as  a whole. The Act mentions Stahis 
Indians as registered under the Indian Act presumably to make sure that they were 
included, since they were not considered citizens in either Canada or the United States 
d l  this century. Jack Woodward in his text Native LmJ" explains that prior to Indian 
AEairs comuig under the Department of M a n  Mai rs  in 1967 pursuant to the 
Department of lndim Affuirrs and Nirthen Development Act "6, it was under the 
Department of Citizenship and rimnigration in 1951. Most Canadian Indians are citizens 
" Spmrow, supra note 15 at 1099. 
T h e  p h  "abject to section 10.3" is added h m  to the subsectr*on by SC. t 992, c 49, ~241) which is 
iu force on proclamation, 
'Y The Immigratron Act and Rel-d LegrSIatio~J 996 Cumoilidaon (Ontano: Butîerworths Canada, 
1996). S. 4,5. pecemafterfdgratrbn. 
'JS 1. W o o d .  N u k  Lmv (Toronto: Carsweii, 1990) at 145. 
O" D e p m e n t  of Tdim Afm'rs and Northenr Deuefopment Act RS-C. 1985, c. 1-6. 
by operation of the Citizemhip Act13'- The Act c d y  does not purport to specincally 
regdate in regards to the rest of AboriginaI people in Canada Conversely, if the Act were 
accepted as regdahg in regards to a i i  AborigÏnaI people, then I would argue that the 
IegisIation is discrimihatory in its different treatment of Canada's Aboriginal people who 
are defked in section 35(1) of the Collstitution Act, 1982. The Act wouid ais0 be in 
specifk violation of its own legislative objectives, that being section 3(f)  of the 
Immigration ~c t . '~ '  That section States: 
3. Immigration 06Jectives - It is hereby declared that 
Canadian imnii@ution policy an& the rules and 
regulations made under thisAct sMl be desijpd and 
administered in such a munner as to promore the domestic 
and international interests of Canada recognizing the need 
(B to enme that any person who seeks 
admission to Canada on either a permanent 
or tempormy b& is subject to s t a n d d  of 
admksiorr that do not dhcrimimte in a 
manner inconsistent with the Canadian 
Charter of Rights und Freedoms; '" 
Section 15 of the Canadan Charter of Rights and Freedoms prohibits 
disdmhatÏon on the basis of race, which 1 beIieve this section of the Immigraton Act 
does, by addressing the rights of one group of Aboriginal peopIe and f w g  to give 
consideration to the other listed groups in section 35 (l), and Amerîcan Indians to whom 
Canada still owes a duty to by virtue of the Treaties signed with those groups - 1  befieve 
that either argument addresses the counter-argument that the Iegislation extingukhes 
Aboriginal mobiIÏty rights. The court in Corbime stressed the  ort tance of land to the 
Cit&mh@ Act RSC. 1985, C. C-29. 
lbr;cL 
Il9 fiid s3, 
c u b e  of Aboriginal peoples and the effect that discrimination based on residency has on 
such peoples, which 1 believe is equally applicable to Confederacy members who Iive on 
the AmerÏcan side of the border. The court cited an excerpt fiom the RCAP Report on 
Aboriginal identity and their lands: 
Aboriginal identity lies at the heart of Aborignal peoples ' 
m'stence; maintuining t h t  identiiiy is an essential and sey- 
validating pursuit for Abon-grka1 people in cities ... 
Cultural idenrity for urbm AborigrgrnaIpeop[e is ako tied to 
a Iand base or ancestral terrrlory. For muny, the two 
concepts are mseparabie ... 
ldentipcution with an ancestral place is important to urban 
people becme of the associated ritual, ceremony and 
traditions, as well us the people who r m i n  there, the 
sense of beiongtng, ihe bond to an ancestral commrrnity, 
and the accessibih?y of famly, community and elderx ''O 
Surely, if the Suprerne Court in Corbiere. supra, wouId not permit discrimination 
between groups of Indiaas based solely on mideacy off the reserve, it wodd not support 
the discrimination between Indian signatones on the basis of residency a w s s  the border, 
both of which are circumstances that were imposed by the Crown. It wottid be 
ttnconscionabIe to aüow the Crown to reIy on its failed promises and racist policies to 
defend rights claimed by Aboriginal peopIe. Certdy, the Aboriginal groups had no 
control over the policies or Iaws miposed on them by the British or American Cmwm 
Therefore, Corbime might be used as an andogous situaiion to prevent discrimination by 
the Crown against the exercise of treaty rîghts by AborigmaI people because of their 
The next question wouid be whether there was in fact any idbgement of the 
mobiIity right. This question would be analyzed by the court based on the specific case 
brought before it. It can be generaiiy analyzed here using the example of a Wabanaki 
member who is refised re-entry into Canada to reunite with his wife and children after a 
visit with his family in the United States. The scenario could be that an Amerïcan born 
Indian cornes into Canada and marries a Canadian bom Indian by traditionai marriage 
and decides to live and work here. Then, some time later the American bom Indian 
travels to the United States to visit with family and fiiends for sorne time. Upon seeking 
re-entry back into Canada he is refiised entry and separated from his € i l y  for 6 months 
whiIe he awaits a d e t h a t i o n  about his re-entry. Meanwhile, his wife and children can 
not see the man. Assume that the man is neither a Canadian citizen nor has he appiied for 
registration under the I n d h  Act, but he is uot a terrorist, but does have a criminal record 
for drug possession. This would be a simila. situation to the case in Watt, to shortIy go 
before the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The first step wouid be to prove that he has an Abonginai right to cross the border 
kely and remain withui the country. The Aboripinaî claimant might offer evidence to 
prove his ancestry with the Penobscots or Passamaquoddies for instance. He might then 
make the same arguments that I made earlia with regards to the Treaty of 1 725i26 
containing a right of fiee passage. He might aIso make an AborigînaI rights argument that 
cross border rnovanent was integrai to his cdhne, and that the Indian treaties provide 
evidence of t ~ s  right. He may aIso use the Jhy Treaty (which I will discuss in the next 
chapter) in the same way that he might use the Indian treatÏes, as evidence of an 
Aboriginal right to cross the border. In m y  opinion, this evidence dong with the historicai 
and anthropologicai review, is more than enough to establish the right. 
The Crown might the. attempt to prove that the right had been exthguished For 
ail the reasons noted above, 1 would argue that the Crown would not be successful in its 
attempts to show that by v h e  of the enactment of the Immigration Act, that aii border 
crossing rights were specincally exthguished. Simply providing for rights in legislation 
is not enough for the courts to infer extinguishment given the strict proof, which is 
required. James [Sa'ke'Jl YoungbIood Henderson in his paper Impact of Deïgamuuwk 
Guidelines in Atlantic Canad~'''~ explained what Delgamtvwk had to say in this regard: 
The Court a#lnned that provincial orfedrral acts or 
regdations couid not artinguidi constitutional e h t s  of 
AborigUtal peoples. It heid that s.35(i) cannot be read so 
ar to incorporate the specific rnanner in which 
constitutionai nghts were regulated bt$ore 1982. and 
stated that federaal-provincial statutory or regulatov 
control of a constitutional right d m  not mean that the 
right is mnguished. oren ifthe control is exercised in 
"greut detail': Finui&, the Court stated that the 
soverei' 's intention U controlling and attnguishment of a 
constitutional Rght c d d  on& be proven me sovereign 5 
wn'tten commattd ïk ciear and plain. The Court declared 
that s.35(I) not on& meutes a comti~n'onalfidtîciary duty 
on the fedkralgovenune~or Aborigina&peoples, &nt also 
operates as a 'Snong" limitation on the legislamiepowers 
of the/edeaL Parliment ar well as provincial 
LegsIatures. No r e m  exiss wljr these coll~n~tutionaL 
principies do not apply fit Atlantic Canada to nunz5 miy 
incomiitent provincial legklation prior to Confedwation 
or fideral legiPation der Ciqfiederation. 
Assuming that the Crown couid not prove that the right had b e n  extinguished, 
the AboripsiaI clahnant wouId have to address several questions in order to establish a 
prima facie inningement of the right. The first question wodd be whether the 
infikgment was measonable. In this case, 1 would submit that forcing an Aboriginal 
man to stop at the border, detain bim for a substantid penod of the ,  deny hun entry, and 
suggest he submit himseLfto immigration hearings, or go through the application and 
approvd process, is unreasonable when such an important nght is at stake. 1 would argue 
that total deni-ai of the right to mobility is the moa extreme example of unreasonableness. 
Given that a less intrusive system could be devised to identify the holders of border 
crosshg rights, absolute ddaI of entry Ïs unjustifiable. 
The second question as to whether the infiingrnent causes undue hardship would 
be best told by the family of the exampie man, who was denied entry to be reunited with 
his family. The present immigration Iaws not oniy cause undue hardship for the traveler, 
but dso their fimdies and fnends. The third question about whether the Iegislation denies 
the cIaimant the prefmed means of exemking the right, is not as applicable as it wouId 
be in a fishg case where there are dozens of ways to catch fish. There is only one way to 
get across the border and ifyou are denied entry, there is no otha alternative but to hope 
and wait for a review. These considerations are more thau is necessary to establish prima 
f&e mningement and tum the btuden back over to the Crown to justifjr the Iegislation. 
The fht question to be answered by the Crown wodd be whether there was a 
vaüa legislative objective, Idce preventing h a .  to the popdace, conservation or other 
objectives which are compehg and substantid- UntÏI the Suprwe Court's ruling in 
~e~gmnuuwk'" the case Iaw had only definitively accepted h m  to the populace and 
conservation as valid objectives in hfhging Aboriginal nghts. In Delgamuuwk, the court 
held that in the context of Aboriginal titIe7 there are justifiable lunits on AboriginaI nghts, 
which is a question of fact that wiI1 determined on a case by case basis, which ùicludes: 
[me development of agngrrcuIture, forestry, rnining, and 
hydroelectnc power. the genera[ economic development of 
the intenor of BII-tkh Columbia, protection of the 
environment or endangered species. the building of 
infrastnrcture and the settlement offomiign populations to 
support those a i m  ... 144 
Thus, the Immigration legishion would k e l y  have to be anaiyzed on this basis. 
The Immigralion Act sets out its objectives under Part 1 entitled Canadian Immigration 
Policy. It tates their declaration that the poücy and rules under the Act will be 
administered to promote a Est of objectives which include: (a) dernographic goals, (b) 
enrichhg the cultural and sociai fabric of Canada (taking into account its bilinguai 
character), (c) facilitate the remion of Canadians with their relatives abroad, (d) facilitate 
adaptation of person granted admission, (e) to facilitate the entry of visitors, ( f )  that 
admission -dards are not discriminatory, (g) to uphold Iegal obligation to the refiigees 
and persecuted, (h) foster a strong and viable economy, (I) to maintain and protect heaIth 
and (h) to promote international order and justice by denying entry to those who are 
iikeLy to engage h crimina1 activity. '" 
That beîng so, there wodd appear to be no particdar concem raised by Abonginai 
people crossing back and forth to iive with and visit famiries and fiends, w 0 4  hunt, 
trade or partake m any other 1awfÜ.i occupation, so cornpebg that there couId be no 
other way to address the problem than to totally deny some Aboriginal people free 
passage. The objectives a c t d y  poctray a more accommodating view of border aossings 
facilitating visitations, cul-, family remions and non-discrimination. These objectives 
while reflective of the French and English dual nature of Canada, blatantiy ignores the 
special nature or culhue of Canada's First Peoples, which wouid cast doubt on the "duai" 
nature of Canada in addition, the objectives cast a brond stroke over "criminals" and 
fails, on first glance to take into accotmt the social conditions which may have given rise 
to a cnmind record on the part of Aboriginal peoples. The few existing cases on the 
border issue have yet to even make this type of andysis; this will be dealt with in more 
detail later on in my thesis. 
The next consideration on the Crown's part would be whether the Crown 
reconciIed its fiduciary duty to AboriginaI people withui the Iegislation. This would 
inchde whether there is as Little inftingernent as  possible on their Aboriginal mobility 
rights, whether the Aboriginal group has been consulted in the drafbg of the relevant 
Iegislation, and in the event of expropriation of their nghts, what compensation was made 
available to them. The govenunent c e r t d y  has the right to protect its borders, but not at 
the expense of constinitiona.IIy protected AborÎgmal and Treaty rights. To date, littIe if 
any Aboriginal p q s  or organizatiom have been c o d t e d  in determinhg the content of 
immigration Iaws and thus most groups and individuab continue to reIy on historicd 
promises such as those contabled in theJ i  Treaty for their fkedom of rnobility. The= 
are &O many different ways to monitor border trafnc, than to deny entry or re-entry to 
Aboriginal peopIe whether they are American or CanadianC Indeed, refusal of re-entry is 
the rnost drastic method that could be empIoyed to achieve the objective. 1 wouid argue 
that the Immigration Department, being a feded department, and representative ofthe 
Crown has failed to consider the mobility of Aboriginal people or the potentid harm 
caused by the enforcement of the Iegislation drafied without Aboriginal input. The Crown 
has made no attempt to compensate Aboriginal people for the h m  they and theù 
families have suffered h m  lengthy detainment periods or absolute refusal of entry or re- 
entry into Canada 
Fwther, I wouid argue that were it put to the test set out above, the Aboriginal 
people affiected could establish their mobirity right based on Aboriginal or treaty rights. 
They couid establish a prima facie interference and the government wouid not be 
successN in establishing a valid concern pdcular to Aboriginal peopIes. Even if the 
Crown did establish a valid concern, they would fail the justification test due to the more 
equitable alternatives available, their discriminatory treatment, their f~lure to abide by 
their own Immigration objectives, the lack of Aboriginal input and findly due to the 
imparable h m  d e f e d  by the Aboriginal travelers, their families and communities. In 
addition, the considerations for Abonginai people with regard to crimina1 activity and 
mobüity shodd be afforded rights comparative of the rights of non-aboriginal peopIe. In 
non-aboriginal Canadian society, Canadians are fiee to move about their tmitories 
wïthout regard to their criminal records. For example, a person whether convicted of 
hud, assadt, possession or rnandaughter is fkee to have1 the temitory of Canada, h m  
province to province without restrÏ~tÏ~n. Aboriginal peopIe shodd also be fhe to traverse 
the& traditional territories regardes of  the^ crnnmal records. 
The cases dealing with the specific issue of Aboriginal mobility are very few and 
are to date oniy lower court decisions. It is surprising that they have, for the most part, 
failed to make the appropriate aualysis regarding Aboriginal and Treaty rights. The k t  
case cüiectiy on point was Smith v. Canada IM where the Aboriginal applicant, an 
American indian, made an application for an interlocutory injunction against the Minister 
of Employment and Immigration to r e m  the respondent Minister fiom proceeding with 
the Immigration inquùy penâing a hearing of the constitutionai application. The 
applicant, Tracey Smith, is a member of the Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians and 
holds Amencan citizenship. She has three chiIdren who are American citizens and Live on 
a reserve in the United States and two more children, with her common-Iaw spouse, who 
Iive on the Stanjikoming reserve in Ontario. These children are registered Indians under 
the In& Act and Canadian citizeml" 
Smith codd only obtain medicai benefits h m  the United States despite her new 
membership in the Canadian reserve, the rasons for which were not addressed. She thus 
had to travef to the U.S. for a dental appointment, d e r  which she was refused re-entry on 
the grounds that she did not have, nor hd applied for, a Visa Only four days Iater, was 
she penn0tted to re-enter Canada and wait for an Immigration Inquirysuiry Sheasked for 
pamission to visit her chiidren back and foah mitil the hearhg, but was refirsed. The 
court heard evidence of Smith's membership in the OjibawayfChippewa Nation who, 
accordmg to the evidence, have dways traverseci the lands between Canada and the US., 
19" Sm'tii v. Cmada (Mahier of EwIoyment and immigrart'on), Cl 9931 OJ. No. 395, odine: QL (OJ.}. 
p?reh&er Snn'th!$ 
and have therefore acquired AborigÏnaI rights to do so. As well she argued that the Jqr 
Treaty conferreci on her the nght to traverse the border. The court decided that similar 
cases relating to the right to be free fbm the payment of taxes and duty at the border, 
namely, ~ r m c e s ' ~  and Vincent"' decided that the Jay Treaty was not a valid treaty 
under section 35(1) of the Comtr'tution Act. Yet, the court decided that there remaiaed 
the Abonginai rights question which constituted a serious issue to be trieci. IS0 
The court went on to analyze the potentiai harm to the applicant should the 
injunction not be granted. As a result, the court decided in favor of Smith, as it felt that 
Smith's common-law spouse and smdi children would SUffer irreparable harm if she had 
to live in the United States and her children in Red Lake wouid suffer equally should 
Smith be forced to live in Canada The harm wodd be minund to the respondent, as al1 
the Minister wouid have to do is tempomily exempt Smith Eom the legislation. A 
consideration of the public interest established the seriousness of dealing with indigenous 
North Amencan people. It was ordered that the hearing be suspended lmtiI the 
constitutional application was heard and that Smith have fiee passage until fina1 
disposition."' 
It is mteresting to note that in this cas+ the court referred to the applicant as an 
Indigenous North American as opposed to classifying her as  an American Indian, because 
of her American citizenship. The court did not hesitate in considering the poss~iiIity of 
Aboriginal rights as they have been defined in Canada, as  extending to an American 
'* I6X 
" Frm& v. The Queen, [195q S.CK 6 18. Deremafter Frm&]. 
" R K. &cent (1993), 12 O& (34  427 (0nt CA-), ïeave to appd to S.CC e e d ,  CI9931 3 S.C.R. k 
mefemafter 
Indian. As this case was an application for an injunction and the criteria for acceptance of  
the argument was a serious issue to be trie& it is signincant that the applicant got past 
this stage. The oniy update to the Iitigation &ce that thne is an application to the Ontario 
court for an order with respect to costs. The otha case is an appeal Eom the order for 
costs. Perhaps the Immigration Tribunal is awaiting a detemination in the Watt v. 
Canada (MinWter of Citizenship and Immigration)" and Mitchell v. Canada (Minuter 4 
National ~evenue)" cases before they make their detedation given the Abonginal 
rights in issue. 
In Watt, mpra, the Federal Court Trial Division descriied the applicant as a 
Native indian who was also an Amencan citizen who desired to enter and remain in 
Canada. Watt was seeking judiciai review of a decision h m  the adjudicator who had 
ordered his departure nom Canada. Watt is an Amencan bom Indian who had been 
convicted of growing cannr'bis in Canada The motions judge felt that there was ooly one 
issue and îhat was: 
... whether an Aborigmalpmson who was neither a 
Canadian nor a regktered fndian hud a riglrt tu remain in 
Canada because 6e belonged to a Irioe whose traditional 
tenr'rory straddled the Canada-United States bordm? 
The Triai Division dismissed the application and held that Watt had no right to 
remain hi Canada, The ïmigration Act pmvides that Canadian citÏzens have a nght to 
enter and remain m Canada (section 4) and that registered hdians have the same rights a 
'% fiid- 
ii5ï-d 
'" Watt v. Canada (Mitrister of Ci&ensh@ and fdgratluo) (1994) 82 F-TE 57, (FedTD.), BeIemafter 
WmL (1 998) 169 DLK Qh 336. (FdCA) [Pereniaffer W i  Appeak 
'n MrScM v, Cànada (MinrSter of N'unal Revenue), CI9981 F-CJ. No. 1513, ontme: Q L  (Fed.CA)- 
[rieteidter Mitchell Appeu& 
Canadian citizens (section 4(3) ). and that no otherperson has a right to enter and remah 
iu Canada (section 5 ). The Federal Court of Appeal in Wafl summarized the Trial 
decision as follows: 
The motionsjudge dismissed the application on the boaris 
that, whether such aboriginal nghts had erisred or not. or 
whethm the appellant was entitled tu rely on them. any 
nrch righs must have been mtinguished by sections 4 and 
5 of the Immigraton Act us quoted above. nese sections. 
she observed, had been adopted in 1977,five years before 
the adoption of the Constitution Act. 1982. She noted that 
section 35 of the latter Act on& recognires and affrms 
'Casting" aboriginal nghts. She fomd the extingtiikhment 
of such Rghts by the Immigration Act befoe 1982 to be 
ampïj clear. IS5 
Reed, J. therefore decided that there was no ambiguity in those provisions of the 
Immigraton Act and held that the applicant had no right to remain in Canada as an 
Amerbn M a n ,  but since there was a senous public interest issue, he should have the 
right to appeai. IS6 The Federd Court of AppeaI adopted the issue as stated by the motions 
judge as: 
The issue in this case is whether an abonngrnaIperson who 
is neither a Canadian ctCLtrzen nor a regstered Indiun hm a 
right to remaz'ir in Cmada becuuse fie belongs to a hibe 
whose traditional t d t o r y  straddles the Canada-United 
States bordm. '-" 
The Federal Court held that the motions judge appiied the fiteral meaning of the 
I i q a t i o n  Act, but had done so in 1994, and since that tirne the jurisprudence fiom the 
Snpreme Court of Canada had coIlSiderabIy evoIved with regard to Aboriginal rÏghts and 
" Wort, supm note 152 
Watt AppeaL, supra note 152. 
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LOO 
the test for extinguîshment. The Court understood the new jurisprudence to stand for the 
principles that: (1) Parliament needed a clear and pIah intent to extinguish Aboriginal 
rights, (2) a generd regdatory scheme which affects Aboriginal nghts does not constitute 
their extingukhment, and (3) that: 
... thefaiiure to recognke an aboriginal right. and a failuze 
to grant specidprotection to it. do not constitute the deur 
and plain intention necessq to ati~ngulih the rigfit ... 
Tlie mere fact that the relevant sovereign power did not 
recognke the existence of such n Rght is not en@ to 
negate its e~r'stence!~~ 
As a resuit of the court's review of the recent jurisprudence, with regard to the 
motions judge's niiing, the court held: 
I beiiae that in the height of th& fin'spnudence it U not 
possible to assume thut, regardles of how the right may be 
dGned O estdished &y evidence. it muy be tukm as 
extingubhed by M m e  of a lm inconsistent with that nght. 
Itnn thmefore of the view t h  the rnorions judge erred in 
Jinding extinguishrnent of the nght as clairned There w u  
neitfier adetpate evrevrdmce of the existence and definition of 
the right nor of a governmental intentr'on to atinguish it!" 
The court went on to state that due to the lack ofevidence, they couid not make 
determinations of fact necessary for a determination of the continued existence of an 
Aboriginal right to remah in Canada Before they made their f ia l  detamination, the 
court did address some of the arguments with regards to the inhefent rights of a sovmign 
state, such as the nght to protect its borders- An overview of Strayer, L's explmation is as 
- 
" Wmt AppeaL supm note 152 at 346 . 
Canada has by its Constitutioon limited the exmise of 
govenmimtu~powers which may be inherent as O sovdign 
state- ... 
As long as the Constitution rmains unarnended. Canadian 
mthorfties are d j e c t  to this limitation on what wotdd 
othm?vrre be an incident of sovereign power. ... 
mis dues not mean, of course, thut proper contd  of the 
border rnay not be a@t@cation for Canada to contd  or 
lirnit in some way the exercise of relevant and 
unertinguised aboriginal rights. ... 
Ium therefore of the viav that the sovereign nature of 
Canada is not a iegul barnber per se to the a'stence of the 
abo~gt'nal t f g h  us ciaimed, . . .'* 
The court also found that the adjudicator has the necessary powen under the 
Iintnigratotz Act to make such detenninations, and therefore aiIowed the appeai. They 
ais0 quashed the depamire order and referred the matter back to the adjudicator for a 
determination under the Imiqation A a  of these rnatters. WhiIe the court held that the 
adjudicator will not be able to declare the invaiidity of any of the Imigroton Act 
provisions, she wi11 be able to treat the provisions as invalid as applied to the applicant 
and refuse to make a departure order against him i f  that wouid codtute an 
unconstitutïond infnngement of his Aboriginal rights. The case is to go before the 
Supreme Court of Canada shortly, 
The issue as M e d  in the FederaI Crown's SubmÏssions to the Supreme Court in 
this case is the same as stated by the motionsjudge and adopted by the Court of Appeaî 
as quoted above? The Crown hopes to prove that by virtue of Watt not having proved 
that the Aboriginal group to which he belongs, has no "4stei' group in Canada, he can 
not be considered an "Aboriginal peoples of Canada". They assert that because of the 
events of settiement and the movement of Aboriginal peoples, that there is no "organized 
society" of Amw Lake peoples in Canada, and therefore a connection with that group 
wodd not avail the appellant of any Aboriguiai rÏghts. This is a narrow view of the 
evidence that has been included in the submission. 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and 
Nodieni Aff&),le is a recent decision regarding discrimination under the Indian Act of 
the votùig nghts of those registered Indians who live on reserve and those who Live off 
reserve, took into account the historicai and social reasons for how and why off reserve 
[ndians have corne to live off reserve. The court decided not to use the wrongs of history 
to the disadvantage of this on-reserve group. The Court in Corbiere explained: 
The enfianchisementprovisions O of the Indian Act were 
designed to encourage Aboriginalpeopie to rmounce their 
hmirage and identity, und force them to do su ifhey wished 
tu take a/icILpm in Cànadian soaCfety. . 
This history shows t h  AborigrnaI policy, in the pust, often 
[ed to the denial of statzcs and the severhg of connections 
6etween band rnembers and the band .-- 
FinaIiyk the mterest @ccted k aho signifcmt becme of 
the ways in which, i~ the part. ties between bandmembers 
and the bmd or reserve have been ~oïmtar t~ly  or 
reluctant!y severed. Those Hected or theirparents may 
have lefi the reserve for ntany remons that do not signa[ a 
la& of interest rir the r a m e  @en the v a r r a r r ~  h 'storicd 
16' Watt*fppeaL mpm note 152 : Taken the Feded Crown's Submissiom in the Matter. ITieremafter 
W i  Su6mrS.stbm~. 
Corbiwe, supra note 18. 
circuntsrmcs surrounding resme commmities ut Canada 
mch as an ofien Riadequate lmd buse, a s e h t l s  Zack of 
economic opportunities and housing and the operation of 
pmt Indian status and band membership d e s  imposed by 
ParIiament. 
So too, shouid the Crown be mindfui of holding the events of history a .  the 
negative effects of colonization a g a i .  the appIicant in WU& It can not be said in good 
faith that the negative actions of the Crown in movbg Abonginai groups or disbandhg 
reserves can now be used to assist the Crown in avoiding the recognition of Aboriginal 
rights. As noted in Van der Peel, supra, Abonginal rights do not have to have been 
exercised continuously since contact Î n  an unbroken ch&.'& Certaùily hterruptions in 
activity occasioned by the Crown should not be held against the AbonginaI claimant. 
This kind of action would not be  in keepîng with the Crown's fiduciary duty towards 
Aboriginal peoples, nor would it uphold the honor of the Crown. 
The Crown aiso asserts that the activity of crossing the border c m  not be 
considered an activity integrai to Watt's culture, and therefore not an Abonginai ri& as 
the movement of people within Canada and over Canada's borders are aaivities shared 
by all cultures in Canada. I think that this bold assertion is an extreme overstatement and 
blatant mischaracterization of the actual situation in Canada WhiIe it is inre that 
Canadians have the nght to and some do, fkeIy move about Canada's territory, not aiI 
IbùL at para 88. 
Y i  der Peet, supra note 12 at 557. Lamr CJ. held in regards to coatmuity of the: Y would note thun 
concept of contUtuttUtutty d es not repite a6ori@raf gropr to p r d e  mifence of uur m 6 m h  ch& of 
contmuity 6etween th& c~~~entpructrces. u toms and traditions, md those wiiich erirled pnor to 
contact. It may be that for a pmod of the un aborr'gntaIgroup.fisonre reason, ceased to engage in a 
pramëer custom or  traàïtfotz whiëh exbtedpnur to contact, 6ut thm renned thepractice. ctcstorn or 
mdition at a Imer d ~ t e  Such an irrterruption will not preclude the esta6Iidiment of m ~16orijgrnaï rigk 
TiuIjitdgts shouh? adopt the ssonrflexr'6iIi@ regwrfmg the at06lrSliment of contimity thm. us b 
Canadians traverse the borda, Iive near the border or have ties to family and fkiends on 
the other side. Nor have non-Abonginal peopte in Canada lived near the border since 
tirne immemonaI or have coastitutiondy protected Aboriginal nghts. I thuik it is obvious 
that he Crown has attempted to deff ect the issue, and detract nom the Aboriginality and 
sui generis nature of the nghts in issue by comparing the appellant to non-aboriginal 
Canadians. The issue is the right of an Aboriginal person to traverse the border based on 
Aboriginal practices stemming from his membership in an Aboriginal culture, as a 
protected Aboriginal right under the Constitution Act, 1982. It is irrelevant where 
Canadians as a whole, travel. What is at issue hem, is where the appelIrnt travels and 
whether this travel over the border is integral to his culture. 1 have Bttle doubt that most 
Abonpinai groups in Canada wodd be able to demonstrate that they have Aboriginal 
rights to hunt in their haditionai territories. It c m  not be  said that simply by m e  of
other cultures or even many cultures s h a ~ g  shxdar rights, that the ciaimant's culture can 
not therefore have that right based on his own cuIture's ancient practices. 
The Crown asserts that because there exists evidence that the Arrow Lakes group 
ceased to exist as a band mder the Indimi Act in 1953, that they can not therefore be 
considered an Abonginai group within Canada 1 think the cite fkom Corbime provided 
above wodd again show that the Abonginai cIaimant shodd not d e r  h m  the negative 
eEî of history brought on by barrîers created by Parliament under the Indian Act- In 
addition, what is required of the cIaûnant is that they estabIish a substantid comection 
with the Aborigmal group, not that they or  their group have met the administrative 
dhtrssed @Fa. they me to adopt r e g d  to the m'iiencepresented tu esta6Ikh the pnor-m-contact 
pra~n'ces, cwtom and tradiïîoorrs of the abon-@ha[ group makrng the claan to an dori@tai njgkn 
requirements of  the Indian Act. The court in R. v. Jacub~'~~, whiie o d y  a lower court 
decision regarding Abonginai rights to cross the border, explained that the Indian Act has 
litüe to do with establishing Aboriginal rights entitlement: 
There is no suggestion that the detominution of 
membership depends. us a matter of law. on regktration as 
an Indian, or as a member of a band. pursuant to the 
Indian Act, .., 
EwVIdence of regrstration or rnembership in a band may, at 
most, help demonstrate the connection of an aboriginal 
person to a partzrtzmIar aboriginal cornmunity. ..!66 
The Crown proceeds 6orn this argument to provide some historicd background 
on the J i  Treaty and how international treaties cm be "...in.stmctive os histoncal 
documents in conshuing aboriginal rfghts.. ."'" While 1 wil1 be deaiing with the Jay 
Treaty in detail in the next chapter, it is interesthg to note that the Crown felt that theJqy 
Treaty was of iittie use in the Watt case, as it invoived ody the indians of Eastern 
Canada. This, of course is the very group upon which I have focused my thesis. The 
Crown argues that there cm be no Aboriginal right to corne into or remah in Canada as 
this nght wouId be "...fundmental& inconsistent with the pupose of ther3S(I) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, to reconciie aborigrnaiprartices with sovereîgnty."" In this 
regard the Crown argues that: 
At the core of the concept of sovereignty W. the interest of 
the stute irr self-presmation. As reflected in both 
htentutionai and domestt'c Imv, one of the primmy w u .  in 
which a stateprotects firis interest is &y nrmntmnntg 
control of its borders. Serf-preservation requires tliat the 
' 6 ~  R Y. Jacobs CI9981 B-CJ. No. 3144, onIine: QL. (B.CJ-)- ~erebafkJacobsI.  
'66 fiid at para II 8, 
'" Wm Subm,lcEoons. mpra note 161 at para. 44. 
las fiid. at para 45, 
state c o n t d  the admission ofpersoons onto its trn't0t-y. 
ne Supreme Court of Canada has recognised that the stote 
has a "cornpelling interest" in protecting its b d m  in the 
imrnigroTort cuntext'" 
What the Crown is missing is that the defence of Aboriginal mobility rights is not 
about uMugration, it is about the fkee movement of Aboriginal peoples within tbeù own 
traditional temtories. as  they have done since tirne immemorial. The Crown insults the 
Indigenous populations of  North America by citing American case Iaw which holds that 
sovereign nations have the right to ". . forbid the entmce of forerLmers within its 
duminio ns...".'" The status of Aboriginal peoples in Canada is that of the First Nations 
of this land, and their specid status is recognized in om CoiEsttution Act. 1982. The 
Suprane Court of Canada has already emphasized this specid status, k t  in S'ow, 
and c o b e d  it in later decisions as discussed above. The court in Spamow, supra held: 
In iny Mm, the dochne of Aboriginll rights exkts, and is 
recogniked and afimed by S. 35(1), becaure of one simple 
fuct: whm Europems arrhed in North Amerka, 
Abori'nal peoplar were alrecdy hem. living in 
comntunitiés on the land, andpartic@ating in distnchire 
cuitwes, as they had dme for centuries. ft U this fact, and 
this fact above al1 others. which separates Abonn@ai 
peoples fiom al1 other minoriîy groups in Canadian society 
and which mandates their speaal legal. and now 
constih~tionai status!" 
It is tmbe1ÎevabIe that we as Aboriginal peoples codd be compared to 
''foteignerC h m  o h  countrÎes m the worId. 1 would hope that this line of reasoning 
wodd bo quickly dismissed at the Suprerne Court Ievel. The court inJnco6s, supra, 
corisidered the Soprane Court of Canada's decision in De&amtnrwk supra and the 
'* iôîd at para 46. 
" fiid. at para 50. 
Crown's sovereignty argument, and held that the Crown's position in this regard was 
fataly fl awed. Macaulay, J. explained: 
In my view, the C m  's argwnent & fatanyflawed, The 
sovereign power enacted Iaws to ossm its sovmeignty: in 
this case the Ctlstonts Act and Excise Act. and 
Ahhough 1 accept that the state, generali'y speakr'ng hm a 
compelling or pressing interest in protecting its borders, I 
do not occept that a right ofpussage by aboriginralpersonr 
for purposes integral to their disrinctive culture is 
irreconcilable with that interest* 
1 rqect the C m  3 assertibn that the aboriginal right 
esrablhhed is findamentally ineconcilable with the 
assertion of sovereignty. In reaching my concluïion, I 
found it helpfiï to com'der the observations of Lambert, 
JA. in Delgarnuuwk v. British Columbia, [1993] 5 W. WJZ. 
9 7 ( B L  C.A.). ut pp. 362362, respecting abonginal rights 
that would have bem imp[icitlly ertingzkshed by the 
assertion of British Sovereignty and newr absorbed as pari 
of the common l m ,  including  hose se rightr which were 
so entireiy repugrtant to naturai justice, equiS, and good 
conscience tfiat they could not. without modtJiccatioion, ever 
be a pmt  of the common lm... " The rights established here 
do notfit within this category? 
The right to cross the border by border mies is not irreconcilable with any of the 
concerns Canada may have with 'Yoreignd' fiom other cormtries. The Crown also 
assRts that if the rÎght exists, that the prohibition on entry to those Aboriginal peopIes 
with Çriminal convictions is a reasonable Lunit on the exercise of that nght, and seeks to 
jnstifL any possibIe hfkingement in this case on that basis, The Crown cites case law to 
support their contention that the Govenime~~t has the right and the duty to keep oat and to 
"' Vmderfeet.stcpranoîe f2at538. 
m~uco6s, supra note 154 at 7 2  
expel "aiiens" fkom this country ifit considers it advisabIe to do so. Once again, 1 do not 
think it accurate or cutturally appropriate to compare or label the Indigenous peoples of 
this continent as "aliens) as ifthey have no better claim to this land than an immigrant 
f?om China, or Iraq or Nigeria, whose nghts postdate the settling of Canada's 
international boundaries. This misleadhg characterization of Aboriginal peoples resident 
in what is now Canada and the United States, once again ignores theirsui generis status 
in this country and specifically that the origin of their rights pre-dates the senling of 
Canada's international boundaries, 
With regards to the issue of criminal convictions, as stated above, it should not 
prevent AboriginaI peoples fkom exercising their rights, no more so than it would apply to 
non-aboriginal peoples in their own political Canadian temtory. While I consider that al1 
the territory in what is now Canada, is rightfully Abonginal land, and that out rights to 
the use and occupation of this land shouid be paramount to the claims of al1 others, I will 
use the current politicai situation as an exampIe. Presently, if a non-aboriginal person has 
a criminai record they are sti11 fiee to travet within the temtory that is considered theirs; 
Le. Canadian territory. There is no restriction of movement ffom province to province 
based on criminal convictions. It shouid fo1Iow theu, that Abonginal peoples with 
Aboriginal or Treaty rights to traverse their territory which just happas to cross the 
Canada-US. border, should be dlowed to do just that without regard to their crùnùiaI 
records. In addition, 1 wilt argue that the Confederacy Nations have a rÏght of fiee passage 
based not o d y  on thektnditiond Abonginai and treaty rightsp but that these rights were 
recognized in an international treaty known as the J i  Treaty- It Ïs my position that the 
promCses made unda the Jby Treaty shdd be treated as  an Iildian treaty and protected 
under section 3 5(I) of the ConstiMion Act, 1982, and at a minimum, it should provide 
ampIe evidence of the existence of the right of fiee passage for the purposes of AborigùiaI 
rights litigation. It is to the J i  Treuty that the anaiysis now tums. 
CHAPTER THREE: 
IN THE SPIRIT OF JAY: 
MORE BROKEN PROMISES OR CAN JAY SAVE US 
TWO HUNDRED YEARS LATER? 
%ut Brothers, this Iine, which the King marked out 
between hîm and the States even supposed the Treaty 
had taken effect, could never have prejudiced yoor 
rights*"" 
THE JAY TREATY OF 1794: 
IRrZRODUCïTON: 
The Jày Treaty, concluded on November 19,1794, cded the Treuty of Amity 
Commerce and Nc~igation'" was made between the United States of Amenca and His 
Majesty of Great Britain. The Treaty was named after John Jay who was Chief Justice of 
the United States at the tirne, who negotiated the articles of peace. The main goal was to 
establish a permanent peace between Great Britain and the United States. nie US. Senate 
advised that the Treaty should be ratified, and was arnended by the U.S. Senate on June 
24,1795. Then, on Octoba 28,1795 there was an exchange of ratifications, and it was 
ratiflecl by the President of the United States. The Treaty was finaDy proclaimed on 
February 29,1796.''' 
With regards to how theJq Treaty was treated here in Canada, there was 
Iegislation impIcmenting ArticIe III (the mobiIity cIause) of the Treaty. This IegisIation 
was passed in 180 1, but repeaieà m Upper Canada in 1824. It was passed in 1796 and 
ahwed to lapse in Lower Canada in 1813.'" The Treaty was concIuded in order to settle 
the drfferences between the two imperid powers with regards to trade and commerce, the 
Mfichefl PM. n<pm note 13 at para 190. The comt was quohg a speech men by Lord Dorchester m 
179 1 to vanous hdian Nations expIaining the J i  Treaty- 
"'Ji  ne*, supra note 6. 
" fiid 
*S. ClpperC L801.c.5S. trPperC 1824.c.40; S. LomrC. 1796,~.7::S. LowerC. LBtZ,c5. 
passage of their sea-going vesseIs and the extent of their territories for these purposes. 
ArticIe III dso addresseci Indian concerns over Indian land and their rights of both free 
passage and the carrÏage of their goods wïthin their temtories without being taxed. 
This Treaty was necessary, for aIthough there had been the Treaty of Paris in 
1783 which recognized the independence o f  the United States and fked boundaries 
between the two, it has left the bblndian question" unanswered. 
No clearpoliticai conception iiad been fonnulated of the 
relationship ofthe Indians either to the oid or the new 
govemment especiaity in respect of rights in the lien& over 
which the natives had fonnerij roamed ut wil[: and their 
protest was that tlie British had prported to tramfer m the 
United States. a titie which they did not possess. As a 
meawe of min'gation. the Britkh conceived the idea of 
setting apmt a neutrui zone between the two countries fur 
Indian sentement, but this did not devehp to the point of 
definite proposal..'" 
It was the Indian concem, dong with some other border fictions between the 
United States and Great Britain, that eventuaiiy Iead to the Jqy Treaty and the indumon 
of AmcIe 3 dealing with the fiee mobility of the Indian tribes. WhiIe the Treaty deait 
with various other issues, it is the part specificaIIy devoted to the concem of the uidians 
that is of importance to the issue of border-crossing rights today. The relevant portions 
read: 
It ik agteed that it diail at all tintes be@e tu His Mqesty's 
subjects. and to tlie citkens of the United States, mîi also 
to the Indfians dweiling on d e r  side of the said boundq 
IhJi-eely to pars and repass 6y Imid or inlimd nuvigatrbn, 
arlo the respective temitories md countnes of the two 
parties, on the contr'nent of Amenka, (the camhy w'thin tlie 
lfmitî of the Hudron's Bay Compmty acq t ed )  und tu 
. - . - 
Franc& supra note 148 at 624-625. 
nmgate al2 the l h ,  f ie rs  and waters thmeof; andfreely 
to cany on trade and commerce with each other. '" 
No duty of enby shall mer be [ M d  by eitherparty on 
pltriès brought by [and or inland nmtigation into the said 
tm*tories respective&, nor shall the Indians passing or 
repashg with their own proper good and effects of 
whatever nature, puy for the sume any impost or duty 
whatever- But goods in bales. or other large packages, 
unusml m n g  Indians. shall not 6e considered ar goodr 
belonging bona fide to Indians. 17' 
This Article specifically provided that the Indians who dwell on either side of the 
boundary had the nght to pass freely over the border as well as cany on trade. This 
Article aiso provided that the M a n s  who cross the border with goods would not be taxed 
or have duty Ïmposed upon them. Ifthere was ever any doubt as to whether this Article 
conveyed any rights or was rneant to binding into the hime, an ErpIanato~ Artide ro the 
nird AmcLe of the Treaty of November 19,1794. Respecting the Liberty tu Pars and 
Repars the Borders and to Cuny on Trade and Commerce was conchded to address that 
very concem. This article was concluded on May 4,1796 and mped by both 
commissioners of Hi5 Majesty of Great Britain and the United States of Amenca This 
Explanatory Article provided additional assurances that the Bghts contained in the J i  
Treaty would net onIy be recognized, but couid not be derogated nom in any fiiture 
agreements and provided in part as folIows: 
Whereas by the t h ~ ~ c i e  of th  treaty of am@, 
commerce md navrgation, ... 
.At was agreed that it shdd  ut al2 thes  be@e to His 
Majesty f subjects und to the c i 'ens  of the United States, 
and ulso to the Indim dwelhg on eilier side of the 
boundq  line. mmSLgned by the treaty ofpeace to the United 
States..fieely to pus  and repars, by [and or inland 
navigation. into the respective tm'tones and cornnier of 
the two contractingparties, on the continent of America? 
(the CO- within the lfmits of the Hudron 's Bay 
Company only excepted.) and to navigate ai2 the lukes. 
rivers and waters thereof; andpeely to carry on trade and 
commerce with each other. subject to the provisions and 
limitations contuined in the said article:.,. 
And it being the sincere desire of HLF Britannic Majesty 
and of the United States that this point should be so 
explained as to remove al2 doubtr andpromote mutual 
satisfaction and fiendrhip: ... 
... and do by these presents erplicitly agree and declare, 
thar no stijndatiom NI all)r treaty subsequentlj concluded &y 
either of the contractingpartres with uny other Stute or 
nation, or with any Indian tnbe, can be understood tu 
derogate in any mannerfrom the righrs m e  intercottrse 
and commerce. secured by the aforesaid third amkie ... 
... and to the Indimrs dwelling on either side of the 
boundary line aforesaid; but t h  al1 the saidpersons shall 
remain atfull libertyfieeiy to pars and repas, by land or 
inland nawgation? into the respective temitories and 
corntries of the contractingpartrCes, on either side of the 
said boundmy lme. andfreely to curry on trade and 
commerce w5h each other. uccording to the stip~ations of 
the said third article of the treaty of antiîy, commerce und 
navigation." 
Nthough it wodd appear by the above expianation of the thMl article, that there 
is a dennitive right for Aborigînaf peoples to f?eeIy cross the border, the c o m ~  in Canada 
have not been willùig to accept the Treaty as holding any enforceabIe rights for 
Aborigind peoples. The focos has beai in discotmting the J i  Treaty as an dorceabIe 
intemationai treaty in Canada, and in disquaiiQhg it as an Indian Treaty with 
constitutional protection under section 35(1). What is misshg in these cases is an 
appreciation of the sui generis nature of  Aboriginal treaty nghts and an openness to 
inchde the specific provisions of the Jày Treaty relating to Indians, as either an Indian 
treaty, or at Ieast as a unique treaty that c m  aiso be protected as the other treaties 
protected to date. At a minimum. the promises that were made under this Treaty to 
appease the concem of the Indians shodd be upheld as part of the honor of the Crown in 
W i n g  its fiduciary duty towards Abonginai peoples. 1 will review the case law with 
regards to the Jay Treaîy and offer an analysis of how each case compares with modem 
interpretive principles in treaty interpretation. 
CASE LAW: 
FRANCS v. THE QmEm 
The first Supreme Court of Canada decision to ded with the.@ Treav and 
Indian mobility was Francis v. Cmada in 1956."' This case involved a Canadian uidian 
who was registered mder the Indian Act, and lived on the S t  Regis Indian reserve in 
Quebec, adjoming an Indian reserve in New York, U.S.A. T'he members of both reswes 
are ai l  £iom the sûme triie. The appellant brought articles into Canada nom the United 
States as a test case on whethcr or not he had to pay duty on these articles. He based his 
c lah  in part on the J i  Treaty of 2794, Article 3. partidarly the second part which 
states that Indians pascihg and repasshg over the border wilI not pay any duty on their 
'" Ecpimatory ~nicCe O the mird Artieof the Eeuty of N o v m k  19.1794. Respecthg the tiberîy to 
P a s  and Repass tiie Bordets and to Cimy on Eade and Commerce- ConcIuded May 4,1796; Ratincation 
adviseci by Senate May 9,1796- ~ereiÏ&erEcxplrmato~ Amde]. 
goods. The contention was that Artide 3 of the J i  Treaty effected the enactment of 
substantive Iaw and did not need statutory enactment because it was a provision of a 
treaty of peace. It was argued that the treaty was an exercise of the prerogative, includhg 
a legislative hction. Chief Justice Kerwin's respouse for the majority was that since: 
The J i  Treaty was not a Treaty of Peace mid it is clear 
that m C d a  such rights andpriideges as ore here 
advanced of subjects of a contractingparty to a treaty are 
enfurceable by the courts only where the treaw has been 
h p h m t e d  or sanctioned by [egisution.." 
Thus, Chief Justice Kerwin decided that any relevant rights of  the appellant in the 
J i  Tm@ were not justicable in the courts of this country. The appehnt's argument 
went on to state that the treaty of peace was now law and was not e t e d  by the war of 
1812, and even if it were, the 9th Article of the Treuty of Ghent "' in 1814 between the 
same states, restored the tfghts under Article 3 of the J i  Treaty. '" Article 9 of the 
Treaty ofGhent states: 
And His Brittanic Majesty engages, on his part, to put an 
end. immediateiy ajer the ratifiation of the present Treuty 
io hostiIities with all the tri'6es or Nations of Indiam with 
whorn he may be at war at the rinie ufstich rat@catioon; and 
forthwith to restore mch Tnbes or Nations, respective&, 
ail the POSS~SSI~I~S,  RRigs und Privikges, which they may 
have enjoyed or be entitled tu ht 181 1, previour to such 
hostiIitr'es Provided always, that such Ribes or Nitions 
shall agree to desrStfiom ah! hostiIitiries agmnst His 
Bntannic Mwesty, und tlis Subjects, upon the Ratifiution 
of the Present Tireay being notiifed to such Tribes or 
Nùtzbns, and sirall so desiPt a c c ~ r d i r t g ~ ' ~ ~  
"' Fruncir:, supm note 148. 
16id at 621- 
" Trew of Ghenr, 1814. From Tredik and Agreements Affe~n'ng Cumadu iiw F i  Bdmrn 8ïk 
Maj~sty and the United Stotes of Amda witk Subsidiary Documents 1814 - 2925. (Ottawa= 
Department of Exter~I  M i  1927)- ~eminafter Treuty of Glientj, 
la 16id 
lSs Ibfd 
Justice Rand went on to explain that a peace treaty is defïned as a treaty which 
concludes a war, and the Treaty of Pmis of 1783 was such a treaty. In contrast, the court 
felt that the J i  Treuty was only a treaty to work out some problems with regards trade 
and Indian concems. Rand, J. stated that a treaty is an executive act between independent 
states acting in sovereign capacities, but its impkmentation may still need legisiative 
action. The différence is that seictly sovereign matters such as establishing borders are 
deemed executed, whereas provisions for future social or commercial relations are those 
within the scope of municipal law. That being so, without a constitutional provision 
declaring the Treaty to be Iaw, it must be supplemented by statutory action. Thus, 
hancid  provisions such as duties must be Iegislated. in terms of the Treaty of Ghent, 
Rand, I. reiied on a United States case which held that the parties to the Treav ofGhent 
merely "engaged" themseives to restore the rights of Indians by legislation, but never 
did.'86 Finally, Justice Kellock dedt with section 87 of the Indian Act deaIing with M a n  
treaties and merely stated that the J i  Treaty did not falI within that definition.'" So, the 
Supreme Court of Canada decided that the Ctutoms Act was in force in regards to 
Indians, and thus, there was no right by the hdians to bring goods over the border duty 
fiee. 18" 
One of the problems with this case is that it was decided in 1956, Iong before the 
new Constitutional provisions for AborïgiaaI peopIe and long before courts had 
- - 
'16 United States v. G a m  (1 937) 88 Fed EL (26) 3 18 at 321. 
'" Seciion 87 (now sec. 88) of the ii&m Aa. nrpm note 21: '38. Sub.jcz u> rhe temrs of any aemy md 
arty 0th- Act of Pmliment; an im of geneuiappIicatiotfj5ont time tu hme irt force at any province me 
applicabfe to andin respect of Iizdictlfs in the Prow'irceC except to the ment thut fiose Iaws mdeproVU.ron 
for mry matterfor which provlm'on ik made by or under thk Act" 
'" Francist supra note Mi?, 
developed the policies behmd Aboriginal claims and the basis of their nghts. This is ali 
too evident in the passage of Justice Rand, who iooks back nostdgicaily on the struggles 
between the Indians and the Newcomers and comrnents: 
ZRere folbwed the slow but iheviiabIe mmch of events 
paralleled by t h  in thk country; and today there remain 
a h g  the border onlyfagmentq reminders of the pust. 
Die stnfe had waged over thefiee and ancient hunting 
grounak and theirfiuits, lands which were divided between 
M>O powers, but that ire in its original mode 
and scope hm long since disappeared."' 
Justice Rand continues on to Say, in regards to the Indian Act, that it is these 
considerations that: 
...Justify the conclusion that 60th the Crown and 
Parliament of this counhy have treated the provisional 
accommodation as having been replaced by an acIusive 
code of new and special rights and ptfvileges. l W  
Yet, it is the very fact that the traditiond Iife, cuittue and practices of various 
Aboriginal groups have not disappeared, that these ways are still practiced and that these 
struggies for their traditiond hunting grounds have not been forgotten or given up on in 
any way by Abonginai groups. It is for ail these reasons that they continue to assert their 
rights and take them to court to have them validated, and why these rights are now 
protected m our Constitution Act, 1982. 1 would argtie that in light of the Constitutional 
protections of Aboriginal rÏghts and as a remit of the Crown's fiduciary duty to 
AboriginaI peopIes, that this case ought to be reconsÎdered m Iight of these more cecent 
judicid standards. 
The case of Mitchen v. Cmadu, supra'" wi1I soon be argued in the Supreme 
Court of  Canada, also de& with the vaIidity of border-mssmg rights under the Jay 
Treaîy. This case will be discussed in more detail below. One of the issues that the Crown 
is addressing is the effect of the Francis case. The Crown is arguing that the Francis case 
is determinative of the issue of Jay Treav rights as it was a Supreme Court of Canada 
case. Counsel for Kanantakeron argues that the Francis case does not stand for 
extinguishment and states ui their submission: 
niejudgement in Franck v. the Queen. ri9561 S.C.R 618 
stands at ntost for the proposition that in 1956, the treaty 
guarantees in A d D  of the Jiy Treaty cudd not be 
enforced by the courts of Canada as there was no domestic 
legislation irnplemenring those treaty guarantees. The 
essentiai holding of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
FranciS was that the nghts guoranteed in Art.m of the Joy 
Treaty codd not be enforced by the courts of Canada since 
there was ''no legtslation in force impIementing the 
stipulaion". (per Rand J.  at 629) 
RandJ. esplcitiy deciined to consider the question of 
whether the treuty rights had been extinguiished, stating 
that gg[w]hether. then. the tirne of its expiration h m  bem 
reached or not it is not necessury to decide" fat 629). 19' 
With regard to the recent evoiution of the law dealing with the rights of 
Aboriginal people, couosel in the Mitchell case dso argues tbat Spmrow, supra, and the 
other cases dkct the aualysis o f  the J i  Treaty that mandates a reconsideration of the 
issue since Franck They explain at paragraph 116 of their submission: 
Be lm of Cmda haP evohred Franak artrrtrcuIutes a 
conception of pmliarntmtary sovereignty before the coming 
"' MltcheRAppeal. supra note 153. 
" Memorandlunr of Fact and Law of Appelht  on the CrossAppeal- VoIimit 2 - Counsei for the 
Respondent - h4'itcheiI Appeul, supra note 153 at para 109-1 10, Pereinafter MitcheflSu6mrS~fOrts]. 
Nito force of the Conrt*&tion Act. 1982. The principle 
t hmt  of the Sireme Courtkjùdgement in Sparrow w m  
that afier 1982 there existed a remedy for Abonginal 
peoples not availaole to them befre 1982- B a t  ronetfy 
conskted of being able to successfuIly assert Abon'grkal 
and treaty rights against the actions of the legidatures 
which curtuii dose ngits, or  inaction by the IegrsIatures 
protecting those rights. Rights that prior to 1982 were not 
judicable, became fidicable afrr 1982. Io' 
The Appellant in Mitchell argued that the Treaty of U'echt and the Treaty of 
Ghent were r edy  peace treaties and were thus self-executing and needed no domestic 
legislation in order to be implemented. These treaties provided nghts for the Indian 
Nations and confirm the rights under theJay Treaty. They at least provide evidence to 
support Article III of the J i  Treaty as a treaty in the sense of binding obligations on 
behaifof the Crown. It is my position that the Francis case ought to reconsidered in Iight 
of the rnost recent case Iaw on Aboriginal and treaty rights. Even if the Francis case was 
rightly decided in its time, and the rights mder the Jay Treaty were not justiciable pnor to 
1982, section 35 of the Constitution Act now makes these rights judicable. A more recent 
case fiom the Ontario Court of Apped attempted to ded with the modern case Iaw and 
fgiled to make the appropriate anaiysis. What foIlows is my rriticism of the case m 
Regina v. ficent'", and why I believe that, despite having the case law before it, failed 
to make the appmprÏate anaiysisS 
REGINA v. mCENT: 
In Reg* v. Vincent a member of the Laureate-Humn band, Elizabeth Vincent 
UnlawfuIIy imported tobacco hto Canada fiom the United States and was foud guiity at 
fiid at para L 16, 
triai, as  she had not estabIished a Iawful excuse as per the Curtoms Act. She appeded the 
decision on the basis that her Iawfiil excuse was that Article 3 of the J i  Treaty, 
coafirmed by Iater treaties and promises of the time period conferred upon her an 
exemption fiom custom duties, rights which are now protected under S. 35 of the 
Constitution Act. The first item to note is that the court initialIy dealt with the J i  Treaty 
as ifit were valid today. Lacourciere, J.A. stated that because the tobacco hported by the 
appellant was contained in seven Iarge cardboard boxes, it could not be considered 
exempt f?om duty as the Article specificaily prohibited exemptions on "... gooh Ni bales 
or oiher largepackages unma2 among Indiam.". As weI1, he outright rejected the 
appellant's contention that the expression: "... thek own gooh and effects ..." excluded 
only those goods not belongiag to Indians. '" 
Aithough Lacourciere, JA. held that this was sufncient to dispense with the 
appeaI, he went on to deal with the issue of whether or not the Jizy Treaw was a treaty 
within the meaning of S. 35 of the Constitution Act which states: 
35. (1) Ine mktiing AbongrgrnaI and treaty righis of the 
Aboriginaipeoples of Canada are hereby 
recognLred and f lmed.  
in considering this question, they reviewed the authonties on the subject and came 
to the conclusion that the fiamers of section 35 mtended the word "treaty" to have the 
meanhg already recognhed m Canadian courts, that being Indian Treaties, or they wodd 
have chosen another word They ais0 decide that since court decisions prior to 1982 
- - 
" Vfuientp supm note 149. 
= J i  Remy. supm note 6. 
Constitdon Act f 982, s35, 
stated that the term 4'treaty" in section 87 (now 88) of  the Indian Act did not refer to 
international treaties, that this makes it clear that: 
... ' treaty ' in thir section does not extend to an international 
treaty such as the J q  Treaty but on& to treaties with 
Indiam wiiich are mentioned throughout the statute. '" 
Finaity, the court ended by statùig the unweIcome resdts should the court accept 
the appeUant7s arguments, namely that: 
... each time that Canada signed an international treaty 
which might produce Gects for Indium and their ban&: 
(a) Canada would [ose its sovereign rights to 
mend, &end tenninate or denounce a treaty 
without the consent of the Indianr and their 
respective ban&; ... 
(6) the Parliament of Canada w d d  be obliged tu 
maintain the treaty in force, men ifthe other 
connacting c o u n q  refused to respect it or 
unilaterall'y renounced if. unlas the Abort@dls 
consented to the abrogation of the Law; and 
(C) the Govenmtmt of Canada would be obliged to 
continue to confer on the Indians ofCanada the 
beneftts they would lime been able to d m  from it, 
regardles of the fate of the treuty. 'CM 
Aithough the Franck case was somewhat problematic, it was somewhat explained 
by the fact that the case was decided m 1956, before the benefit o f  the Constitution Act. 
19BT and the recent cases which explain Aboriginal policy issues in interpreting the rights 
they daim. The same can not be said for the Vincent case, which had a i i  the benefits of 
ment Supreme Cowt deckions as weii a s  the hterpretive prÏncÏples for adjudicating 
AborigùiaI rights. RespectfbIIy, 1 wodd argue that this case is wrongly decided in its 
mFrmr&t supra note 148 at 631. 
conclusions and its methodology in adjudicating the issues. The problem is exacerbated 
by the fact that leave to the Supreme Court of Canada was refused. 
The Ontario Court of AppeaI interpreted Article 3 to mean that since the appellant 
transported the tobacco in seven large boxes, they are not exempt nom duties, without 
explmation as to how they made this interpretation, other than IiteraIly. It is submitted 
that the court failed to use the principle as enunciated in Nowegijik v. me Queen before 
making their holding. The principle stated that : 
... treaties and statutes reluting to Indians shotdd be liberai& 
constmed and uncertninties resolved in favor of the Indians. "' 
In addition, they negiected to read on M e r  in the passage where the quaüfier is 
added: 'i..not usuaI among Indians...", which could aiso imply that large baies or 
packages which are usuai among Indians would still be exempt from duties. This is a 
treaty which relates to Indians and should be constnied accordingly. Thus, if the court had 
any probIems with interpretation or there was any arnbiguity as to what the words meant, 
they shouId have resolved that problem in favor of the Indians. Yet, the court did not 
mention the consideration of any evidence as  to what is 'iisuai" among Indians then or 
now. In the absence of such endence, they shodd have piva  the benefit of the doubt to 
the appellant and at Ieast directed that the matter be refened back so that evidence could 
be provided to address these gaps. 
SmiiarIy, with the second phrase regarding ownaship of the goods, the court did 
not provide a b a i s  upon which they ~jected the appebmt's bterpretation that it onIy 
applied to goods that were not those of the Indians. The principk in Nowegijick wodd 
'96 Vincent. supra note 149 at 441. 
apply here as we4 had the court had any question about it. On its face, it is submitted that 
the court erred in its interpretation of the fïrst two parts of the appellant's contention 
based on the interpretive principles that have been established for these issues. Ifit is the 
case that was Little evidence before the court, the matter couId have been referred back to 
consider new evidence. 
In regards to the question of whether theJay Treaty is of the kind which is 
included in section 35 of the Consritution Act. 1982, the court takes a position which is 
not in Iine with the balance of the authorities cited on point in that case. Specincally, the 
court cited Briau Slattery who stated that the expressicn treaty rights is niaciently broad 
enough to include treaties between the C m  and other sovereign States when such 
treaties indude stipulations in favor of Aboriginal people?" The court dso quoted 
Rofessor Hogg in support of Slattery's position with regard to internationd treaties 
holding rights for Aboriginal peoples. 
These authorities coupled with the broad interpretive principle were enough to 
convince the triai judge of the ÏncIusion of the Jay Treaw in section 35, yet, when faced 
with the choice, the court of apped went the other way. They focused on the fact that the 
miters al1 mentioued that there is some doubt as to whether the treaty codd be indudeci, 
based on the Iack of case law on the point. Yet, Judge Lysyk expressed his opinion that a 
liberal interpretation of the text of the Ciimer wodd not necessarily give the same 
meanhg to the word treaty as  wodd the Indian ~c t? '  It is submitted that the Court of 
" Nowegjr'ck, supm note 49 at 36. 
m" B. Sattery, The Cortstitunconof Guarantees ofAbon'ja1 und T J  Ri@ (1983) 8 Queen's W. 232, 
at 243- [peremafter SImery]. 
Yincertt* Supra note 149- 
AppeaI erred in not properly considerhg the broad interpretive principle ni Nowegijik 
and should have resolved the doubt as to whether the treaty was mcluded in section 35 in 
favor of the appeiiant. 
Similariy, the court states that because pre-1982 cases said that the term treaty in 
the Indian Act did not include intemationai treaties, that the same should be true now. Yet 
the court fafieci to establish upon what line of  reasoning that holding is based. The 
judicid p ~ c i p l e s  and iriterpretive policies have changed since 1982 precisely due to the 
mclusion of section 35 Ui the Comtitutr'on, and more equitable views of Aboriginal Bghts, 
thus the pre-1982 cases should be re-examined in light of such changes. To simply 
dismiss the possibiIity ignores the major changes Aboriginai Iaw has gone through in the 
1st decade or so. Lacourciere JA. concluded that the lndian An was a cornplete code 
which governs the "tights and privileges" of in di an^.^ 
The Indian Act determines sorne of the nghts of registered Indians who üve on a 
reserve and most of the provisions are in relation to band members. It does not m e r  the 
questions of Aboriginal hunting and fishing nghts, seKgovemment rights, land claims, 
the nghts of Metis or the off-reserve AboripinaI people and thus is obviousfy not 'the' 
source to Iook to in attempting to define Aboriginai mobility rights, espa5aiIy those that 
may be fomd m an international treaty such as the Jay Treaty. It is submitted that the 
Indian Act and its provisions should be looked at with the fiduciary duty of the Crown in 
mind as entmciated in Gu& v. Z?ie Queen m5 and a broad I i b d  intqretation of the 
word %eaty" withui the Indm Act shouid be adopted. Regardes of the def'lnition of the 
word %eaty" as found in the Indian Act, the court couId incorporate this unique form of 
"promise" Ïnto the word "'treaty" as used in the Constitution Act, 1982, so as to protect 
the honor of the Crown in making such promises. 
As explained in the previous Chapter, the courts have held that it is to be assumed 
that the Crown intended to honor its promises to the hdiitfls, and the Jay Treuty should be 
no exception. The very purpose of section 35(1) is to reconcile Crown sovereignty with 
the fact that Aboriginal peoples were aheady living here in organized societies. The cases 
from Sparrow to Van der Peet to Delgamuuwk, dl stress that Crown sovereignty must be  
reconciled with rights of Abonginal peoples. This purpose was partially FuKlled Ui 1794 
when the European powers worked out how they were going to divide their politicd lines 
as between thernselves, but assured the Indian Nations that this border was never intended 
to affect them. The inclusion of protections for the Indian Nations in the Jay Treaty was a 
solemn promise by both European powers that the border was irrelevant to the Indian 
Nations as far as kee passage was concemed. How codd the Crown now argue in good 
faith that they no longer have to reconciIe their assertion of sovereignty over Indian 
Lands with the Aboriginal and treaty rights of those Nations to fiee passage over the 
border? 
The finai error on the part of the Apped Court was to use possibilities and 
hypothetlcd situations to help determine the issue, which only se& to distort the 
issues. The colnt stated that each time that Canada signeci a treaty "'... which might 
produce flects for I n d i a  .. ",, they wouId Iose their right to amend or terminate the 
treaty without the consent of the Indi2~11~. The coust was not deaIing with possiile fimne 
treatles, they were dealing specifrdy *th t h e J i  Treuty, which had aIready been 
signed by the British and American parties. Thus, this was no? an issue of an imaginary 
treaty which mriy have produced effécts for Indians. The Jay Treaty specScaUy 
mentions Indiaus and was partialIy brought mto existence to que11 hdian concerns about 
border travel. The J'y Treaty was read aloud and explained to the Indians for a purpose, 
and one c m  only liberally constme that it was to ensure they understood the benefits, 
rights or recognition of rights that was embedded in the Jay Treaty. 
The nrst concem was that Canada wouid lose its sovereign nght to amend or 
denounce treaties without the consent of Indians. My question is how the court came to 
this conclusion. Aboriginal people are seeking to have the rights that were promised them 
m the J i  Treaty recogized once again and e e d .  They are not seeking to have dl the 
provisions of the treaty upheld. Certain rights were promised to the Indians and the 
Crown's honor being at stake, together with its fiduciary duty demand that these rights be 
recognized as promised years ago. It is not rny understanding that ail Canadian Indians 
have asked for a veto on dl Canadian treaty making powers. To suggest such an absurd 
resuIt takes away the focus of what the case was about: a promise made to be upheld. 
The same c m  be said of the courts second concern relahg to the hypotheticd fear 
that Canada wodd have to maintain the treaty in force even if the other country 
renotmced it without Indian consent. The focus of the c l a h  is to recognize the right of 
fiee passage of Indians, not to usurp Canada's treaty m a h g  powers or political powers 
with mternationd commimity. Again, such far-fetched claims are not what is behg 
adjudicated. The ri@ advanced is the rÎght to pass fkeeIy over the border as promiseci in 
the JqV Treaty pnrsuaot to ody one Article of the Joy Treuty. Some flex1iZty remai& 
with the courts of this country and with the Iegislattïre m order to accommodate pre- 
existing commitments to the Indians. It is not so fx fetched to imagine that Canada couId 
incorporate the nghts into the Iinmigration Act, or choose to uphold the promises it made 
without declaring the treaty as a whole must be upheld. 
The thud concem was that Canada wouid be obîiged to uphold the benefits 
conferred on the Indians despite the fate of the Treaty. Why woddn't they uphold 
promises made to the Indians, given that that would be in keeping with the honor of the 
Crown and the fiduciary relationship it has towards to the Aboriginal people of this 
country? How the court could classiS. this part as "absurd", is absurd in itselt Because 
the court irnagined these imaginary absurd consequeuces, they held that the J i  Treaty 
could not be considered an indian Treaty. 1 believe the analysis shouId be the other way 
around, in establishg the exiexistence of a treaty and then review the benefits conferred 
within. No where in the J q  Trea~,  did the text express the intention to confer such far- 
fetched rights on the AbonginaI people as  suggested above. The court did not uphold the 
honor of the Crown by deflecting the issue Eom what was before it, to imaginary resuits 
oot sought by the Mans.  It is well-settied Iaw that the Crown owes Aboriginai people a 
fiducïary duty to protect their interests and has recognized and afnrmed their AbonginaI 
and Treaty rights in the Constitution as discussed in the prevîous Chapter. Thus, to ignore 
the promises and assurances given to the Indians so many years ago given to procure th& 
peace and fEendship wodd be acting below the hÏgh standard that has been set by the 
courts* In this regard, coume1 for Kanantakemn at the Court of Appeai in the Mitchen 
case, staîed: 
At the Fort EeRe Conference in Augusi 1795. overlûû 
yems ago. Lt- Gov. Sntcoe refmed to ArtrcCe J i  
Treaty and the Treuty of Utrecht statr'g: '"Brothers: By the 
Present Treaty your nghts me guarded. und specijically 
piaced on ;heir anc~~entfooting. ".. 
Tie Constitution of Canada, through the promise of ~3 .5 ,  
now m r e s  tliat the wwd of the white man cm be kept? 
It is my position that shce there has been no definitive ruiing fiom the Supreme 
Court of Canada on the utility of the J i  Treaty, that at le& legaLIy, the possibility 
rem& that a proper anaiysis can be completed to give recognition to the promises of the 
Crown. As stated above, the court in Smith dismissed the applicant's arguments that the 
J i  Treaty conferred on her the right to traverse the border- The court decided that 
previous cases, namely Francis and Vincent. decided that the Jay Treug was not a valid 
treaty under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act. As such, while there remained the 
Abonginal rights question which constituted a senous issue to be tried, there would be no 
relief based on the Jizy Treaty-fo5 The Jay Trenty was immediately dismissed without 
consideration of modem interpretive principles, so that the case became one of 
Aborigind nghts and oot the J i  Treary? 
Similarly in Watt, as stated in the previous chapter, the Court of Apped upheld 
the application forjudicial review of the adjudicator's decision to deport Watt and held 
that there was no evidence that Watt's Aborigind nghts had been exthguished and sent it 
back for review. This case was aIso treated as maùily an Aboriginal rights case, and made 
no dennitive statement on the J i  Treuty. 
The next case that I will deai with, Mitchell v. Canada (Mhister of NationaC 
Revenue - M.ALR.)'L" is a case that relates to the imposition of duty on goods brought 
across the border by an Aboriginal person. While primarily a duty case, Mitcheli, supra 
dso addresses the Jny Treaty and M a n  nghts which may flow fiom this treaty as welI as 
the other international îreaties, namely the Treaiy of Ghent 'Og and the Treuty of 
U~echt. '~ This case is of phcda r significance, as it wil1 soon be argued in the 
Supreme Court of Canada 
MALAL v. MITCHELL: 
In the Mitchell case, the Abonginal respondent has met with his Council of 
Mohawks and decided that since the federal goverment refused to negotiate their border 
nghts, he wodd cross the border, and bnng goods back over to Canada &er fifit 
declaring his goods and asserting his Abonginai rights. The Federai Cornt of Appeai 
upheld the triai court's decision in Mitchell "O that the Aboriginal respondent, Grand 
Chief MÏchael Mitchell, dso known as Kanantakeron, did indeed have an Aboriginal 
right to carry goods across the border for non-commercial scak trade without having to 
pay duty at the border. The Cotirt of AppeaI restricted the tnd judge's dedaration, to 
irade ody with other First Nation comrnunities in the geographic area of Quebec or 
Ontario, with gpods bought in New York State. The Court held that the use must aIso be 
for personai or community use. On the issue of the J i  Treuty the apped court felt that 
their hdmg of an Aboriginal right was not based on the Jay Treaîy. WhiIe at the same 
Mitchelt Appetzi, supra note 153. 
B R  Treaiy of Ghenc supra note 183- 
Treuty of Utrecht 1713 Dereinaiter Utrecht]. 
'" Mitcheil Apped, nrpm note 153. 
the,  they heId that the J i  Treaîy could not be used to limit the scope of an Aboriginal 
The triai judge had aiso decIared a right for the Mohawks to pas  and repass fkely 
over the Canada-US. border. The amended declaration by the Feded Court of Apped 
reads as follows: 
. ..the plainw as a MohmvR of Akwesene resident in 
Canada has an msting Abo~ginal right which is 
constitutionall'y protected by sections 35 and 52 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, when crossing the international 
border at Cornwall Island, to bring with himrerf in 
Canada. for personal use or consuniprion. or for collective 
use or colfsumption by the rnembers of the comrnunity of 
Akwesame, goodr boughht in the state of New York without 
h&g to pay any dus> or taxes to the Canadian 
guvernment or autiority.."' 
The Federal Court of Appeal heId that while they were amending the hial judge's 
declaration, they wanted to make it clear that they were also endormig his numerous 
factuai and Iegd hdings. It is for this reason that I wiU tum to the hid decision to 
review the J i  Treaty and its -Ris at international law as this case is soon to be argued at 
the Supreme Court of Canada IeveI. I wiII use both the Triai Ievel and Court of Appeal 
IeveI of Mitchell, for my treaty analysis of the J i  Trem and why it shodd be considered 
a treaty, or at Ieast a source that evidences the Crown's obligations towards the border 
Nations with regards to fiee passage- 
LNFORMING AN ANGLYSIS OP THE JAY TREATY= 
Most of the cases dealuig with treaty interpretation Eom the Supreme Court of 
Canada and courts at the apped level, have dedt primarily with treaties that were 
negotiated directiy between the M a n s  and Canada. It is submitted that the policies 
behuid adopting such favorable interpretive tools in regards to Indian rights pursuant to 
these treaties ought to apply with equal force to treaties, clauses, promises or declarations 
that are made to Indians oa behalfof the Crown, both Amencan, Canadian and British. 
The fact that Aboriginal people ail over this continent have relied on these treaties to 
ensure their survivai, and that of friture generations, signifies that when the question of 
treaty &ses, it should be considered very carefblIy. These issues require some 
understanding of the unique and sacred aspect of these documents. in R. v. White and 
Bo6, the Supreme Court of Canada held : 
... 'Treuty ' is not a word of art and ... it embraces al1 such 
engagements made with persons in authority as any be 
brought within 'the word of the white man ' the sanctity of 
which w u ,  at the time of British erplorution and 
settLement, the must important means of obiaining the 
goodwiil and CO-operation of the native tribes and enstcring 
that the cohiî is  would be protectedfiorn death and 
destruction, On such assurance the Indians refied"' 
It is o d y  with a cIear undenitandihg of this inbalance of power that the courts 
shouId attempt to mterpret these sacred treaties. As 1 stated eartier, 1 do not beiieve that 
the courts are the best way for the Crown to deal with our treaties. GNen the honor of the 
Crown that is at stake, and the fiduciary duty that they have with regards to our interests, 
1 believe that they shouid aclmowtedge the validity of each of our treaties, and be& 
discussions as to theu scope and how to protect our rights, as opposed to constantly 
denying them. This is no Iess appropriate for the Jay T'eaty and the promises contained 
therein. For the puposes of my thesis, 1 wiIl aiialyze the rights tmder the J' Treaty 
according to the legd principles as discussed in the previous Chapter. 
In order for any of the western powers to secure any presence in North Amenca, 
they needed the alliance of the then powerful AborÏginal Nations. The agreements which 
resulted fiom such alliances shouId be upheId without regard to superficial formaiities as 
form, precedent or otherwise. The Simon case stated that in interpreting treaties it must be 
remembered that indians were not "on p a f  with sovereign aates and thus fewer 
formaihies were required? Aiso, the Supreme Court in Sioui "" cited a passage h m  an 
Amencan case, Jones v. Meehan which enunciated the poiicy behind constniing the 
Mau rights contained in treaties LiieraUy. A Liberal construction serves as recognition of 
the fact that the bargainhg powen of the parties were very unequd; the court states in 
part: 
In constnïing any treaty between the United S~otes and an 
Indian m-be, if nust always. .. be borne in mind that the 
negotiations for the treaty are conducted, on the part of the 
United States, an enlightened andpowerfuI nation, by 
representatrves skiilid in dipornacy, masters of a wn'tten 
fanguage, unàérstmdr'ng the modes and f o m  of creating 
the v a n a n i  technica2 estates known tu th& lm, and 
assirsted by an interpretet employed by thse lves;  t h  the 
treaty k d r m  irp &y them and in then- OWR language; that 
the Indiuns on the other hand. are a weak and dependent 
people, who have no written hguage and me whollj 
'" R v. White andBo6 (1  964), 50 DL& (24 613 (B.C.C.A,) at 649- [heremafter White and BobI. 
" S h o ~ t ~  supra note 46- 
"' Sian, ~ p m  note 51. 
unfàmiriar with all the f u m  flegal expressiu~, and 
whose only knowiedge of the t m  in which the treaty is 
framed is that irnparted tu t h m  by the interpreter employed 
by the United States; and that the treaty m m  thmefore be 
construed not occording tu the technical meaning of 
its wordr to lemed lawyers. but Ni the sense in which they 
w d d  natwaI& be understood by the ~ndian-"* 
It is important to note that whiie 1 have relieci on this passage for the legd 
p ~ c i p l e s  it espouses, I am very much aware that it aiso speaks of the Indian Nations as 
weak and dependent people. The Indian Nations of this continent have asserted their 
independence and strength since the very first contact with the European Nations. Were it 
not for the rnilitary and poütical strength of the indian Nations, there would have been no 
need for the British and Americans to work so desperately to secure alliances with the 
various Nations through the treaty process. Aîthough this passage is problematic, the 
uitimate point is an important one - that since the treaties were written in the Ianguage of, 
and pursuant to the Iegai system of one party, dl doubts respecthg ünplementation 
shodd be construed in favour of the other party. This reasoning is in h e  with recent case 
Iaw mentioned earlier, that states that treaties shouid be LiieraIty constnred and 
ambiguities resoived in favour of the uidians. 
The courts to date have rejected the idea that the J i  Treaty as an intemationd 
treaty to be considered a treaty akui to those protected under section 35 of the 
ConstiMion. Sttreiy the reasoning in the most recent cases to deny the tmty because 
there is no decision sa* that the J i  Treaty is an India. treaty, is a circdar argument, 
&en the modem day principIes regardhg treaty interpretation. In the Ontario Court of 
AppeaI in Vincent. supra, Lacouciere JA. at 436-437 stated: 
It is obvious that accordmg to Canadian court decisions 
the word "treaiy': when it de& wifh Abon'ginaIs, h a  
always had the rneaning of a treaty b e e n  the C m  and 
the Indium. There ir no court decision wliich grves it the 
rneaning of an intmationaI treagr. 
1 disagree that it is so obvious that by wtue of our courts having only been faced 
with "hdian" treaties as they are sosalied, that the ratio to take from that, is that a treaty 
which may not fit a previously considered format, must therefore be exempt fiom 
consideration. The court in Sioui, seemed open to the possibility of treaties behg other 
than the standard surrender of land type and heId that it could also include treaties which 
oniy deait with social or political nghts: 
ï k r e  is no reason why on agreement concerning 
something other than a tm*toty, such as an agreement 
about political or social rights, cannot be a treaty within 
the nieaning of S. 88 of the hdimi  AC^? 
It would appear to me that when faced with such a document, as the J i  Treaty, 
one wodd keep the principIes of hierai interpretations and the resolution of ambiguity Ï n  
favor of the Indians in the forefiont. 1 beiieve that @en these principles and the recent 
court decisions regardhg evidence and interpretation, that Article III of the J i  Treaty 
codd very weU be considered a treaty deserved of protection under the Constitution Act 
$1982. Understanding that the J i  Treaty dso dealt with o t h a  non-AborÎginaI issues, 
m I y  the above princÏpIes aord the interpretatiion of these promises some measure of 
recognition. 1 see nothmg in the case Iaw to date that wodd prohibit a hierai 
"6 Sioui, SUP~Q note SI at 1043- 
interpretation that would make the Crown responsibIe to fiilnll its obligations as they 
relate to the Aboriginal beneficiaries. 
As discussed in the previous Chapter, the Supreme Court in Simon set out a 
method by which the Iower courts must interpret treaties. The following is an anaIyàs of 
these interpretive principles and how they relate to the Jay Treaty. The nrst question 
relates to the validity of the Joy Treaty. In relation to Indian treaties, the Supreme Court 
in Sioui explauied the Simon case: 
In Simon tfiis court noted that a treaty with the indians i$ 
uniqzie, that it is an agreement sui generiS which is neitfiei 
created nor tenninated according to the rules of 
internationai lm."' 
In Shon, the court spoke of the way in which treaties were made: 
nie treaty was an exchange of soiemn promise berneen the 
Micmacs and the King's ropresentative entered into lo 
achieve and gumantee peuce. It is an enfrceacrble 
obligoton benveen the Indians and the white man and. as 
such, fails within the meuning of the word "treaty " in r88 
of the Indian Act. "' 
I have noted that the court in Mitchell summed up the characteristics of treaty 
From these extracts it is c&ew t h  wfiat characterkes a 
treaty is the mtention to create obligations, the presence 4 
mutua&& bindmg obligations and a certain nieustn-e of 
solentnity. 
Tire Supreme Colat h a  heïd that formaiities me 4 
secundmy importance in decidig on the nature of the 
document containihg an agreement w'th the Indim. L m e r  
L k Siaa. supra m 1045 stated that the factors irr 
detennnn'ig the existene of a treaty me the sme unes thut 
'* fiid. at 1043, 
''' SnIro~~ supra note 46 at 410, 
as.& in detennining the intent of the parries to enter into a 
treaty. He sfuted: 
... Among these factors a t c  
( I )  continuous e~~mciise of a right in the past and at 
present, 
(2) the reasons why the C r m  made the 
cornmitment, 
(3) the situation prevuiling ut the t h e  the document 
war signe4 
(4) eviLdence of relations of mutual respect and 
esteem between the negotiutes, and 
(5) the subsequent condiet of the 
As stated above, i think there would be sufficient evidence to show that after the 
Jizy Treay was read to the Indian Nations, that both the Crown and the [ndians treated it 
as though the rights were in effect. The subsequent conduct would include the action 
taken by both the Americans and the British which incorporated those treaty rights into 
their tegislation. The factors listed in Sioui wouid al1 be met in this instance. Certainly, 
aAer Simon, it is settIed law that exeinsic evidence may be used in the determination of 
mcertainties or ambiguities that are often fotmd in treaties. The Jay Treaty was 
negotiated between Lord Grenville, the British Foreign Minster and Amencan Chief 
Justice John Jay, The trial corta's decision in Mitchell, is a good example of how these 
issues are deait with and the kind of evidence that is needed to address them. As the Court 
of Appeai in Mitchell adopted the facts as detemineci by the tnaI judge m that case, their 
marks  are nseful in this andysis of how to go through the Sinion test. 
'Le Mitchell T6aIt supm note 13 at para 176. 
The court in Mitchell, accepted that had this been a treaty-making mission, that al1 
the parties had the requlled authonty to bind themselves in the J i  T r e a ~  of 1794. The 
court stated in part: 
... The C m  representatives wou(d have been viewed by 
the First Nations present nt these meetings as authorrZed to 
speak for the Crown and the First Nations had the capacity 
to enter into treaties . . .=* 
The court even went so far as to accept the evidence that the same protocol was 
used at the various meetings where the officiais went to the Indians aad c o b e d  the 
protections of the Jizy Treaty for the Indians, and stated in part: 
... 1 accept the Plainrif/s evtiience describing the protocol 
followed at these meetings and accept that this protocol is 
comrStent with that trsed by First Nations in treaty 
cmncils .? 
The Crown Ui the Court of Appeal in Mitchell argued that by vimie of the fact that 
the Indians did not sign any documents relahg to the rights under Jay Treas that 
despite the similar protocol which was foiiowed, that the J i  Treaty codd therefore not 
be comidered a treaty. This issue has akeady been addressed in Sioui, where the Hurons 
had neither signed their treaty nor was their evidence of the usuai soIemnÏty that 
accompanied the conclusion of a treaty. The Supreme Court held that a treaty had in fact 
been conduded, and that uniess the treaty document itselfspecincaily Iays out ail the 
circurnstances surmuading the conclusion of the treaty, the absence of Indian signatures 
or wampmn belts is not determinative of whether a treaty actuaily exists and extrùisic 
evidence may be used to support its vaüdity: 
Tiie appellant argues that the Hurons did not formul.&e 
the document either bv th& s~ncrture fwfiich woul.. not 
be absolutefv necesse to muke it a tteatwl or by the use of 
necklaces or belts of shelk wliich were the traditional 
m e t M  wed &y HUTOM to formtzlke agreements at the 
time. Cleuri), trhk argument hm wezght only jcthe 
document accurate& indicates ail the events swotrnding 
the signature. OththenvLse. extninFcproof of soiemnities 
could heip to show that the intended to enter into a forma1 
agreement and that thgy rnmifested this intent in one way 
or another.." (emphasis added) 
The court in Mitchell also relied on the testimony of many experts, one o f  which 
was Dr. Robert Venables, a cultural historian who explained that the background to the 
Jày Treaty of  the situation prevaiig at the thne and the reason it was concIuded with 
provision relating to the Indians. Its inclusion was due to the grave coacem by the British 
and Americans to avoid M e r  conflict on the fiontier with the Indian Nations? One 
document, which helped put the J i  Treaty in context, was the foliowing speech given by 
Lord Dorchester to various Indian Nations in 179 1. Lord Dorchester was anmering 
questions h m  the Man Nations and stated in part: 
Yuu have told me, there werepeople who s ~ y ;  thnt the King 
yuur Father wlien he made peace with the United States, 
guve mvay your lm& to t h  
1 cannot think that the govemrnent of the United Sates 
would hoLd that langurrge, it must corne fiom iII-informeci 
i n d ~ d u a k  
You well know that no man c m  giw. what i s  not his OMI. 
Wnen the King made peace md gave independence to the 
United Jattes. lie made a Treaty hz which he marked out a 
lime between them and irin; tins mlpli&s no m e  than that 
beyond this lhe he wmid not exîmd LLr mtifeteme .... 
m 
-Sieur; mpnr note 51 at 1048, 
" Mitchen mai, nrpm note 13 at para 187- 190. 
But Brothers, this line. which the King marked art between 
him md the States ewn supposed the Treaty had tukm 
gect, codd never have prqudiced your Rghts. 
B e  King f nghts with respect to your tem'tory wme 
agaihst the Nations of Europe; these he resigned to the 
States. But the King never had any rights against you but tu 
such parts of the Country ar had been fairly ceded by 
yarrseives with our ownfree cornent by Public convention 
and sale. How then cm it be said that he gave away your 
Rofessor Charles JoWon  was qualified at trial as an expert hisonan and 
explained that Lord Dorchester was acknowledging the creation of the bormdary in 1783, 
but that the border did not apply to indians. Professor Johnston testified that the British 
were faced with the serious risk of war with the powerfil lndian Nations, should the right 
to pass and trade over the border area, not be prornised. This view was corroborated by 
Dr. Venables, who stated in part: 
For the Bn'tisA and their Indian allies, the JÙy Treaty 
would assert through international lm what had befre 
been asserted by the presence of British troops in posts 
such as Oswego and Niagara. For its part, the United 
States gained the concession of the fort. For both Britaiit 
and the United States. the absence of a guarantee of Indian 
fiee made across the borders w d d  have meant residing a 
w m  not unifie the w m  Imched by Pontiac and his 
followers m 1763 - - that war hmfng been c a t d  6y cr 
British strangulatron of lndfm trading rr'ghts? 
The court in Sioui addressed the g e n d  situation that existed as between the 
European powers and the Indian Nations with regard to the capaci@ to heat and indeed 
fif i . .  at para 190, 
f i f i  at para 203, 
the necessity of concludiug peace treaties if the European powers had any hope of senling 
here saffeIy: 
The mother counmes did everything in theirpower to 
secure the alliance of each Indinn nation mrd to encourage 
nations allied wtlh the enemy to change sides. When these 
efforts met with success, they were incorporated in îreaties 
ifoliance or neutraliq, Inis cfearlv indicotes that the 
Indr'an natrfns were reparded in their reicrtrôns with the 
Eurmean nations which occupiod North Alnerira as 
Both the British and the Arnericans treated with the hdian Nations as Nations and 
their inclusion in the Jay Treaty is evidence of that treatment. The Treaty contained very 
important rights for those Indians who Iived near the border regarding h e  passage and 
duty fiee importation of goods. treaty deait with political and social rights as 
contemplated in Sioui. FinalIy, whiIe the indian Nations were not signatories to this 
Article of the J i  Treaîy? the case Iaw holds that this is not a necessary part of 
establishhg a treaty. Given that the conferences focused on the border rights of the 
Indians, and that the Jay Treaty M y  acknowIedged the Indian presence and the risk of 
war; a situation of both give and take for the Western powers and the Indians, the Treaty 
shouId therefore be considered a treaty under section 35(1) of the Coltstihition Act, 1982. 
C e W y  any ambiguity or uncertainty in domg so, wodd be resolved in favor of the 
Indians 
The Supreme Court of Canada was abIe to recognize a "IegaUy" new form of land 
holding known as Aboriginal titIe m Delgamuuwk TheÎr reasonbg expIained that 
AboriginaI rÎghts are Mique and sui gaieris and the court proceeded to devdop a test for 
" Sioui. mpra note 51 at 1053. 
the establishment ofAboriginai titIe. By cornparison, the courts couid find a way to 
incorporate this type oftreaty, the J i  Treaty, into the Constitutionai meaning of b a t y "  
in section 35(1) based on the sui generis nature of such rights. The relevant provisions of 
theJoy Treaty could be classined as an Indian Treaty without having to incorporate the 
provisions which do not relate to Mans.  
The next issue to consider is whether or not the J q  Treaty contains direct 
mobility rights or rights incidental to the exercise of the primary nghts which wodd 
mcfude a mobiIity right, and the scope of those rights. The court accepted that the case 
law has demonstrated that a fair, Iarge and iiberal interpretation of treaties is necessary. It 
is to be  noted that the treaty is to be read as understood by the M a n s  not that of the 
Crown's Iawyers. Again, the scope or extent of the cights should be considered from the 
perspective of the 'hatural understanding of the indians", ln this case, the mies 
throughout history stressed repeatedy the importance of their ab ility to pass keely within 
their territory which was not fashioned around the politicai borders of the English. in the 
later J i  Treaty, the Indians were given an exemption nom border duties to compliment 
their right of Eee passage. 
As stated previously, the Jay Treaîy q&caUy addressed the right of h e  
passage in Article III which provided for: "...the Indians diveiling on ei'ther side of the 
said 6oundaiy iine,fiee& to pars and repass by l a d  or inlrmd nawgation, into the 
respective tm'toIr'es und countrrtrr&s of the two portes, on the continent of Amerka?. 
There is no ambipCty m the words stating that the Indians on both sides of the border 
have the right to p a s  and r e p s  fi=eeIy. Even had there beai ambigttity, the honor of the 
Crown, and the Liierai hterpretatlon prlncipIes wodd demand that dÏs  section be  read in 
favor of the Indians for the rite of fiee passage. Given the important rights that are 
recognized within the Jüy Treaty, the presumption shodd be that this Article should be 
considered a treaty under section 35(1). The court m Sioui held that given the important 
clauses provided in the treaty at issue in that case, that the presumption is that the 
document was indeed a treaty: 
While the ana&mk thus fm se- to suggest that the 
document of Sèptember 5 is not a treuty, the presence of a 
c h s e  guaranteeing the fiee amcise of religion, automs 
and tmde with the EngIish cannot but raise serious doubts 
about th& proposition It seems erhemely sbange to me 
that a d o m e n t  whicfi ik supposedly on& a ternporaty, 
unilateral and informal safe conduct s h d  contain a 
c h e  guaranteeing rights of such importance. As BBisson 
54. noted in the Cowt ofAppeaI jt~dgment, t h e  wmld 
hme been no necessity to mention the Jiee aercise of 
religion and customs in a document rhe Gects of which 
were only to ïast for a fm days. Stich a gumantee wodd 
dflniteiy have been more namal in a treaty wfime "the 
word of the white man" b 
Given the above andysis of domestic treaty pinciples and the historicai evidence 
around the Jay Treaty and its importance to both the Eumpeans and the ùidians, there 
remains no doubt that the Jay Treaty ought to be protected under S. 35(I) as other Indian 
treaties. It is snbmitted that the conference minutes, meetings and promises made therein 
an: enough to constitute a treaty on theu own shodd the J i  Treaty doment  itself, fail 
as one protected in section 35(1). Aside h m  the acrual readng and explanations of the 
J i  Treaty to the Indians by British officiais, 1 note the foUow0ig promises, made to the 
Indiarts contemporaneous to the signhg o f  the Jay Treaty with the United States. 
" Sioui, , ~ p m  note 51 at 1048- 
Lieutenant Governor John Graves Simcoe addressed the Indians and made a link between 
the Treaty of Uhecht and Mcle III of the Jày Treuw 
Brothers: By the presort treaty your rights are gunrded. 
and spec~jicali"y placed on their ancient footing. ... 
Upon these principes the present treaty Ls established, you 
have a nght to go to the Bn'tr'sh settfements. or those of the 
United States as shall suit your convenience. nor shall y o w  
parsing or repussing w'th your own proper goob and 
effects of whatever nature. pay for the same any impost or 
duty whatever. 
Brothers: You see therefore that by the Treaty n perpetuul 
and constant communication is secured between you and 
the King 5 subjects and ourfiture Trude and Nitercourse. is 
guaranteed on the most unresrrained and General 
f i~ t ing . -~  
In the minutes of yet another meeting of British oficials and the uidians, Colonel 
McKee, the Deputy Superintendent Generai of Indian Anairs, refemd to the Jizy Tireas, 
and explained: 
Taken the greatest cure of the rights and independence of 
ail Indimr nations who by the î ~ s r  treuty with America, are 
to be pqectiy free and unmoiested in their trade and 
hunting grouna5 to trade with whum they pie- 
WhiIe these meetings were ofien hefd with different groups of hdian 
Nations at different times, the minutes show the intention of the Crown to ensure 
that the border was between the Western powas only, and wodd not in any way 
dkct the rights of the Indians. In the CotmciI of August 1796, between McKee 
and the Chiefk of the Ottawas and the Chippewas, reference was again made to the 
ChiLdren, ... but hm notwithtunding taken d e  greatest care 
of the &hts and independence of ail the Indian Nations 
who by the lmt Treaty with Amenencap are to be perfectly 
jFee and unmolested in th& Trade and hunhng groundr tu 
trade with whom t h e y ~ l e a r e ~  
(emphasis added) 
With regard to the language of Article III of the Jizy Treaty, it is tme that 
the article aIso promises similar border crosshg rights to American and British 
citizens. While the Ianguage is superficiaily the same, the context of the Article 
means something much broader for the Indians. It is significant that the Indians 
were singled out in the article as to who had border crossing rights, and f.irrther 
duty Eee rights were recognized for them that were not for the British and 
American citizm. This implies that the uidian Nations, as beneficiaries, stood on 
a very different footing and needed to be provided for specificdly so as to satisfy 
their concems. This is furth- evidenced by the fact that their rights included more 
than those of the British and American citizens. The conferences settie any doubt 
as to what was intended, even if the words of the Article do sound similar as  those 
for the non-Indian citizens. 
Even between the officids writing back and forth, they ail acknowledge 
the necessity of satisfyhg the Indians and promising them their right to ffee 
passage so as to avoid war. Thus the avoidance of war was the Aborigmal side of 
the bargain. The Ianguage in the above documents and meetings are not 
ambiguous. They expresdy provide that the Indians wodd rem h m  hostilities 
so Iong as th& rïghts w i i  regard to the border were protected. These discussions 
were held with the Indians at the time the treaty was made. These meetings were 
heId with capable parties who wodd be considered parties of authority and the 
protocol used at these meetings, foIiowed that of  treaty-making forums. The 
M a n  Nations upheld their end of the deaI, yet the Crown has Failed to honor its 
promises by letting the implementing legislation lapse. The Ontario Court of 
Apped in R. v. Ti lo r  and Wiliams had this to Say about the reliance by Indiaas 
on certain rights over time: 
Ine accepted evidence was that this understanding of the 
treaty has been accepted and acted on for some 160 years 
without intemrpton. In my view, it is foo [de now to 
deprive these Indians of their hiktonc aboriginaf nghtsr R. 
v. White and Bob at p p .  648-49 D.L.R." 
Again the Supreme Court in R v. Adams has held that the Crown's refusai 
to give legd effect to Aboriginal or treaty Rghts cm not be used to deny those 
nghts. The Court stated at paragraph 33: 
The fact that a partrwcular practice, custon or iradirion 
continued foilowing the arrivai of Europeanr, but in the 
absence of the fumai giuss of Iegal recognition fiont the 
European colon~ers, s h d d  not undennine the protection 
accorded to aborigrkat peuples. Section 35(1) w d d  fuiil to 
achieve its noble purpose of presennng the integral and 
definhgfeatures of distncttve uboorigaf societies ifit on& 
protected those d@nhg f e a t ~ e  ... whick received the tegal 
approval of Brffih and French colonkers. 
It Ïs my position that whether the actuai Jày Treaq itseifcan be considad 
a treaty, at a minimum, the minutes andor promises are enough to constitute a 
bindmg obligation, ifnot a mat. under section 35(1), of a sui generis nature. The 
case Iaw to date has provided the courts with a means by which to hterpret 
treaties. The process is and should therefore remain open to other kinds of 
treaiies or obligations that wilI be given the force of treaties. The general nature of 
treaties and the lack of specific requirernents to establish such was addressed by 
Lamer J. in Sioui, who explaineci: 
In White and Bob, supra, Morris JA. also disatssed the 
nature of a treaty under the Indian Act. As he rnmtioned in 
the passage I huve already quoted. the word "treuty " is not 
a tmm of art. It mere[v identifies agreements in wiiich the 
"word -the white man" is &en and bv which the 1- 
made cettufi o f  the Indians' co-opetution. Noms JA. 
also wrote ut p.649: 
In view of the argument before us, it is 
necessary to point out h t  on numerous 
occasion m modem days, nghts under what 
were entered into with indians as solemn 
engagements, dthough completed with what 
would now be considned informality, have 
been whittIed away on the excuse that they do 
not comply with presmt day formal 
requirements and with rules of hterpretation 
applicable to transactions between people who 
must be taken m light of advanced civiiization 
to be of equai statu. M a n c e  on instances 
wbere tbts * been done 
-. (emphasis added)?' 
The third issue in the interpretation of this Jay Treaty is whether or not the Treaty, 
in form, the J i  Treuîy or the promises as treaty, has been teminated or limited." In 
Simonr. v a ,  the court deait with termination by hostilities and termination by 
exh&ui*shment and held that once it has been estabiished that a valid treaty has been 
entered hto, the party argoing for its tennination bears the burden of p m h g  the 
'40 Ti for  d WiiZI'ents, supra note 76 at 368- 
Siout supra note 51 at 1044: Deljgmmk supra note 143 at para 106. 
'3f S h n .  supra note 4 6  
circumstances and events justifying the termination. Thus, in regards to a daim for the 
nght to fke passage, it wodd be up to the Crown to identify any specific hostiiities and 
prove that these hostilities if any, had the effect of terminating the Treaty. The burden is 
the same should the govemment dege extinguishment I beiieve that the Crown wouid 
have no more evidence in a c iab  today to establish termination or exhguishment, than 
they did in Simon, and thus the Jày Trenty. solely in respect of the Indians and 
specifïcally their rights of fkee passage across the border, is of as much force and e f k t  
today as  a sui generis treaty, it was at the thne it was concluded. 
The fourth issue is whether those who submit a clairn are covered by the Jizy 
Treaty. I wouid argue that the Aboriginal Nations of the Confederacy, be they now 
Canadian or American, have a complete right to fkee passage based on their Treaty of 
1725. The specinc Aboriginal people who would be entitled include the 'status7* 
"Mans7' as deked in the I n d h  Act, as wel1 as the treaty signers' descendants. I wouid 
argue that based on the case 1aw and the liberai interpretive principles regarding treaties 
that alI the Wabanaki members wouid be  beneficiaries of the maty rights be they 
Canadian or American, based on their substantiai comection to the treaties as 
descendants of the signatories. 
The commitments made at the counciI meetings discussed above, were 
commrmicated to other Indian Nations in 18 15 by reIating the contents of a previous 
Iettg3 for the Chiefs o f  Caughnawaga (Kahnawake) to at least the Passamaquoddies of 
Maine, who are members of the Wabanaki Confederacy: 
In a m e r  also the W u m p n  which you have sent to us in 
retuni thmefore we send to you ours, specifLg Our ireaty 
which tookplace A B .  18110 [sic likeij 18151. Ther@ore, all 
nations and hr'bes of Indiam from the East and West and 
for the North and South wherein our Chiefs fium every 
nation and tribe were present. tlierefore we should bind the 
good doing of our ancestors in this treaty of peace. nte 
EngiISA and Am&n generals were present Laving fieed 
all the Indiam of Wars inairrihg between them. and no 
bounda~y line s h d d  mSt between us crnd the Indian 
b r e t h ,  rrot any dun'es, taxes or cusioms should be levied 
on ta. fW 
The Passamaquoddies, as members of the Confederacy wouid have no doubt 
communicated this message even ifrepresentatives for other Wabanaki mies were not 
there. I beiieve there is mom for more subaantiai research into this are* but is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, other than to mention that dong with the Mohawk, Iroquois, 
Ottawas, Chippewas, and numerous other M a n  Nations, the Wabanaki were Iikely 
hcluded in the passing of this message about the J i  Treafy and its rights. 
The United States is presently wresthg with the same issues, a1thoug.h to a lesser 
extent than Canada. Megan Austin's article: A C u b e  DMded by the United States 
Menirco ~ o r d f l * ,  compares the plight of the Mexïcan Indians with that of  the Canadian 
-- 
" The judgement in the MitcheN Appeai, supra note 153, states. that the previous Ietter which was read to 
îhe Psrssamaquoddles ofManie in 1815 but was dated L 870, which obviom1y can not be the case. lt was 
lifrefy a letter dated shortfy before 1815 witli reg& to theJlry Treaîy. 
Mitchen S U ~ ~ ~ O I I S ,  supra no te 192 at para î51. 
"'M-S. Attstm, A C u i ~ e ~ d e d  6y TheUledStates -Mexico Bord@: B e  Tohono 0'0dha.m Cl- 
for Borde Crossikg Righîs (1991) 8 2  Ariz I. of Wl & C o q .  L. 97. 
Indians on the American border. Austin explains that this issue of the J i  Treuîy was 
raised in an American case in McCmdless v- United States ex rel. Diablu. '36 This was a 
decision which favored the Mohawk accused and his rights to cross the border fieely. 
They held that the Aboriginal person had an inherent right Aboriginal right to cross the 
border. Mer that decision, the United States amended theis Immigraion Act of 1924 to 
reflect the rights of Canadian-bom, Amencan Indians to enter and remah and the United 
States so long as they met a certain blood requirement." Austin then pointed to a more 
recent case; Atkinr v. which held that Indians have the right of free passage. The 
court held that there was an ". . .aboriginal right... to movefreeij within their own 
temitory without regard to the Intenational Boundary andfree of the reshictions 
imposed by the immigration iau~. ' '~~ The situation appears to be different with regards to 
the issue of paying duty on goods brought over the border. Austin's solution to the 
problem of the inconsistent application of the J i  Treaty nghts regarding border crossing 
is comprehensive border legislation which wouid uphold the passage rights of border 
tn'bes*-' 
In Denise Evan's article: Tie Jày Treaty and Aboriginal Righd4', she expIains 
that the courts in the United States have been reluctant to recognize the right for 
AborighaI people not to pay duty on the goods they bring over the border. She cited two 
ra McCandess v- hited Stuîes ex teL Diabo, 25 F- 26 7 1 (3d C i .  1928)- 
" Immigration Act of f9Z4, A p d  2,1928, ch. 308,45 Stat 401, repfaced by 8 U.SC 1359 (1982) which 
provided in part Wothing in chis subch;ipter shaii be comtmed to affect the rïght of Amerkm Indians 
born Ïn Canada to p a s  t6e bordas of the United Sates, but sac6 right SM extend only to petsons who 
possess at feast 50 percent quantum of blood of the Amexkm Indian race." 
mr Arkrirs v- M e  380 F- Supp, 1210 @- Me 1974). 
= Ibid- at mo- 
'"a A u t h ,  mpra note 235, 
'"' D- Evans, TtieJizy Treaty and AbongbraLf&hts (1 995),3 Dai J. Le@ Studies 215- I_heremafter Ev411~I. 
cases which essentidy held that Article III of the J i  Treaty codd not be considered to 
have granted rights in ~erpetuity.'~' Evans points out that while the courts in these cases 
held against the right of  duty-6xe passage, that neÏther court considered the issue of 
inhere~lt Aboriginal rights. Evans States that the case Iaw has created two very ciiffient 
policies with regards to border nghts; one recognipng ftee passage, and the other failing 
to recognize any duty-fiee nghts. '43 
Another Amencan article, me Medicine ~ i n é ~ ,  written by Sharon O'Brien, 
details the Amencan treatment of the J i  Treaty as it relates to Indians living close to the 
Canadian-Amerkm border. O'BBen's opening paragraph puts the border in an Aboriginal 
perspective: 
Again and again Blackffeet wam-orsfleeing northward ufir 
raiding attack watched wtWtth growing amarement as the 
purming troops of the United Sates Anny came to a 
mdden. almost magical stop. Again and again. jleeing 
southward, thqr saw the same thing happen as the 
Canadian Mounties reined tu an abnpt halt. Ine tribes of 
the Bluckj&eet Confedwacy living aiong what k now the 
United States-Canada border came to rejèr to that potent 
but im'sib[e demarcation as the "Medicine linet: It seemed 
to them almost a supmatwaL m a n f i t a t i ~ n ~  The 
Confeedeacy members Lad hunted. roamed, prayed and 
allied w*th m'besfiorn norrhrmr Alberta and Saskachavan 
ail the way down to Yellowstone. For these Indian Natfons, 
the "Medicme Line" was ne* inpossible to 
compreirend: Mm did not dMde a land; rather, rivers and 
rnountaim hterrupted the lands u&y. '4s 
" KamufA v. UnitedStiztes er reL Ahro 279 U.S. 231 (I929b Se+ ais0 G m t  nrpm note 186. 
Evans, supra note 241 at 223. 
IY S. O'Brien, Ine Medede Late: A Border Dibidmg TnbaCSoverer'gnty. Ecunonries und Fmniies (1984) 
533 Fordham L. Rev. 3 15- [fieremafter OtBn-en]. 
x f i r i Z  
O'Brien argueci that even if the nghts and the positions of the parties to the J i  
Treaty were unsure as to what exactly these rights meant, the rights of Eee passage for the 
Indians were reafnrmed two years later when Bntain and the United States concludeci an 
Explanatory Article which repeated the stipuIatioas of Article III of the Jay ~reaty? 
(This explanatory article was discussed earlier in this chapter) O'Brien then focuses on an 
issue which results in iïmited border movements within the America and Canadian hibes, 
especiatly those ûiibes of the Wabanaki Confederacy. O'Brien notes that according to the 
U.S. Department of State's publication: Treaties in Force Jon. 1. 1984. that Article DI of 
the Jày Treuty, in so far as it relates to the hdian nght to pass across the border appear to 
be in force? Again, regardess of whether the rïghts under the Jby Treaty have been 
given the ''formal gioss" of legd recognition, the rights remain and such Iegislation could 
be used to support the Crown's original intention. 
To date, the Canadian cotuts have rejected the idea that theJay Treaty and the 
other supporthg international treaties, nameIy the Treaty of Utrecht and the Treaty of 
Ghent, have justiciable rights for Aboriginal Nations. It is nevertheh my submission 
that there remaius possibiIities at the international Ievel to argue that the provisions of the 
'Y Exphtory Artide, supra note 180: That no sti@ations m any treaty subsequently conchded by 
eiiher- of the contracting part& with any 0th- state or nation, or with any Indiau triie, can be tmdesstwd 
to derogate in any mamier h m  the ri@ of fiee mtercomse and commerce, secured by the do-d 
Thed Article of the Treaty of A d y ,  Commerce and Navigation, to t6e subjects of His Majesty and tu the 
citizens of the United States, and to the IiiclTans dwelIing on eitha side of the botmdary h e  d o m - &  bm 
h t  di the saki person SM rrmani at fidl h i  k I y  to p a s  and r e p a s  by land or idand navr'gation, 
mm the fespective temitories and cornitries ofthe contracthg p&es, on eitherside of  de said bomdary 
lins and W y  to carry on trade and commme wnb each other, according to the stipalations ofthe minI 
article of the treaty of amityI commerce and navigation, 
O'Brien* supra note 244 at  335. 
Jizy Treaty at Ieast in respect of the Indian Nations whose traditional tenitory straddles 
the border, remab in force. The word of the white man was ail that the Aboriginal 
Nations of this country had to rely on when considering the firme of their children. 
When the Aboriginal Nations concluded Treaties or agreements or held meetings with the 
western officiais, they no doubt assumed that whatever the officids promised in exchange 
for their alliances wodd be honoreci. It is rny position that the very essence of 
international treaty law: pacta sunt smandu, meaning an agreement to be honore& 
appiïes to the J i  Treaty. The Vienna Convention does not preclude the pursuit of treaty 
rights by Fkst Nations of the J q  Treaty even if they are unable to reach the status of a 
state. Certainly, international Iaw has a role to play in interpreting the Jùy Treaty 
domesticdly for the benefit o f  Indian Nations in Canada On the subject of domestic 
courts t a h g  judicial notice of international Iaw in their cases, Professor Macdonald 
states: 
In Canada, a h ,  fhe standurdpractice hm been to notice 
&diciaNy Intentationai law. alfhougfi as in Enghd .  the 
Canadian courts have not mual& seen fit to comment on 
this point directly. There have. Rowever. 6eee several 
judicial comments whieh make clecrr that hternationaf lm 
isjudciah'y noticed fit the sume way tht  domestic Imv is. 
In Ine North, Dmes,  J. in upholdmg the Iower court 
fntdnzg, soid that the hot pursuit doctrine "being pmt of the 
Cm of nations wasproperlyfidiciaIly t a h  notice of and 
ucted upon. " Thtr stutement cm on& mem that cusionimy 
mks which are part on iiztentatrônaf lm me to be 
judcfÜ& noticed In the Anned Forces refwence, 
Tmchereau J. saw his task ar,firsr "tu seek ifthere d t s  " 
rire CtlSfomary rule in quesftbn. Tire implcatrun in thh  
statement is that it ik t w d g e  whu murt do the seeking 
as lie dues in domestic [mu; in factP in domestc law, the 
tmk  cwld be desm-bed mhg exact& the ssmn wordir; to 
seek iftliere exr'sts the domestic ruCe iir questtkn. n e  
conclusion t h  international h v  V being treated as part of 
domestic law in th& regard is inescapabe. 
While Johnston is refeming to customary law, it is submitted that the principle of 
pact stmt satanda nom customary Iaw should apply to the domestic interpretation of the 
Jay Treaty. The rnaximpacta sunt servanda is a general principle of law which means an 
agreement to be honored? This concept was part of international customary law at the 
time contact was made in this continent and so widely accepted that it found its way into 
the Vienna Convention on the L a w  of Treaties. Article 26 of the Convoition provides as 
fo Ilows: 
E v v  treaty in force is bindmg upon the parties to it and 
must be perfonned by thent in goodfaiih. 3o 
The requirement for an international treaty is that the parties are subjects of 
intemationaf Iaw, they must intend to create binding obligations and the agreement must 
be governed by international law. ui regards to the J i  T q ,  1 don? thmk there is any 
doubt that both Britain and the United States wodd have then and still are viewed as 
International parties. It has dso been argued that the Indian Nations, were a sovereign 
independent people who were Nations, or at Ieast treated as Nations, that need to be 
treated with. At the very least, Lamer, 5. in Sioui held: 
Iconsider that, iitstead, we can concludefiom the 
histoncd documents that 60th Great Britain and France 
fert thaî the Indiian nations had suflcfènt indepeidmce cmd 
played a large enough role h North America for it tu be 
xs R St S. Macdonald, DM. Joimsio~f edr, Tne Structure mrd Proces of intmationaC Lmv (1983). at 1 1 1. 
I b x  
Vienna Comentio~ on the he of Theananes (1969) II55 UN.T.S- 33 1, in force 1980. [IiereMafter 
Kenna], 
goodpolicy to maintain relations with thern very close to 
t h e  maintaid  between sovereign nations. 'S1 
The Court in Sioui went on to explain: 
nie colonial powms recognired that the Indians Lad the 
capucity to sign treaties direct& with the European nations 
occupyrhg North Ammicnn tern'tory- The sui generis 
situation in which the Indians were pluced had forced the 
European mother comrnès to achowledge thut ihey had 
sumient outonomy for the valid creation of solemn 
agreements which were called "treaties ", r e g d e s s  ofihe 
snin meaning givm to thut word then and now by 
international hX 
The historical evidence illustrates that the British depended a great deai on these 
uidian Nations for their successes in the New World and very much needed their 
alliances. Rofessor Johnson testifying in Mirchef[. supra stated: 
WTtatever the Indians' cornmitment and rofe. it is meMdent 
that withart th& physical or moral support the British 
cause early in the war would have been in serious trouble, 
thut is. at a time w h  the British forces were 
cornparatively thin on the ground 20 
Chief Justice Marshall of United States Supreme Court in Worcester v, Georgia 
commented on the recognition of sovereignty of the Indian Nations when concluding 
treaties: 
TIte words "treuty " and "nution. " are wordr of our own 
fmrguage, se[ected in out dipontatic and legislafie 
pmceedings, by mselves. havhg each defmite and well- 
understd memring. We huve applied thent to Indias, as 
we have appled h e i n  tu 0 t h -  nations of the earth; they me 
applied to all in the sme sertse? 
Sioui. m p m  note 51 at 1052. 
'St 16id at 1056- 
zs Mitchell mat* supra note 13 at para 226, 
" Woreesterv. Georgia (1832) 31 U S  (6 Pet) 515. 
Ms. Holma, an expert in Mitchen, explaineci that during the negotiations of the 
Treaty of Ghent which c o h e d  the previous cights granted to the hdians in the Jay 
Treaty. the British Minisiter asserted the nght to include their Indian allies in the treaty. 
Even at that t h e ,  the British were more than aware of the Iegai impIications of including 
the Indian Nations in the treaty, as evidenced in diplornatic correspondence of the time of 
negotiations: 
..A is Mth equul astonishmt and regret the tmdersigned 
(British MhistersJ find that the Amerfcan P~enipotentiaries 
huve not only declined signing any provisional Article by 
which the Indian Nations who have tuken part witli Great 
Brituin in the present Contest, may be included in the 
Peace .., 
The British Plenipotentimies huve yet to l e m  that it is 
contrq to the acknowledged principle of public lm [O 
hclude Allies in a negotiation for Peace. or thut it is 
contrary to the pructice of al1 civilzed Nations to propose 
that a provision shouid lie made for theirfuture semnty ... 
155 
The Indian Nations were a force to be dedt with if fkiendy relations could not be 
maintained and thk was done by acknowledghg in meetings* that the indian Nations 
were independent and certain promises were made. The fact that these promises were 
between two Nations, elevated the Treaty to an intemationd treaty, despite the form these 
promises took; that being either orai promises or written promises Ïncorporated in a 
different document; The J i  Treaty. The mterpretation of a treaty, even an international 
treaty, shodd be made wÏth the view of the parties at the tirne- Coupihg this with the 
" Lettex fbm three British MniisDers to the Chuted States Ministers dated Septe-4 1814 pubüs6cd m 
W-R M0117nng ed D@Ioma!ië Correspondence of the UnitetiStutes, Cmadim ReIatrOns, L784 - 1860 
(Carnegie Endowment for hternatlod Peace, 1940) at 641-646, 
Iibd interpretive prhcipIes in regards to Indians, wouid certaidy lead to the conc1~on  
that while the form may have been différent, the Indians no doubt considered these very 
strong promises a treaty made with the British as they had exchanged promises as welI. 
William Claus, the Deputy Superintendent Generai of M a n  MaKs addressed the 
Indians on A p d  24,1815 and stated: 
I amfi<rher instructed to infom yyou that in making Peuce 
with the Government of the United Sates of America. your 
interest were not neglected, noo would peace have been 
made with them Lad they not consented to inchde you in 
the treuty. ... 
Nothing is required in r e m  fur y a v  Father 's benevolence 
towardî you. but a renewal of the Engagements made by 
p u r  ancestors and yoiirselves?6 
ui Mitchell. Professor lohnston testifïed that this meeting doue was suficient to 
amount to a treaty as the parties had exchanged obligations. The British offered 
protection and in return the M a n s  wouid offer support in times of need as their 
ancestors had done. Thus far, we have international playen signing a treaty between 
Nations, exchanging promises regarding the border in the Jay Trecty. Iater c o b e d  by 
the Treaty of Ghent. By viitue of the very subject matter of the J i  Treaty, peace and 
borders, it is goes without saying the international law was at the foremost of the 
negotiators minds as evidenced in the excerpt cited above. 
The Court of Appeai in Vincent held that since the J i  Treaty was an internationd 
treaty it dÏd not fd under the protection of section 35(1) of the Consthtion Act, 1982. 
They went on to h01d that since the treaty was not @lementeci by IegisIation, that 
therefore preciuded the hdians f h n  seekùig to have thek border crossbg nghts 
enforced. Yet, the admission is made that the treaty was implemented by national 
legislation in the United Kingdom, The United States and Upper and Lower Canada, but 
was aiiowed to expire in the nrst decade of the 19" century in Canada Surely, the Indians 
relying on the honor and good faith of the Cmwn , couid reIy on its implementation in 
domestic law, as a recognition of these treaty rights. By this legislative action, the Crown 
evidences its intention to recognke these border rights. The Indian Nations of the 
Wabanaki Confederacy as weii as other border Nations in Canada and the United States 
stiII hold the Jizy Treaty as a valid and binding agreement that is as sacred as the other 
treaties signed so long ago. 
Regardless of this legislation, this international treaty is one which was made and 
there rernains an obligation to uphold the promises, despite the Iegal impIications of when 
and how Iong the treaty was implemented under domestic legislation. Article 27 of the 
Viennu Convention provides in part: 
A party ntuy not invoke the provisun of its intemal iaw as 
jiatr~catitionnfor its fâiiure to p-fom a treaty. 257 
The Nation to Nation d d g s  between the British Crown and Aboriginal peoples, 
coupled with the constitutionai recognition of Aboriginai treaties, puts international 
treaties specincally dealing with Aboriginal peoples m a specia.I position. Even if 
mternationd treaties are not generdy considemi executed in Canada without domestic 
IegisIatiou, in defetence to the principie of ParIiamentary sovereignty, that the principle 
of ParIiamentary sovereignty is itseff subject to the principIe of coIISfitutïonaI supremacy. 
In Light of section 35(I) of the Conrtatutioon Am, 1982, the absence of domestic 
implementation of the Jay Treaty can not be a valid answer given the purpose of s.35(1) 
to reconde prior Aboriginal presence with the assertion of crown sovereignty and to 
uphold the honor of the crown. Even if the domestic courts couId not accept that the 
Vienna Convention applies to this Treaty, they could at Ieast inforrn their interpretation of 
the Treaty by international law principIes for the benefit of the Indian Nations. I wodd 
argue that to do any less would fly in the face of aiL the case law which supports large and 
liberal interpretations in favor of the Indians and the principle of reconciling the Crown's 
honor and duty to act in good faith with these very real promises made to the Indians. 
Assuming for a moment that an Aboriginal group was unsuccessful in arguing 
that this international Treaty, the J i  Treaty, is either a section 35(1) treaty, or the 
promises made theremder could be treated as an indian treaty, then what of their rights as 
thkd party beneficiaries? The meetings, letters and the Treaty itseif is evidence of the 
grave importance to the security of the colonies in includmg the Indians in the Trea*/. 
The very purpose of Article III was to gant them border crossing nghts so as to avoid 
cextain war with the Indians. Not only were the Indians mentioned in the Jay Treaty, they 
were apprised of the negotiations as they went aIong and promised indusion and were 
well mforxned of the content of  the rights contaùled therein by Whie of many meetings 
and the spread of information. Even stronger was the knowledge that the British claimed 
they wodd not have even made the treaty ~ Ï t h  t e United States udess that mcIuded 
rights for the Ifidlausans 
Section 4 of the Viema Convention provides that rights may be created For third 
states so Iong as the parties to the heaty htended nghts be granteci for them. The third 
Yienno, supra note 250, Artide 27. 
party's assent is presumed so long as the contrary is not ùidicated Once this rïght has 
been created, the resulting obligation may only be revoked or modined with the consent 
of the parties incIuding the third state. 'S8 This was certaÎdy one of the arguments put 
forth in Mitchell, and it was argued that the promises in the J'ày Treaty were intended to 
be permanent and that it was a "stipulation pour artrut" at international law. In regards to 
the assertion that the tbird party must be a state, at that time, the formal requirements of 
statehood were not a necessary requirement of British Treaty making in the mid-18' and 
19' centuries. The historicai evidence reviewed earlier provides evidence that the indian 
Nations were treated as Nations The Crown consistently relieci on the Nations as allies 
and &en addressed them as Nations or independent peoples and made treaties with them 
as though they were Nations. What other party has been afTorded such treatment other 
than Nations or states? Ifthey're not Nations or states, by international standards today, 
they were as close as one could get, and were at least a sui generis body who were 
afforded the sarne treatrnent and should therefore be afforded similar rights today. 
The appellant in Mitcheil argued that the status of the Indian Nations at the h e  
of the J i  Treaty must be understood in light of the d e s  which prevailed Ï n  that time 
period?9 The provisions of the J i  Treaty and the other conternporary treaties 
disthguished between Indian Nations and the subjects of American or European nations. 
The Sian case reviewed the history and found that the Iiidian Nations w a e  û-eated as 
'Nations": 
mr Ilitd Artides 34-37. 
C ie  Concemihg the RigRt of Passage overhdïm Terrjtmy, M e  1.C.L rep. 1960, p.6, at44; See 
also D.P- O'ConneE, Intemanima[ L m ,  VOL 1 (London= Stevens & Sons, f 963 at 303-304. [herehdb 
îïndim TerritoryI. 
The mother couniries did everythikg in th& power to 
s e m e  the allimce of each Indiun nation and to encourage 
nations allied with the enemy to change sides. men these 
efforts met w.ith success, they wme imrporated in treaties 
of alliance or neutrahy. Tiiis clemly indicutes that the 
Indian nations were r e g d d  in their relations wilh the 
European nations which occupied North America as 
independent nations? 
This capacity to treat with the Crown is not a power tbat British or Amaican 
citizens had with the colonial powers. Even if they codd not be consideml a s  
independent states, there is no such requirement to be considered beneficiaries of  
sripuutions pour aumi. As the Indian Nations were not direct signatones to the J' 
Treaty, Article III of the Treaty codd be viewed as a stiplclan'on pour autrui. "' ui the 
Cere of the Free Zones of Upper Llpperavoy and the District of Ger."' the Permanent Court of 
International Justice held that the essential critena for determinhg the existence of a 
stipulation pouraum<i is the intention to create a right. There is no doubt in the case of 
the Jay Treaty. as evidenced by a.ü the historicd records, that the Crown intended to 
mate a right for the border Nations. Once these rîghts were created, as stated above, they 
couid not be extinguished without the consent of the Indian Nations. 
The appellant in the Mitchell case made a good point about the character of what 
is protected under section 35(I). They argued that the emphasik of the constitutional 
protection is on "treaty rights' and not the treaty itseEm Therefore the protection is of 
260Sh<i, supra note 51 at 1053. 
26t Indimr Tévitory, supra, note 259 at para 51- 
Cme of the Free Zones of Upper S<rvoy md the Diraiet of Gex, ( 1932) P.C.L.ï. S&es A No.32, p96 at 
148, 
Y MitchellESUbhons. supra note 192- 
the right and not the instniment evidencing the right In Sioui, the Supreme Court 
explained: 
On the one hand. we have be$ore UP a document the fonn of 
which and some of whose dject-matter suggest t h  ii is 
not a treaty, and on the other. wefind it to contain 
protection offindamental rights which supports the 
oppsite conchsion ... '64 
Those Indian Nations that attendeci the meetings and conferences which explained 
the protections afZorded hem under the J i  Treaty have the benefit of its provisions, but 
so too would the other neighboring border hies.  Aside fiom the histoncai excerpts 
provided earlier, there is additional evidence that the Crown intended that these treaty 
nghts apply to d l  the hdian Nations. At one particular Council held in present day 
Ontario, in 1815, William Claus, the Deputy Superintendent Generai of Indian Affairs 
read Article III of the J q  Treaty to al1 the Chiefi present. What is interesthg is the fact 
that Claus requested that the M a n  Nations in attendance present the news of the Treaty 
to AU the Indian Nations by way of the Wampum Belt in accordance with ai1 their 
customs.'" As a resuit, ail of the neighboring border Nations should have the right to pass 
and repass Eeely over the Canada-U.S. border by Wtue of their association with the 
Passamaquoddy, thruugh the political and social Iinks of the Wabanaki Confederacy. 
The J i  Treaty is considered a sacred document for the its promises that the 
border wouid have no affect on the border Nations and they shodd pay no heed to it. The 
Aboriginal Nations were free to travel the lands which crossed the newly imposed border 
without mtemrption. This promise was one that made by both Emopean powers in 
exchange for peace f b m  the border Nations. Given the sui generis nature of Indian 
Treaties, and the liberal interpretive principIes fiPm the case law, there stands little reason 
why this treaty cm not be treated as an Indian treaty under s.35(1) at Ieast in so far as 
Article DI is concemed The Explanatory Article eliminates any problems in detenninuig 
the scope of the right, which is simply fiee passage. The historical record clearly shows 
that what was intended was exactly what was promised to the Indians: that the border 
would not affect them and nevertheIess. their nghts were guarded under the Jùy Treaiy. 
Canada cm not now Say that by vllhie of their indrf'ference w i i  regards to the 
implementing Iegislation that they c m  now avoid their corI1Iliitments to the Indians given 
the honor of the Crown which is at stake. The honor of the Crown demands that the rights 
of the member Nations of the Wabanaki Confederacy, being border Nations, be 
recognized and protected under s.35(1). 
CHAPTER FOUR: 
SAVING THE HONOUR OF THF, CROWN: 
SOLUTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
uOur history has showa, anforhuiately, a i l  too weU, that 
Canada's Aborigind peoples are justinied in worrying 
about goverment ob jectives ...w2" 
SOLUTIONS FOR TRE FUTURE: 
FIDUCL4RYDUTE 
The best solution right now wodd be to immediately start dialogue between the 
Aboriginal groups affecteci by restrictions on rnobility and corne up with some ways to 
ded with the wom cases immediately. These wodd include those persons who need to 
traveI back and forth over the border to see orbe with their families. This would have to 
include Mans with American citizenship as well as Canadian citizenship. What is 
needed is consuItation with al1 the border Aboriginal Nations in order to properly assess 
their concems and work out a mutually satisfactory way of incorporating their rights into 
the way Immigration officials carry out their mandates. The governrnent has a fiduciary 
obligation to actively c o n d t  with Aboriginal peoples with regard to Iaw or poiicy that 
may affect their Aboriginal rights. This is the minimum standard that wilI satisfy the 
fiduciary duty that is owed to Aboriginal peopIes. Otten, it wilI take more than 
The very concept of fiduciary duty as it relates to Canada's Abonginai peopks 
was nrst enunciated in Gumn v. Km, a judgement h m  the Supreme Court of Canada 
which took the duty which was owed f b n  a political and mord IeveI to that of a Iegd 
one. rii that case, the Department of Indian Mairs and Northem DeveIopment 
266 Spwow. supra note 15 at 11 f 0, 
'6T DeIgamuuwk, supra note 143 at para 16û-f 69, 
@ JAND.) had agreed to Iease temis over m d e r e d  Indian land that were different 
h m  what the First Nation had agreed to, and they were much Iess favorable terms. With 
regard to these facts, the court held: 
In my view, the nature of Indian title and the fiamework of 
the statutory scheme established for disposing ofIndian 
landplaces upon the Crown as equitable obligation, 
enforceable by the courts. to deai with the [and for the 
beneft of the Indians. Bis obh'gation does not amount to a 
tmst in the private lm sense. It U rather afiduciary d&y. 
If, however, the Crown breaches thisfiduciay duty it will 
be liable to the Indiam in the sanie way and to the same 
ment as ifsuch a hurt were in effect. 
Thefiduciary relatiomhip between the C m  and the 
Indimis Iias its roots in the concept of aboriginal, nntbe or 
Indian title. n e  fact that Indian ban& have a certain 
interest in land does not. however, in itselfgie rise tu a 
fiduciq reiationship between the Indians and the C m .  
The conciusion that the Crown is a fiduciav depends p n  
thejhher proposition that the lndian interest in the land LF 
inaiienable except upon surrmrder to the Crown? 
While this case is seen as important one in the protection of Aboriginal peoples in 
the assertion of their rights, it is aiso probletnatic. Some have asserted that the above case 
Iimited the fiduciary duty of the Crowa to mereiy reserve land transactions. Had there 
been any doubt that this was not the intention of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice 
Dickson and La Forest L in Spmrow heId: 
In out opinion, Guerr'n, together th R v. Tùylor and 
IViiiims ... g r m d  a g e n d  guidingprinciple for s..W(I). 
Bat ir, the govenmtmt hm the responm'6iIity to act iit a 
fiduciary capaciîy with respect to ubort-ginaLpeoples. me 
reldionship between the governent und aborigàrak is 
trust-Me, rather t h  aàvetsmùl, and contemporary 
Gueriir, supra note 106. 
-de 16X at 376, 
recognition and #matr'on of aborigi'irui ~ g h t s  must be 
defmed in iight of thiî liiptotfc re la t f~nsh@.~ 
AIso, Leonard Rotman in: ParaIIel Patlis: Fiducia~~ Doctrine and the Crown- 
Native ReIutionship h Canada" explains that the precise nature of the fiduciary 
obIigation has yet to be expanded upon by the courts. In regard to Guerin, which came 
out m 1984, Rotman States: 
Yet, more thon ten yeurs latw, the Canadianjkdiciary 
remains poised at the perimeter of the Crown 's duty, 
reftîsing to venture into its core, 
Be irnpiementution offiduuary doctrine to simultaneous[y 
desmCTIbe md rnonitor the Crown-Native reiatr'onship h m  
created dficuities 60th for tfiejudichy and legal 
scholars, UnMe rnany other areas of the law, such as 
contracis. thefiduciary reian'on - and its concomitant 
dtitie~~ obligations. nghts, and benefts - U not very well 
understo~d.~~ 
Rotman then goes on to explain exactly what the fiduciary duty entails with 
respect to Abonginai people and states in part: 
The Crom-Native fidueimy relatiowhip. in actuaiity. is 
cornprtked of two distrnct types, or genres, offiduciary 
relatiomhips. The Crown owes a generaI, overarching 
fiduciary duty to aboriginal peuples as resuk of the 
historr'ctd relationship between the parties duting back tu 
the t h e  of contact. lit additz'on, the Crown aïs0 owes 
specific fiduciq dutrutres or obligations to particular Native 
grmps stemmbtgfiorn its reiatiionshijm with those groups 
orporn spe@c treattès, agreements, or aI1imce.s that it 
entered mto? 
-?O Spmow. supra note 15 a L 108. 
* LL Romian, Pmanet P& Fiducr'my Dactn'ne and the Crown-Nathe ReIotromhip iir Cmtuda 
(Toronto: Uniiversïty of Toronto Press, 1996)- 
" 16idd at 34, ILI$, 
fiid at 11-18. 
The importance of negotiations to Abonginai peoples and their inclusion in 
decision-making by government is evidenced in the more recent court cases dealing with 
the fiduciary duty of the Crown to Aboriginal peoples. The court in Perry v. 0ntan'09', 
was faced with the Ontario Game and Fish Act which provided that ody "status Indians" 
would have the benefit of Abonginai hunting and fishing rights. The court granted the 
order for a declaration that mtil the issue had been superseded through negotiations 
between the province and the Aboriginal groups, the legislation wouîd be read as though 
the word "status Indian " was replaced with the word "'AboriginaI person." The court 
stressed that AU Aboriginal nghts are protected under s.35(1). They aiso held that the 
government has a fiduciary duty to ensure that ALI., AbonginaI groups are included in 
negotiations. consultations and the benefits of programs aimed at promoting the exercise 
of Abonginai rights. Justice Cosgrove particularly stressed the messages previously 
stated in Spamow: 
Our hktory har shown, unfortnute&, aall too well, 
that Canada S ~60riPriai~MPples  re psnfed r k worm'np 
about PO * vernntent obrecttves that may be superfcially 
neutral, bubut which comtitute de facto threats to the 
anstence of Aboriginal rights and interests." 
He went on to cite R. v. Jones and N u @ i v ~ n ~ ~ ,   thregards to the actions of 
govemment Ministers m their dealings with Abor@m.I gmups Iookmg for input mto how 
their rights wiI1 be affected by Iegislation or policy 
What sltould be stated, however. is that a &h-handed ana 
I4 R Peny [I996] 2 CNLR t6I.(Ont T.D.)* [riereinafter P m 3  [1997] 148 DL& (49 96.(ûnt 
CA). 
m~pmrow, supra note 15 at 1110. 
Db R Y. Jones & Nadmon, (1993) 3 CXLK 182- 
u d v ~ u i  stunce on the iiatt ifthe Min- win neither 
me@ the c o n ~ o n u l  ~uirements  with which, one 
would erpect, ii would consider itserfduty bomd to 
corn& nor will itvroviae un enforeable regulato~ 
scfieme capable of achieving the commarion goals which 
it seek ... (emphasis added) 
I do not think it was ever suggested that there would 
necessnnIy be no at@msmients required or no costs 
invdved, 
Govemment politics aimed at excluding particular Aboliginai groups as in the 
Immigration Act as discussed earlier, or those failing to provide adequate time or rnoney 
for consultation, negotiations and information dissemination will resuit in unenforceable 
Iegislation against the Aboriginal groups based on the Spamow test. The Immi@atiion Act 
may prove to be one of those acts which exclude a portion of Abonginal people, an action 
which shouid not be accepted by the colllts af'ter the constitutiond protections aorded to 
Aboriginal rights in 1982.1 wouid argue that the binden on the govemment is a heavy 
one which involves more than mere "'token" meetings or meanhgiess der-the-fact 
consultations. The recent case of the Union of Nova Scotia fitdims v. Canada (Minrîter 
of Fisheries))" is illustrathe of the '%gh-handedness" of the govemment and a failure on 
the part of the Minister to act on this fiduciary duty towards the Abmiginal Nation. This 
case is just one example of what Aboriginal groups have to ded with on a daily basis 
when trying to protect their nghts, These groups o h  have trouble even getting various 
governent departments to the table to discuss their rights. 
The situation m the UN-SI. case hvoIved the approval of a project that had the 
potmtid to be e~fremely hannfiil to the Milanaq fishery. The Mi'kmaq mderstood tbat 
the process would involve codtatiori with the Mi'kmaq before any deciQom were 
made-that couId affect their fishery. The Minister proceeded without regard for the 
Crown's fiduciary duty to these Mi'kmaq and the project was approved without 
infortlfing the Mi'lanaq. With regard to this action on behalfof the Minister, the court 
held: 
It is not surpnSing that the decision rnakingprocess is 
perceived as unfair by the applicants. for the UNS1 had 
receivedfindingfm DIAND to undertake an independent 
revr*ew with the assistance of connrltants, it had received 
micou~aging responresfrom the Ministen of DFO and of EC. 
attdgeneral assurances of the importance o /WSI  involvement 
in the usesment process. Yet the decision was made before the 
meeting, arranged at the WSIk request, with DFO scientists to 
discuss the applicant 's concernr... 
Ine Crown 'r fiduciary d q  to the appiicants as representing 
Abongrnal people continued throughout the assesment process 
and therealier ... 
1 am persuaded tfiat by their/aii[ure to consider the fiduciimy duq 
here owed to the applicants, when the dect'sr'on war made on behaifof 
the Ministers. those acting on behaifof the Mintkters did breuch that 
dzq. " 
These are the kmds of issues that Aboriginal peopIe must deal with on a daily 
bans. Despite &gs by even the highest court in our country with regard to the fiduciary 
duty owed by the goverment to AboriginaI peoples, govemmentai actions ofien fd1 far 
short of meeting this doty. GeneraiIy, the Aboriginal groups are ofien left to prove their 
rights in court as opposed to haMig the opporttmity to work out viable s01utions with the 
varÎous goversment agencies. It is hoped that with the guidance provided by the Supreme 
Union of Nova S'cotia Iidiuorv v. Cmada (MnrSrer of Fcsiimerres and Oceau-), C199q 1 F C  325. 
Ibid, at 334342+ 
Court of Canada in Delgamtmk that this situation may improve. The Court attempted to 
elaborate on what this fiduciary duty entds: 
Inere Lr dwavs a due qfconsultatÏon. mether the 
abo~grnal group has been connrled is relevant tu 
detennining whether the inJFingement of aborigrnaf titie is 
jtlst@ed, in the sarne way that the C r m  's f d w e  to 
consult an a b o n ' a l  group wi iA  respect to the tenns by 
which reserve land is [eased ma. breuch its fiduciary duty 
at cornmon l m  Gtienennn The nature and scope of the duty 
of connftation will v m y  with the ctLrcumstances. In 
occasionaI cases, when the breach is less seriou or 
relative& minor, it will be no more than a dity to disms 
important decisons that will be taken with respect to landr 
held pursuant to aboriginal titte. Ofcourse. men in these 
rare cares when the minimum acceptable standard is 
consultation, this cohpultation mut  be in good faith, and 
wilh the intention of substantiuily addressing the concems 
of the abon'grnaipeop[es whose lands are at issue. I n  moH 
çuses. it will be smtfica . . ntlv de- than mere 
consultanon. Some cases mav eve . . n reaurre full consent of  . . un ubonmnal nation, pcrrftCrrftcuiarIy when the provinces 
enact htnting andfishmg regdations in relation to 
abonginal fan&. 
Second, aboriginal n'fie, unlike the abokgirial right tofLFh 
for food, hm an inescapably economic aspect, particuiarîj 
when one takes into accuunt the modern uses tu which 
landr IieIdpsuant to aborighai titLe c m  beput. The 
economic aspect of abon'grnui titk suggests that 
weik a possibility suggested in Sparrow md which I 
repeated in Gladktme. Indeed. compensattatron f r breaches 
offiduiary duty are a well-estubMiedpart of the 
fmdscape of ubon'gotaal rights: Gumn. In keeping wïfh the 
duty of honor mdgood faith on the Cimm, fair 
compensuhon will ordinananl'jr be requived when aboriginal 
title is hrfrmgedw (emphasis added) 
There remains the fact that with the cases on fidtttiary duty, it is now obviously 
cIear that the Department of Immigration must take steps to meet with AbariginaI peopIe 
and at least begbi discussions on the existence of a right to cross the border hely, the 
scope of that nght, and its impIementation. As c m  be seen in the Watt and Mitchefl cases 
that are soon to be argued in the Supreme Court of Canada, this is not the course they 
have chosen to take. Once again, the Crown has decided to deny the rights of Aboriginal 
peoples at ail costs, without taking the preIiminary steps of consulting with the border 
Nations. There remains one other very important aspect of border crossing rights that has 
yet to be expIored in this thesis. A claim by the Aboriginal Nations in the Wabanaki 
Confederacy for Aborigind titIe in their traditionai lands might dso address border 
issues, given that their traditionai lands ùiclude lands on both sides of the border. 
A fair assesment of Abonginai title in this area, as a result of a land claim, wouid 
involve an in-depth review of historicai and anthtopological Somation which is beyond 
the scope of this thesis on border crossing rights. It is a very important aspect of 
Aboriginal rights which wodd more properly be the subject of its own thesis. 
A successful land cIaim based on Aboriginal titie provides for more than just a 
distriibution of land to that claimant Abonginai Nation@), and opens the door to a wider 
mandate for negotiations. These topics include govemmentd powers and responsibility 
within a tenitory and couid indude negotiations with both Canada and the United States 
over how to resoIve the border issue. A land cIaim in the AtIaotic provinces wouid be 
submitted on the basis that an AborigmaI Nation or Nations have valid Aboriginal titIe 
clamis to a comprehensÏve area, Iike New BnmSwick for ïnsmce. This is done through 
" De~mmnnvk, supra note 143 at para 16û-f 69. 
specific claims, for smalIer, detaminable land pieces. such as an expansion to a reserve 
area, or a cornprehensive claim to dl of New Brunswick, which involves larger, 
m d e h e d  land areas of New Bnuiswick. Land claims based on Aboriginal title cm: 
expand resewes, provide new land bases off reswes, provide compensation for past use 
and exploitation by the Crown and other entities, create a different tax system for 
Aboriginal lands, provide the Abonginal Nation(s) with a percentage of revenues fFom 
natuml resources used by the provinces, capital for economic development, h d i n g  for 
self-government initiatives and other arrangements for the Aboriginal group(s) to give 
effect to their rights. Land clairns require years of research, and negotiations with the 
federai and provincial governments. It is an alternative to takuig a claim to court an 
asking for a court to declare that the particular Aboriginal group has Aboriginal title to an 
area, aithough this remains an option shouid land claim negotiations fail.'" 
There has been some question over the Iast few decades as to whether or not 
Aboriginal nghts such as fishing righfs depend on the estabiishment of Aboriginal title to 
the Iand where they propose to exercise their nghts. Recently, two Supreme Court of 
Canada cases, Adam and Cote have senled the question. In Adams, a Mohawk was 
charged with fishing without a licaise within the historicd botmdaries ofNew France on 
Iand that had been ceded m 1888. The court cited V m  der Peet and held that AboriginaI 
titIe was just one maniféstation of Aboriginal rights and that Aboriginal rights do not 
have to be based on a c l ah  of Aborighai titIe to an ana, dthough the exercise of a 
particdar right may be site specifrc. As for the land cession in 1888, the cotrrt heId that 
- - 
a' liidiari and Norihem M i  Canada, Cirnpr&ertsnre Land C t b  Polfcy- (ûîtawa, 1986). 
while the land cession may possiily preclude a cIaim to Abonginal titIe, it in no way was 
a clear and plain intention to exhguish f i s h g  rights in the ares?' 
Senilarly in Cote, an Algonkiau was charged for faiIure to have a Iicense to fish 
and without paying a fee to enter the fishing area The court upheld the fee as it did not 
h d e r  the right to fish, it aided it in providing fùnding for roads, etc. The kense was 
declared void as an Aborigind person could only obtain one by special discretion of the 
Minister. This bIanket prohiiition against fishing cm not be justified as there were no 
criteria or guidelines for the Minister to exacise his discretion. Like Adams, Cote 
stressed that Aboriginal title did not have to be established to clah f i shg  rights. As 
weii, the absence of French recognition of Abonginai rights did not affect their protection 
under S. 35(1).2g4 
Thus, I wodd argue that the mobility rights of Wabanaki Nations contahed 
specificaiiy in theJay Treaty did not need the " formai gioss of legd recognition" 
demanded in the pre-1982 Francis case, and this absence of  formai legidative inclusion 
of the treaty into domestic Iaw should not S e c t  the Aborigind nghts contained within- 
As weii, should a land claÏm fair in the area, this should not be an end for the assertion of 
mobility rights as Aboriginal rights do not depend on Aboriginal titIe to an area. One 
codd still argue a mobility nght based not only on the Indian treaties, but aIso as an 
Aboriginal right mtegral to the society, regdess of a proven land clami. 
As seekuig a court declaration of Abonginai title to an area Ïs a leagthy way to 
"2 ttd0mpk mpm note 99- 
Cote. supra note t OO, 
'U Ad', supra note 99- 
assert mobility rights, and land cl& c m  take decades, it is important to look to interim 
solutions until the larger issues can be properly dedt with. Negotiation is aiways 
encouraged by the courts as opposed to Iitigating these issues. Yet, Iitigation is the 
direction that many Aboriginal groups w i U  be forced to take to detennine once and for dl 
their relationship with the rest of Canada in relation to their valid claims, if the Crown 
contlliuaily fails to îive up to its fiduciary duty to consuit. Aboriginal rnobiiity rights are 
of an fmmediate importance, so there need to be some interim solutions.'" 
The present reqykements under the Immigration legislation represents an 
unnecessary burden on Aboriginal mobility rights with regard to the border. Immigration 
Act challenges, through the courts may seem to be the quickest route to force negotiation 
of cross-border passage for Abonginai people, but it is the Ieast desirab le option, given 
the direction given by the courts towards consultation and negotiation. As emphasized in 
Sparrow. there is a swng move towards negotiations between the Aboriginal groups and 
the governments to establish the beneficiaries of the rights and the scope of the rights 
themselves. TEs duty by the Govemment to consdt includes al1 Aboriginal peoples 
within a specified temtory, and not just band members. The idea is to work out a process 
to incorporate the AborÏgind mobility right bto ImmrImmrgration law and policy, m order to 
avoid firture conflicts between Aborîgmal people and Immigration officids. More 
importantly, we must seek immediate interiin soIutiom to prevent imparable harm done 
to Aboriginal families caused by the absence of a family member that is detained at the 
border or refùsed admission, 
The courts have recognized Abongmal and Treaty ri@, and now the federai and 
provincial governments will have to be more active in negotiations and consultations with 
the Aboriginal people in order to facilitate the full exercise of their rights, as part of their 
fiduciary duty. It is my position that suice this is clearly Abonginai territory which 
includes Canadian and Amencan land, then special provisions ought to be made for those 
mobility issues that were guaranteed would be protected both prior to the establishment 
of the border and after. AfteralI, the Aboripinai groups have been travershg that area for 
a substantial period of t h e  prior to contact before borders existe4 and have continuaily 
travmed the border area since contact, without interruption or haWig to pay duty on theù 
personal goods, until ment  restrictions. 
I suggested earlier that the best way to start the process is to have representatives 
of the immigration Department and the affectcd Aboriginal Nations get together and mise 
the issues around border-crossing. W l e  this thesis has focused on the right of passage, 
other issues would inchde the right to m o r t  goods duty-free and the commercial 
implications of those rights. This is a political process which demands good faith on both 
sides and a true cornmitment to work out a mutudy satisfactory solution to address the 
issues at Ieast on an interim basis. With regards to the specinc issue of fixe passage, 
Ieaving duty for another day, the simplest way to permit ftee passage without opening up 
the border to a fke-for-d, w d d  be tu agreed to a fom of identification that wilI Iet the 
rmmigration officiais (mow who has a rïght to pass fkely. A simiIar identification 
process was worked out after Spunow in terats of identifjhg the Aboriginal peoples who 
were validly exercising their Abonginal right to fish. 
In the Atlantic provinces, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans @.F.O.), have 
met with the current structure of Aboriginal ~ O ~ P S ,  being the Bands, the Unions which 
represent the Bands, and the Abonginal organkations that represent the interests of the 
status and non-status and Metis Indians that do not reside on a reserve. What has corne of 
these meetings are the Aboriginal Fisherks Strategy (AFS) agreements with each 
Aboriginal organization. There is currently a division in the community as to whether 
these agreements are more harmN to our fishing rights than they are beneficial. Again, 
this is another issue which is deserved of its own attention Ui a future paper, but for now, 
1 will use it as a precedent for an interim solution to the border crossing issue. 
As the precise scope of the fishing rights in this area has yet to be determined, on 
an interim basis, the groups have agreed that for the purposes of the AFS Agreements that 
these rights whatever they are, will not be prejudiced by the Agreement. An agreement 
that was in force between DFO and the New Bnmswick Abonginal Peoples Council 
(NBAS-C.) Ïn 1997, provided in part: 
L(1) Tlre purpose of this Agreement is to provide for the 
management of thefishay and the invoLvement of the 
Abonoginal orgmizatr'ort in the numagement, protection and 
enhancement ofmenenes resources andfish habitat mea. ... 
L(3) The Parties agree that this Agreement SM not serve 
to d i e  or to I h i t  abonn@zal or treaty ngh and LP trot 
intended to be, d s h a K  not be int.preed io be, und 
agreement or a: treaty withnr the rneaning of sectrbn 35 cf 
the Constzutron Act. 1982, - - 
L(4) The P d e s  recognize thut this agreement k the result 
of dimsions c o n d ~ e d  wi'thin the context of m e n t  
legisrtion.iurisprudence and govemment policy and, as 
such. does not constitute. and shall not be hterpreted as, 
d e n c e  of the name or extent of uboriiginal treatyfishing 
rightr and made wi'thoutpr@ce to the positions takert by 
either Party with respect tu aboriginol or treaty *hts or 
tit le. 
1451 Nothing in this Agreement is Nltended to. nor shall be 
interpreted tu, affect any aboriginal or treuty nghts of any 
other abor+grgrnal group. 
L(6) Tne Panies intend that thb Agreement wiii estabksh 
the relationship between the Parties witli respect to ali 
maners and bsues that this Agreement addresses and wiii 
supersede mrd replace all other arrangements and 
agreements between the Panies with respect to those 
rnatters and issues, wiwiruout preiudice however to aw 
P the  partie^.^ 
Given the politicai nature of Aboriginal rîghts, an hterim border crossing 
agreement could echo some of the same purposes at the outset. Their Whereas clauses 
couid detail the history and note that the agreement is made in the spirit of partnership 
with Aboriginal peoples and that it is an mterhn step in the process to corne ta a h d  
soIution. With regard to identification of those Aboriginal people who by Nation or 
temtory have a right to EeeIy cross the border, Immigration and the AboriginaI group 
could agree to a unique card that wodd be issued by either party which is specinc to ody 
border crossing that could be both traced and venfied through documentation fÏIed in 
support of the card This infomation codd be heId by both parties or solely by the 
A b o r ï ~ d  organization, so Iong as the card nrmiber couid be matched with the name of 
*Agreement 6erweert DFO mdNBMC with Respect IO FiShenerres -1997-CA-M) 17. Dated 1997. 
an Aboriginal person with border crossing nghts. The issue of proof was addressed under 
the example AFS agreement as foIlows: 
54'1) ï7iefihing descn'bed in th& Schedule will be camed 
out bypersons who are designated in accordmice with thk 
Schedule tojkh. 
542) abject to tlzh subsectim. ail rnembers of the 
Aboriginal Organikation who have a rnembmship card are 
designated to fish. The AborigrnaZ ûrganhation muy 
designate additonalpersons as set out in subsection 7(1) 
of thtk Schedule. The Abon'grnal Organikation mayprepare 
a Iist of members of the AboriginaI OrganPation who have 
a rnembership card but who nevertheless are not 
designaed to e h .  Once the list is pruvided tu DFO 
pursuant to subseckion 7(3) of this Scheduie, the members 
of the First Nations whose names are on the iist are not 
designated to fish. 
X(3) A person fishing as set out iIr this Schedule will cany 
a NBAPC membership card or a designation card at ail 
times while engaged injkhing or any other activity 
r@med to in th& Scheduie. inchding the hantesting, 
tramportig and Ianding of@h and wiil present the 
NBAPC card or designution card to a DFO fishery oficer, 
a D F 0 f i h . y  gtiardian or an Abori*grnaC Fisherrerres 
Guardian on request. 
7.(1) Tire Aborigmal Organizmon wiil designate persom 
to fish &y issuing designation car& Each cmd wilC be 
personaC and non-tranrferabIe and win bear a mipie card 
molber und the name of the person designated. 
7.(3) Before thefiiring descrïbed in th& Schedde 
commences. the AboriGal ûrganizration willprovide to 
DFO a fikt of names of the mm6ms of the MBAPC who 
havel\rgAPCmembersliip cm& but who nevdeless are 
not ddgnated tom and a fi& of nmnes of alpersons 
desigrrated tom ptrrsuant to subsectr'on (1) together wt'th 
th& dmesIgnatrkn cmd number- 
744) The Abor(ginal Organization rnay amend the names 
and designation cmd numbers in the Iists refewed to in 
subsectiun (3)? 
The above represents an example of how some of the nghts issues codd be dealt 
with on an interim basis. The second part provides an option for dealing with 
identification issues at the border. The key to the hterim resolution of the border crossing 
issue, is not so much how the identification will look, but that a process is set up to deaI 
with the issue. Given that most passing problems have been with Canadian unmigration 
authonties, an interim solution involvuig the Canadian govemment is most pressing. But 
given that the issue concerns the Canada - United States border, tri-partite arrangements 
among Canada, United States and the Aboriginal Nations would be preferable. Thus 
wodd dso be appropriate as a modern day updating of the Jay Treaw process. Aboriginal 
Nations shouid be fidi signatories to whatever interim measmes are made. 
CONCLUSION: 
1 have concluded that there exists a strong argument for an Abonginal mobility 
right for the rnembers of the Wabanaki Codederacy to pass tkeely over the Canada and 
United States border. The J i  Treaty of 1794 is a source for the explicit recognition of 
such a right as contained in Amcle KU. AIthough some Iowa court decisions have 
decided against this treaty confefnng any rights, the coints in di those cases fded to do 
the propa analysis as mandateci by the tests set out by the Suprmie Court of Canada in 
Sparrow and V m  der Peet and Simon. As welI, the protections afforded mder section 
3x1) of the Constitution A a  1982, mandates a reconsideration of the pre-1982 cases 
which dismisseci the Jay Treaty as a valid Indian treaty. At a minimum, the promises 
made in the Jay Treaty and in the subsequent Erphnation Article shodd be protected in 
the same light as other Indian treaties in section 35(1).Tbe courts have stressed repeatedly 
the principles for large and liberal interpretations in favor of the Indians in the case of 
ambiguities or doubts. The fiduciary duty owed to the Aboriginal Nations of this country 
by the Crown, demands that these issues be dealt with so as to prevent any more harm to 
Aboriginal families and communities. 
The AbonginaI Nations which comprise the Eastern Indians, the Abenaki, the 
Wabanaki Codederacy or the Treaty signe= of the t7007s have Iived, hunted and 
traveled the area of OId Nova Scotia since time immemoriai. It is theu status as the First 
Peoples of Turtle Island (this continent), which entitles them to special protections under 
Canada's Constitution and the highest court in the country has recognized this fact. 
Nearly ail the AboripinaI Nations of this country are survivors of the devastating effects 
of contact; plaques, oppression, genocide, discrimination, abuse and a hoa of other 
tragedies. The dark winter which once covered Aboriginal people in theù traditionai 
tenitories has been Iifted and the nght for recognition of their Aboriginal and Treaty 
nghts continues with a aew to protecting the rights of their chUren, seven generations 
hto the htttre. The family is central to Aboriginal life and al1 the Nations of Turtie IsIand 
or North Amerka are family and as such often work together to effect their mutual rights. 
The Canada-US. border is symboIic of the division which have been imposed on ai l  
North Amerka hdigenous gronps. It is the h e  which M e s  our peopIe at the heart of 
om cnlture; orn f d e s .  Whder the right of fkee passage to travel the border is upheId 
as an intefnationaf treaty nght, and Abor@naI Treaty right, an Aboriginal right or as part 
of negotiated powers mder Aboriginal titie and land cIaims, it must be done now. This 
nght must be protected in order that Aboriginal families no longer have to M e r  as they 
have to date. The year 2000 should mean a new begiIining for Aboriginal people and the 
goverxunents of Canada owe a duty to Aboriginal people to facilitate this process legdiy 
and rnoraiiy. 
These treaty s igna of the Wabanaki Confederacy have Lived off the lands and the 
seas of this area h m  t h e  immemorial. They have a basic Aboriginal nght to sunive 
and adequately sustain themselves fiom their traditional occupations and go on thriving 
for generations to corne. They have sustained themselves Eiom the land and seas within 
their t d t o n e s  for thousands of years and the courts have held that Aboriginal rights are 
not fiozen in time and permit th& evoIution over time. Therefore, it is only naturai that 
they should recognize that the Wabanaki culture has evolved to such a stage where 
Canadian and American travel is a way to sustain themsehes and their famiües spinhialiy 
emotionally and cuItudIy and economicaIIy. This group has an Abonginai nght to cross 
the border fkeely. This right can easily be reconciled with sovereignty and the Crown's 
right to protact its borders by implementing a system of identification. This is the easiest 
way to both ident* rights hoIders while mterfering with the exercise of the right as iittle 
as possibIe. These rights shouid be guarmieed to rnembers of the Confederacy regardess 
of deIr citizenship as Americans or Canadians gîven their special reIationshÏp with the 
Crown, which is the same either way. 
These groups also have Indian trait. rights which impIicitiy guamtee fiee 
passage over the border in pdt of their traditiond activities as provided for in the 
Treaty of If52 and the Treaty of i72&'26. These treaties rights are pmtected tmder 
section 35(1) of the Constiuzion Act, 1982. The Merence between these nghts and 
Aboriginal rights, is that treaty rights should not have to go through the process of 
teconciliation, as the rights contained in the treaty are in themselves the result of the 
Crown reconciluig thek interests with the rights of Aboriginal people. Therefore, the 
rights should stand as they presently read in the treaty. This wodd also apply to the Joy 
Treaty shouId it fhally be interpreted as an Indian Treaty desenred of protection under 
section 35(1). 
Thus, not ody should ail the Aboriginal groups be included in any benefits 
received fiom treaties or rights adjudication, Iegislative participation or negotiations, but 
this shodd happen hedia te ly .  There is certainly no worry of a "flood gates" effect 
shouid a temporary exclusion be made for Aboriginal people in the 
legÏsIation, or a border agreement is negotiated and signed. The Aboriginal people in 
Canada comprise less than 3% of the population and those specific Aboriginal people in 
this area around the Wabanaki Confederacy here , wodd comprise even Iess of that 
population. The administration of nich border crossing activities wouid be no more 
difficult than the AFS agreements. A fom of identification that would be mutudy 
acceptable to both parties couId deviate concems on both sides of the border. Regardess 
of the effort that wiïI  be required to work out a solution, or the degree ofdifncdty or 
expense that Ït  will entail, the honor of the Crown demands that they live up to their 
fiduciary duty to the AboriginaI Nations of the Wabanaki Confederacy and work out a 
solution to assist these groups m thenright to fixe passage as promise so long aga 
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